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596 lines
17 KiB
596 lines
17 KiB
/* |
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* COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 |
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* The Regents of the University of Michigan |
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* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED |
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* |
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* Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works |
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* and redistribute this software and such derivative works |
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* for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of |
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* Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity |
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* pertaining to the use of distribution of this software |
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* without specific, written prior authorization. If the |
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* above copyright notice or any other identification of the |
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* University of Michigan is included in any copy of any |
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* portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must |
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* also be included. |
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* |
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION |
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* FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY |
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* PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF |
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* MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
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* WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE |
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* REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE |
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* FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR |
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING |
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN |
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* IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
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* SUCH DAMAGES. |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h> |
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#include <linux/types.h> |
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#include <linux/jiffies.h> |
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#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> |
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#include <linux/random.h> |
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#include <linux/pagemap.h> |
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|
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) |
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH |
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#endif |
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|
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static inline int |
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gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) |
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{ |
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return blocksize - (length % blocksize); |
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} |
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|
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static inline void |
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gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize) |
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{ |
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int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset); |
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char *p; |
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struct kvec *iov; |
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|
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if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len) |
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iov = &buf->tail[0]; |
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else |
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iov = &buf->head[0]; |
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p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len; |
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iov->iov_len += padding; |
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buf->len += padding; |
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memset(p, padding, padding); |
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} |
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|
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static inline int |
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gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize) |
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{ |
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u8 *ptr; |
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u8 pad; |
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size_t len = buf->len; |
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|
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if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) { |
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pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1); |
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if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad; |
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goto out; |
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} else |
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len -= buf->head[0].iov_len; |
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if (len <= buf->page_len) { |
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unsigned int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1) |
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>>PAGE_SHIFT; |
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unsigned int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1) |
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& (PAGE_SIZE - 1); |
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ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last]); |
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pad = *(ptr + offset); |
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kunmap_atomic(ptr); |
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goto out; |
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} else |
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len -= buf->page_len; |
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BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len); |
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pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1); |
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out: |
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/* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent |
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* a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need |
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* to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data. |
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* However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless. |
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* In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server |
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* also uses length and head length together to determine the original |
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* start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's |
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* easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem. |
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* It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and |
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* tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the |
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* server to attempt to parse the padding. |
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* XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism |
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* wrap/unwrap functions. */ |
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if (pad > blocksize) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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if (buf->len > pad) |
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buf->len -= pad; |
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else |
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return -EINVAL; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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void |
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gss_krb5_make_confounder(char *p, u32 conflen) |
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{ |
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static u64 i = 0; |
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u64 *q = (u64 *)p; |
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|
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/* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really |
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* necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in |
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* our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support |
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* rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt |
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* already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets |
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* I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring |
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* uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I |
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* don't care enough. */ |
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|
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/* initialize to random value */ |
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if (i == 0) { |
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i = get_random_u32(); |
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i = (i << 32) | get_random_u32(); |
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} |
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switch (conflen) { |
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case 16: |
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*q++ = i++; |
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fallthrough; |
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case 8: |
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*q++ = i++; |
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break; |
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default: |
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BUG(); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with. |
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* The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace |
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* them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */ |
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/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface, |
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* and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */ |
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|
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/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */ |
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|
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static u32 |
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gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, |
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struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) |
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{ |
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char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; |
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struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), |
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.data = cksumdata}; |
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int blocksize = 0, plainlen; |
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unsigned char *ptr, *msg_start; |
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time64_t now; |
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int headlen; |
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struct page **tmp_pages; |
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u32 seq_send; |
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u8 *cksumkey; |
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u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; |
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); |
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now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); |
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blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); |
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gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize); |
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BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize); |
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plainlen = conflen + buf->len - offset; |
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headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, |
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GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen) - |
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(buf->len - offset); |
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ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; |
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/* shift data to make room for header. */ |
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xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, headlen); |
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|
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/* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ |
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BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); |
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g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, |
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GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + |
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kctx->gk5e->cksumlength + plainlen, &ptr); |
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/* ptr now at header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ |
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ptr[0] = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff); |
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ptr[1] = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff); |
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msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; |
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|
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/* |
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* signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE |
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* to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according |
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* to the RFC. |
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*/ |
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*(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg); |
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*(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg); |
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ptr[6] = 0xff; |
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ptr[7] = 0xff; |
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gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen); |
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if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) |
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cksumkey = kctx->cksum; |
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else |
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cksumkey = NULL; |
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/* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ |
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tmp_pages = buf->pages; |
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buf->pages = pages; |
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if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - conflen, |
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cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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buf->pages = tmp_pages; |
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memcpy(ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); |
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seq_send = atomic_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send); |
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/* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum |
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* and encrypt at the same time: */ |
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if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx, kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, |
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seq_send, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8))) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, |
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offset + headlen - conflen, pages)) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; |
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} |
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static u32 |
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gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, |
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struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, |
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unsigned int *align) |
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{ |
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int signalg; |
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int sealalg; |
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char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; |
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struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata), |
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.data = cksumdata}; |
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time64_t now; |
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int direction; |
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s32 seqnum; |
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unsigned char *ptr; |
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int bodysize; |
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void *data_start, *orig_start; |
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int data_len; |
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int blocksize; |
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u32 conflen = kctx->gk5e->conflen; |
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int crypt_offset; |
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u8 *cksumkey; |
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unsigned int saved_len = buf->len; |
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dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); |
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ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; |
