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1912 lines
49 KiB
1912 lines
49 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
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/* |
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* AppArmor security module |
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* |
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* This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
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* |
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
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* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
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#include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> |
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#include <linux/mman.h> |
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#include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/namei.h> |
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#include <linux/ptrace.h> |
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#include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/sysctl.h> |
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#include <linux/audit.h> |
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
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#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
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#include <linux/zlib.h> |
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#include <net/sock.h> |
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#include <uapi/linux/mount.h> |
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#include "include/apparmor.h" |
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#include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
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#include "include/audit.h" |
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#include "include/capability.h" |
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#include "include/cred.h" |
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#include "include/file.h" |
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#include "include/ipc.h" |
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#include "include/net.h" |
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#include "include/path.h" |
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#include "include/label.h" |
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#include "include/policy.h" |
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#include "include/policy_ns.h" |
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#include "include/procattr.h" |
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#include "include/mount.h" |
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#include "include/secid.h" |
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/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
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int apparmor_initialized; |
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union aa_buffer { |
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struct list_head list; |
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char buffer[1]; |
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}; |
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#define RESERVE_COUNT 2 |
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static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; |
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static int buffer_count; |
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static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); |
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); |
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/* |
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* LSM hook functions |
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*/ |
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/* |
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* put the associated labels |
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*/ |
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static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
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{ |
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aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); |
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set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
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} |
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/* |
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* allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
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*/ |
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static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
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{ |
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set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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/* |
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* prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block |
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*/ |
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static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
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gfp_t gfp) |
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{ |
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set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
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*/ |
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static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
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{ |
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set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); |
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} |
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static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) |
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{ |
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aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, |
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unsigned long clone_flags) |
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{ |
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struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); |
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aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
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unsigned int mode) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
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int error; |
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tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); |
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error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, |
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(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ |
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: AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
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aa_put_label(tracee); |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); |
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return error; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
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int error; |
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tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); |
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error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
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aa_put_label(tracer); |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); |
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return error; |
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} |
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/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
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static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
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kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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const struct cred *cred; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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cred = __task_cred(target); |
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
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/* |
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* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will |
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* initialize effective and permitted. |
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*/ |
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if (!unconfined(label)) { |
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struct aa_profile *profile; |
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struct label_it i; |
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label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { |
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if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) |
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continue; |
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*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, |
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profile->caps.allow); |
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*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, |
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profile->caps.allow); |
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} |
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} |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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aa_put_label(label); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
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int cap, unsigned int opts) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) |
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error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); |
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aa_put_label(label); |
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return error; |
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} |
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/** |
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* common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
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* @op: operation being checked |
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* @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
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* @mask: requested permissions mask |
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
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* |
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
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*/ |
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static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, |
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struct path_cond *cond) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) |
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error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond); |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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return error; |
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} |
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/** |
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* common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond |
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* @op: operation being checked |
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* @path: location to check (NOT NULL) |
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* @mask: requested permissions mask |
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* |
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
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*/ |
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static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt); |
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struct path_cond cond = { |
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i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(path->dentry)), |
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d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode |
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}; |
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if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond); |
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} |
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/** |
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* common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
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* @op: operation being checked |
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* @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
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* @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
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* @mask: requested permissions mask |
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
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* |
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
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*/ |
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static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
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struct path_cond *cond) |
