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2697 lines
63 KiB
2697 lines
63 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
|
/* |
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* linux/kernel/sys.c |
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* |
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> |
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#include <linux/utsname.h> |
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#include <linux/mman.h> |
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#include <linux/reboot.h> |
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#include <linux/prctl.h> |
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#include <linux/highuid.h> |
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#include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/kmod.h> |
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#include <linux/perf_event.h> |
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#include <linux/resource.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/workqueue.h> |
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#include <linux/capability.h> |
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#include <linux/device.h> |
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#include <linux/key.h> |
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#include <linux/times.h> |
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#include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
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#include <linux/security.h> |
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#include <linux/suspend.h> |
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#include <linux/tty.h> |
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#include <linux/signal.h> |
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
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#include <linux/getcpu.h> |
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#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/seccomp.h> |
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#include <linux/cpu.h> |
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#include <linux/personality.h> |
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#include <linux/ptrace.h> |
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
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#include <linux/file.h> |
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#include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/gfp.h> |
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#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/version.h> |
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#include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/compat.h> |
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#include <linux/syscalls.h> |
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#include <linux/kprobes.h> |
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/time_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/sched.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/stat.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/coredump.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/task.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/cputime.h> |
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
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#include <linux/uidgid.h> |
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#include <linux/cred.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/nospec.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
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/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ |
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#include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/uaccess.h> |
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#include <asm/io.h> |
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#include <asm/unistd.h> |
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|
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#include "uid16.h" |
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|
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#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
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# define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
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# define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
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# define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
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# define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_FP_MODE |
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# define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_FP_MODE |
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# define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SVE_SET_VL |
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# define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SVE_GET_VL |
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# define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS |
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# define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS |
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# define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS |
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# define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
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# define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
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# define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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|
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/* |
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* this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
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* architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
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*/ |
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int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
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int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
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|
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
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|
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/* |
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* the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
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* UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
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*/ |
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int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
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int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID; |
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|
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
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|
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/* |
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* Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, |
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* or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. |
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* |
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* Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe |
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*/ |
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static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) |
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{ |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
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|
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if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || |
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uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
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return true; |
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if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
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return true; |
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return false; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* set the priority of a task |
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* - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
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*/ |
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static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
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{ |
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int no_nice; |
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|
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if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
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error = -EPERM; |
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goto out; |
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} |
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if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
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error = -EACCES; |
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goto out; |
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} |
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no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); |
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if (no_nice) { |
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error = no_nice; |
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goto out; |
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} |
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if (error == -ESRCH) |
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error = 0; |
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set_user_nice(p, niceval); |
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out: |
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return error; |
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} |
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|
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
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{ |
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struct task_struct *g, *p; |
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struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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int error = -EINVAL; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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goto out; |
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|
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/* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
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error = -ESRCH; |
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if (niceval < MIN_NICE) |
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niceval = MIN_NICE; |
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if (niceval > MAX_NICE) |
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niceval = MAX_NICE; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
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switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: |
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if (who) |
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p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
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else |
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p = current; |
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if (p) |
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error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
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break; |
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case PRIO_PGRP: |
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if (who) |
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pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
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else |
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pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
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do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
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error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
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} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
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break; |
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case PRIO_USER: |
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uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
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user = cred->user; |
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if (!who) |
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uid = cred->uid; |
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else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { |
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user = find_user(uid); |
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if (!user) |
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goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
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} |
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do_each_thread(g, p) { |
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if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) |
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error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
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} while_each_thread(g, p); |
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if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
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free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
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break; |
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} |
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out_unlock: |
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read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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out: |
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return error; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
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* not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
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* has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
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* to stay compatible. |
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*/ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
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{ |
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struct task_struct *g, *p; |
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struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
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switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: |
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if (who) |
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p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
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else |
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p = current; |
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if (p) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) |
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retval = niceval; |
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} |
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break; |
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case PRIO_PGRP: |
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if (who) |
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pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
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else |
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pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
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do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) |