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if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, |
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len - offset)) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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if ((ptr[0] != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG >> 8) & 0xff)) || |
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(ptr[1] != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG & 0xff))) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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/* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ |
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/* get the sign and seal algorithms */ |
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signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); |
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if (signalg != kctx->gk5e->signalg) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8); |
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if (sealalg != kctx->gk5e->sealalg) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff)) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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/* |
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* Data starts after token header and checksum. ptr points |
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* to the beginning of the token header |
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*/ |
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crypt_offset = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) - |
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(unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base; |
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|
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buf->len = len; |
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if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, crypt_offset)) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum) |
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cksumkey = kctx->cksum; |
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else |
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cksumkey = NULL; |
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if (make_checksum(kctx, ptr, 8, buf, crypt_offset, |
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cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SEAL, &md5cksum)) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, |
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kctx->gk5e->cksumlength)) |
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return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; |
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/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ |
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now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); |
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if (now > kctx->endtime) |
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return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; |
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/* do sequencing checks */ |
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if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, |
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ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum)) |
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return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; |
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if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || |
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(!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) |
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return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; |
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|
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/* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be |
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* better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ |
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blocksize = crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); |
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data_start = ptr + (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength) + |
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conflen; |
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orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; |
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data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; |
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memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); |
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buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); |
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buf->len = len - (data_start - orig_start); |
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if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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|
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/* slack must include room for krb5 padding */ |
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*slack = XDR_QUADLEN(saved_len - buf->len); |
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/* The GSS blob always precedes the RPC message payload */ |
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*align = *slack; |
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return GSS_S_COMPLETE; |
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} |
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/* |
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* We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need |
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* to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports |
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* seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers |
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* with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass |
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* without using too much stack space. |
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* |
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* If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever |
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* algorithm. |
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*/ |
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#define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u |
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|
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static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) |
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{ |
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char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; |
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char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; |
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unsigned int this_len, i; |
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BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN); |
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read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift); |
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for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) { |
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this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift)); |
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read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len); |
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write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len); |
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} |
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write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift); |
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} |
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static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) |
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{ |
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int shifted = 0; |
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int this_shift; |
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shift %= buf->len; |
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while (shifted < shift) { |
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this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN); |
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rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift); |
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shifted += this_shift; |
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} |
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} |
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static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) |
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{ |
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struct xdr_buf subbuf; |
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|
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xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base); |
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_rotate_left(&subbuf, shift); |
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} |
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|
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static u32 |
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gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, |
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struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) |
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{ |
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u8 *ptr; |
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time64_t now; |
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u8 flags = 0x00; |
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__be16 *be16ptr; |
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__be64 *be64ptr; |
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u32 err; |
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|
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); |
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|
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if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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|
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/* make room for gss token header */ |
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if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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|
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/* construct gss token header */ |
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ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; |
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*ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff); |
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*ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff); |
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|
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if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) |
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR; |
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if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0) |
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY; |
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/* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */ |
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flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED; |
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|
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*ptr++ = flags; |
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*ptr++ = 0xff; |
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be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr; |
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|
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*be16ptr++ = 0; |
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/* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */ |
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*be16ptr++ = 0; |
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be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr; |
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*be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64)); |
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err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, pages); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); |
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return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; |
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} |
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|
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static u32 |
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gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, |
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struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, |
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unsigned int *align) |
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{ |
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time64_t now; |
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u8 *ptr; |
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u8 flags = 0x00; |
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u16 ec, rrc; |
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int err; |
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u32 headskip, tailskip; |
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u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN]; |
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unsigned int movelen; |
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dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); |
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|
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if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; |
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|
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if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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|
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flags = ptr[2]; |
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if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || |
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(kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) |
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return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; |
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|
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if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) { |
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dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__); |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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} |
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|
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if (ptr[3] != 0xff) |
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return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; |
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|
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ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4)); |
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rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6)); |
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|
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/* |
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* NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss |
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* doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203. |
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*/ |
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|
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if (rrc != 0) |
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rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); |
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|
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err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, len, buf, |
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&headskip, &tailskip); |
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if (err) |
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return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
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|
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/* |
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* Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify |
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* it against the original |
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*/ |
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err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, |
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len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, |
|
decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); |
|
if (err) { |
|
dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); |
|
return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
|
} |
|
if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6) |
|
|| memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) { |
|
dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__); |
|
return GSS_S_FAILURE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* do sequencing checks */ |
|
|
|
/* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ |
|
now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); |
|
if (now > kctx->endtime) |
|
return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf. |
|
* We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or |
|
* the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it. |
|
* Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available |
|
* head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. |
|
*/ |
|
movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); |
|
movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; |
|
BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > |
|
buf->head[0].iov_len); |
|
memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); |
|
buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; |
|
buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); |
|
|
|
/* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ |
|
xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); |
|
|
|
*align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); |
|
*slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); |
|
return GSS_S_COMPLETE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
u32 |
|
gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, |
|
struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) |
|
{ |
|
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; |
|
|
|
switch (kctx->enctype) { |
|
default: |
|
BUG(); |
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: |
|
case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: |
|
return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages); |
|
case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: |
|
case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: |
|
return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
u32 |
|
gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, |
|
int len, struct xdr_buf *buf) |
|
{ |
|
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = gctx->internal_ctx_id; |
|
|
|
switch (kctx->enctype) { |
|
default: |
|
BUG(); |
|
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW: |
|
case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW: |
|
return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, len, buf, |
|
&gctx->slack, &gctx->align); |
|
case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: |
|
case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96: |
|
return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, len, buf, |
|
&gctx->slack, &gctx->align); |
|
} |
|
}
|
|
|