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{ |
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struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; |
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return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); |
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} |
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/** |
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* common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
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* @op: operation being checked |
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* @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
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* @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
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* @mask: requested permission mask |
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* |
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
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*/ |
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static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
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{ |
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struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(dir->mnt); |
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struct path_cond cond = { }; |
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if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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cond.uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); |
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cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
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} |
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/** |
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* common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
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* @op: operation being checked |
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* @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
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* @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
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* @mask: request permission mask |
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* @mode: created file mode |
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* |
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
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*/ |
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static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
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{ |
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struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
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if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
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umode_t mode) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
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S_IFDIR); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
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umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
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const char *old_name) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
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S_IFLNK); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, |
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struct dentry *new_dentry) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) |
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error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); |
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end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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return error; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
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const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) { |
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(old_dir->mnt); |
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struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, |
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.dentry = old_dentry }; |
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struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, |
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.dentry = new_dentry }; |
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struct path_cond cond = { |
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i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)), |
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d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode |
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}; |
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0, |
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MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | |
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AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
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&cond); |
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if (!error) |
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path, |
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0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | |
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AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); |
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} |
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end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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return error; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) |
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{ |
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return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) |
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{ |
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struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
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* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
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* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
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* actually execute the image. |
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*/ |
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if (current->in_execve) { |
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fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) { |
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struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(file); |
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
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struct path_cond cond = { |
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i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), |
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inode->i_mode |
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}; |
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0, |
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aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); |
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/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
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fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
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} |
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aa_put_label(label); |
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return error; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
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{ |
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struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
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struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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|
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spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); |
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rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); |
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end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
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{ |
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struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
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|
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if (ctx) |
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aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); |
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} |
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static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, |
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bool in_atomic) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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|
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/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ |
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if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) |
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return -EACCES; |
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label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask, in_atomic); |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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|
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return error; |
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} |
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static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) |
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{ |
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return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), |
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false); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
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{ |
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return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, false); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
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{ |
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u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
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|
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if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
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mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
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|
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return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, false); |
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} |
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|
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static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
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unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic) |
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{ |
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int mask = 0; |
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|
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if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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if (prot & PROT_READ) |
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mask |= MAY_READ; |
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/* |
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* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
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* write back to the files |
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*/ |
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if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
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mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
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mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
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|
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return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic); |
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} |
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static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
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{ |
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return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC); |
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} |
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|
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static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
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unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
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{ |
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return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, |
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!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0, |
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false); |
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} |
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|
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static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, |
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const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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|
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/* Discard magic */ |
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if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) |
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flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; |
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|
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flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; |
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|
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label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) { |
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if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
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error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); |
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else if (flags & MS_BIND) |
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error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); |
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else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | |
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MS_UNBINDABLE)) |
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error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); |
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else if (flags & MS_MOVE) |
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error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); |
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else |
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error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, |
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flags, data); |
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} |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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|
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return error; |
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} |
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|
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static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
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{ |
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struct aa_label *label; |
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int error = 0; |
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|
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label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
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if (!unconfined(label)) |
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error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); |
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__end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
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|
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return error; |
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} |
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|
|
static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, |
|
const struct path *new_path) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label; |
|
int error = 0; |
|
|
|
label = aa_get_current_label(); |
|
if (!unconfined(label)) |
|
error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); |
|
aa_put_label(label); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, |
|
char **value) |
|
{ |
|
int error = -ENOENT; |
|
/* released below */ |
|
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
|
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); |
|
struct aa_label *label = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) |
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); |
|
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) |
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); |
|
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) |
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); |
|
else |
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if (label) |
|
error = aa_getprocattr(label, value); |
|
|
|
aa_put_label(label); |
|
put_cred(cred); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, |
|
size_t size) |
|
{ |
|
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; |
|
size_t arg_size; |
|
int error; |
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR); |
|
|
|
if (size == 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ |
|
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
|
/* null terminate */ |
|
largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!args) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
memcpy(args, value, size); |
|
args[size] = '\0'; |
|
} |
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
args = strim(args); |
|
command = strsep(&args, " "); |
|
if (!args) |
|
goto out; |
|
args = skip_spaces(args); |
|
if (!*args) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); |
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { |
|
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { |
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
|
AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { |
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, |
|
AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { |
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { |
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) { |
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); |
|
} else |
|
goto fail; |
|
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { |
|
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) |
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); |
|
else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) |
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | |
|
AA_CHANGE_STACK)); |
|
else |
|
goto fail; |
|
} else |
|
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
|
goto fail; |
|
|
|
if (!error) |
|
error = size; |
|
out: |
|
kfree(largs); |
|
return error; |
|
|
|
fail: |
|
aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
|
aad(&sa)->info = name; |
|
aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL; |
|
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); |
|
end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds |
|
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
|
*/ |
|
static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); |
|
struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred); |
|
|
|
/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ |
|
if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || |
|
(unconfined(new_label))) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
|
|
|
current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
|
|
|
/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ |
|
__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed |
|
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
|
*/ |
|
static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
|
{ |
|
/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ |
|
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); |
|
|
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); |
|
*secid = label->secid; |
|
aa_put_label(label); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
|
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
|
int error = 0; |
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(label)) |
|
error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim); |
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, |
|
int sig, const struct cred *cred) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *cl, *tl; |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
if (cred) { |
|
/* |
|
* Dealing with USB IO specific behavior |
|
*/ |
|
cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
|
tl = aa_get_task_label(target); |
|
error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); |
|
aa_put_label(cl); |
|
aa_put_label(tl); |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
|
tl = aa_get_task_label(target); |
|
error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); |
|
aa_put_label(tl); |
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(cl); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
|
|
|
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); |
|
if (!ctx) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
|
|
SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field |
|
*/ |
|
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
|
|
SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; |
|
aa_put_label(ctx->label); |
|
aa_put_label(ctx->peer); |
|
kfree(ctx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field |
|
*/ |
|
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, |
|
struct sock *newsk) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); |
|
|
|
if (new->label) |
|
aa_put_label(new->label); |
|
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); |
|
|
|
if (new->peer) |
|
aa_put_label(new->peer); |
|
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label; |
|
int error = 0; |
|
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
|
if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) |
|
error = af_select(family, |
|
create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), |
|
aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
|
family, type, protocol)); |
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct |
|
* |
|
* Note: |
|
* - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to |
|
* move to a special kernel label |
|
* - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or |
|
* sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in |
|
* sock_graft. |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
|
int type, int protocol, int kern) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_label *label; |
|
|
|
if (kern) { |
|
struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); |
|
|
|
label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); |
|
aa_put_ns(ns); |
|
} else |
|
label = aa_get_current_label(); |
|
|
|
if (sock->sk) { |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); |
|
|
|
aa_put_label(ctx->label); |
|
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); |
|
} |
|
aa_put_label(label); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, |
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(!address); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, |
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(!address); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
listen_perm(sock, backlog), |
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. |
|
* |
|
* Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept |
|
* has not been done. |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(!newsock); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
accept_perm(sock, newsock), |
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(!msg); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), |
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, |
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, |
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ |
|
static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
sock_perm(op, request, sock), |
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ |
|
static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
|
int level, int optname) |
|
{ |
|
AA_BUG(!sock); |
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
|
opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), |
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
|
int optname) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, |
|
level, optname); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
|
int optname) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, |
|
level, optname); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
|
{ |
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk |
|
* |
|
* Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held |
|
* |
|
* dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() |
|
* to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, |
|
skb->secmark, sk); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
|
|
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
|
|
if (ctx->peer) |
|
return ctx->peer; |
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer |
|
* |
|
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, |
|
char __user *optval, |
|
int __user *optlen, |
|
unsigned int len) |
|
{ |
|
char *name; |
|
int slen, error = 0; |
|
struct aa_label *label; |
|
struct aa_label *peer; |
|
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
|
peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); |
|
if (IS_ERR(peer)) { |
|
error = PTR_ERR(peer); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, |
|
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | |
|
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ |
|
if (slen < 0) { |
|
error = -ENOMEM; |
|
} else { |
|
if (slen > len) { |
|
error = -ERANGE; |
|
} else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { |
|
error = -EFAULT; |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
if (put_user(slen, optlen)) |
|
error = -EFAULT; |
|
out: |
|
kfree(name); |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
done: |
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet |
|
* @sock: the peer socket |
|
* @skb: packet data |
|
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet |
|
* |
|
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent |
|
*/ |
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
|
|
|
{ |
|
/* TODO: requires secid support */ |
|
return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket |
|
* @sk: child sock |
|
* @parent: parent socket |
|
* |
|
* Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can |
|
* just set sk security information off of current creating process label |
|
* Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based |
|
* instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled |
|
* socket is shared by different tasks. |
|
*/ |
|
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
|
|
if (!ctx->label) |
|
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
|
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
|
struct request_sock *req) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, |
|
skb->secmark, sk); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx. |
|
*/ |
|
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
|
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), |
|
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), |
|
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), |
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), |
|
#endif |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, |
|
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
|
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), |
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free), |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), |
|
}; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool |
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
|
.set = param_set_aabool, |
|
.get = param_get_aabool |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint |
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
|
.set = param_set_aauint, |
|
.get = param_get_aauint |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
|
const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
|
const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int |
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = { |
|
.set = param_set_aacompressionlevel, |
|
.get = param_get_aacompressionlevel |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool |
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
|
.set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
|
.get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
|
|
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
|
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
|
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
|
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
|
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ |
|
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); |
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH |
|
module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* policy loaddata compression level */ |
|
int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION; |
|
module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
|
aacompressionlevel, 0400); |
|
|
|
/* Debug mode */ |
|
bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); |
|
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* Audit mode */ |
|
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
|
module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
|
&aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
|
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
|
*/ |
|
bool aa_g_audit_header = true; |
|
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* lock out loading/removal of policy |
|
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
|
* load policy, if lock_policy is set |
|
*/ |
|
bool aa_g_lock_policy; |
|
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* Syscall logging mode */ |
|
bool aa_g_logsyscall; |
|
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
|
|
|
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
|
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
|
module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); |
|
|
|
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
|
* on the loaded policy is done. |
|
* DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now |
|
* that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. |
|
*/ |
|
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; |
|
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); |
|
|
|
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
|
#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int |
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = { |
|
.set = param_set_aaintbool, |
|
.get = param_get_aaintbool |
|
}; |
|
/* Boot time disable flag */ |
|
static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1; |
|
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444); |
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long enabled; |
|
int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); |
|
if (!error) |
|
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); |
|
|
|
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
/* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ |
|
if (apparmor_initialized) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
error = param_set_uint(val, kp); |
|
aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer)); |
|
pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */ |
|
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
struct kernel_param kp_local; |
|
bool value; |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
|
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
|
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
|
kp_local.arg = &value; |
|
|
|
error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local); |
|
if (!error) |
|
*((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg); |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to |
|
* 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for |
|
* display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM |
|
* infrastructure. |
|
*/ |
|
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
struct kernel_param kp_local; |
|
bool value; |
|
|
|
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
|
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
|
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
|
kp_local.arg = &value; |
|
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
|
const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
error = param_set_int(val, kp); |
|
|
|
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
|
Z_NO_COMPRESSION, |
|
Z_BEST_COMPRESSION); |
|
pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %u\n", |
|
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
|
const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return param_get_int(buffer, kp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (!val) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val); |
|
if (i < 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
aa_g_audit = i; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (!val) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, |
|
val); |
|
if (i < 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) |
|
{ |
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
|
bool try_again = true; |
|
gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
|
|
|
retry: |
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
if (buffer_count > reserve_count || |
|
(in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) { |
|
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
|
list); |
|
list_del(&aa_buf->list); |
|
buffer_count--; |
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; |
|
} |
|
if (in_atomic) { |
|
/* |
|
* out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase |
|
* how many buffers to keep in reserve |
|
*/ |
|
reserve_count++; |
|
flags = GFP_ATOMIC; |
|
} |
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
|
|
if (!in_atomic) |
|
might_sleep(); |
|
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags); |
|
if (!aa_buf) { |
|
if (try_again) { |
|
try_again = false; |
|
goto retry; |
|
} |
|
pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n"); |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) |
|
{ |
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
|
|
|
if (!buf) |
|
return; |
|
aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); |
|
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); |
|
buffer_count++; |
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* AppArmor init functions |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
|
* |
|
* TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
|
*/ |
|
static int __init set_init_ctx(void) |
|
{ |
|
struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
|
|
|
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void destroy_buffers(void) |
|
{ |
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
|
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) { |
|
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
|
list); |
|
list_del(&aa_buf->list); |
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
kfree(aa_buf); |
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
} |
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init alloc_buffers(void) |
|
{ |
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
|
int i, num; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are |
|
* used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers |
|
* two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more |
|
* buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. |
|
* This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be |
|
* disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. |
|
*/ |
|
if (num_online_cpus() > 1) |
|
num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
|
else |
|
num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
|
|
|
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL | |
|
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
|
if (!aa_buf) { |
|
destroy_buffers(); |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
} |
|
aa_put_buffer(&aa_buf->buffer[0]); |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL |
|
static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
|
{ |
|
if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = { |
|
{ .procname = "kernel", }, |
|
{ } |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { |
|
{ |
|
.procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", |
|
.data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, |
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int), |
|
.mode = 0600, |
|
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, |
|
}, |
|
{ } |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
|
{ |
|
return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path, |
|
apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; |
|
} |
|
#else |
|
static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
|
{ |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) |
|
static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb, |
|
const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
|
{ |
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
|
struct sock *sk; |
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark) |
|
return NF_ACCEPT; |
|
|
|
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); |
|
if (sk == NULL) |
|
return NF_ACCEPT; |
|
|
|
ctx = SK_CTX(sk); |
|
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, |
|
skb->secmark, sk)) |
|
return NF_ACCEPT; |
|
|
|
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb, |
|
const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
|
{ |
|
return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) |
|
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb, |
|
const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
|
{ |
|
return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { |
|
{ |
|
.hook = apparmor_ipv4_postroute, |
|
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
|
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
|
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
|
}, |
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) |
|
{ |
|
.hook = apparmor_ipv6_postroute, |
|
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
|
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
|
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
|
}, |
|
#endif |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) |
|
{ |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, |
|
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) |
|
{ |
|
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, |
|
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = { |
|
.init = apparmor_nf_register, |
|
.exit = apparmor_nf_unregister, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) |
|
{ |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops); |
|
if (err) |
|
panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
|
{ |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
aa_secids_init(); |
|
|
|
error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); |
|
if (error) { |
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); |
|
goto alloc_out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
|
if (error) { |
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); |
|
goto alloc_out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); |
|
if (error) { |
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n"); |
|
goto alloc_out; |
|
|
|
} |
|
|
|
error = alloc_buffers(); |
|
if (error) { |
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n"); |
|
goto alloc_out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
error = set_init_ctx(); |
|
if (error) { |
|
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); |
|
aa_free_root_ns(); |
|
goto buffers_out; |
|
} |
|
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), |
|
"apparmor"); |
|
|
|
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
|
apparmor_initialized = 1; |
|
if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); |
|
else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); |
|
else |
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); |
|
|
|
return error; |
|
|
|
buffers_out: |
|
destroy_buffers(); |
|
alloc_out: |
|
aa_destroy_aafs(); |
|
aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); |
|
|
|
apparmor_enabled = false; |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { |
|
.name = "apparmor", |
|
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, |
|
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled, |
|
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, |
|
.init = apparmor_init, |
|
};
|
|
|