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retval = niceval; |
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} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
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break; |
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case PRIO_USER: |
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uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
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user = cred->user; |
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if (!who) |
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uid = cred->uid; |
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else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { |
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user = find_user(uid); |
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if (!user) |
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goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
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} |
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do_each_thread(g, p) { |
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if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) |
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retval = niceval; |
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} |
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} while_each_thread(g, p); |
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if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
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free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
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break; |
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} |
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out_unlock: |
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read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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|
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return retval; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
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* or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
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* |
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* If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
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* equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
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* |
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* This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
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* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
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* a security audit over a program. |
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* |
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* The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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* |
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* SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
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* operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
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*/ |
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#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER |
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long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; |
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struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t krgid, kegid; |
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|
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krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
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kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
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|
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if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
|
|
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new = prepare_creds(); |
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if (!new) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
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old = current_cred(); |
|
|
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || |
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gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
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ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
|
new->gid = krgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
|
} |
|
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
|
if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || |
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gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || |
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gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
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ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->egid = kegid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
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(egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
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new->sgid = new->egid; |
|
new->fsgid = new->egid; |
|
|
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retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid); |
|
} |
|
|
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/* |
|
* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
|
* |
|
* SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) |
|
{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
int retval; |
|
kgid_t kgid; |
|
|
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kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); |
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if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
|
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retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
|
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
|
else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) |
|
new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
|
else |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setgid(gid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
|
*/ |
|
static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
|
{ |
|
struct user_struct *new_user; |
|
|
|
new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
|
if (!new_user) |
|
return -EAGAIN; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many |
|
* poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming |
|
* it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit |
|
* for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the |
|
* failure to the execve() stage. |
|
*/ |
|
if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && |
|
new_user != INIT_USER && |
|
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
|
current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
|
else |
|
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
|
|
|
free_uid(new->user); |
|
new->user = new_user; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
|
* or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
|
* |
|
* If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
|
* equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
|
* |
|
* This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
|
* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
|
* a security audit over a program. |
|
* |
|
* The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
|
* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
|
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) |
|
{ |
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
int retval; |
|
kuid_t kruid, keuid; |
|
|
|
kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
|
keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
|
|
|
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
|
new->uid = kruid; |
|
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && |
|
!uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
|
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
|
new->euid = keuid; |
|
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && |
|
!uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && |
|
!uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
|
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
|
retval = set_user(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
|
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
|
new->suid = new->euid; |
|
new->fsuid = new->euid; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
|
* |
|
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
|
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
|
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
|
* the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
|
* in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
|
* will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
|
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) |
|
{ |
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
int retval; |
|
kuid_t kuid; |
|
|
|
kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); |
|
if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
|
new->suid = new->uid = kuid; |
|
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
|
retval = set_user(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
} else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setuid(uid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
/* |
|
* This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
|
* and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) |
|
{ |
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
int retval; |
|
kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; |
|
|
|
kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
|
keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
|
ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); |
|
|
|
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
|
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && |
|
!uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && |
|
!uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && |
|
!uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
|
new->uid = kruid; |
|
if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
|
retval = set_user(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
|
new->euid = keuid; |
|
if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
|
new->suid = ksuid; |
|
new->fsuid = new->euid; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
|
{ |
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
|
int retval; |
|
uid_t ruid, euid, suid; |
|
|
|
ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); |
|
euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); |
|
suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
|
|
|
retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); |
|
if (!retval) { |
|
retval = put_user(euid, euidp); |
|
if (!retval) |
|
return put_user(suid, suidp); |
|
} |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) |
|
{ |
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
int retval; |
|
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; |
|
|
|
krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
|
kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
|
ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); |
|
|
|
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && |
|
!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && |
|
!gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && |
|
!gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
|
goto error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
|
new->gid = krgid; |
|
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
|
new->egid = kegid; |
|
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
|
new->sgid = ksgid; |
|
new->fsgid = new->egid; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
|
if (retval < 0) |
|
goto error; |
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new); |
|
|
|
error: |
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
|
{ |
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
|
int retval; |
|
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; |
|
|
|
rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); |
|
egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); |
|
sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
|
|
|
retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); |
|
if (!retval) { |
|
retval = put_user(egid, egidp); |
|
if (!retval) |
|
retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
/* |
|
* "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
|
* is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
|
* whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
|
* explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) |
|
{ |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
uid_t old_fsuid; |
|
kuid_t kuid; |
|
|
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); |
|
|
|
kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); |
|
if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
|
return old_fsuid; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return old_fsuid; |
|
|
|
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || |
|
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
|
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { |
|
new->fsuid = kuid; |
|
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
|
goto change_okay; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return old_fsuid; |
|
|
|
change_okay: |
|
commit_creds(new); |
|
return old_fsuid; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setfsuid(uid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Samma på svenska.. |
|
*/ |
|
long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) |
|
{ |
|
const struct cred *old; |
|
struct cred *new; |
|
gid_t old_fsgid; |
|
kgid_t kgid; |
|
|
|
old = current_cred(); |
|
old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); |
|
|
|
kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); |
|
if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
|
return old_fsgid; |
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds(); |
|
if (!new) |
|
return old_fsgid; |
|
|
|
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || |
|
gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
|
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { |
|
new->fsgid = kgid; |
|
if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
|
goto change_okay; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
abort_creds(new); |
|
return old_fsgid; |
|
|
|
change_okay: |
|
commit_creds(new); |
|
return old_fsgid; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
|
{ |
|
return __sys_setfsgid(gid); |
|
} |
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process |
|
* |
|
* Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and |
|
* the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in |
|
* which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. |
|
* |
|
* This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) |
|
{ |
|
return task_tgid_vnr(current); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) |
|
{ |
|
return task_pid_vnr(current); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could |
|
* change from under us. However, we can use a stale |
|
* value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see |
|
* release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) |
|
{ |
|
int pid; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
|
|
return pid; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) |
|
{ |
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
|
return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) |
|
{ |
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
|
return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) |
|
{ |
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
|
return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) |
|
{ |
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
|
return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
|
{ |
|
u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
|
|
|
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
|
cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
|
cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
|
tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime); |
|
tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime); |
|
tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime); |
|
tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
|
{ |
|
if (tbuf) { |
|
struct tms tmp; |
|
|
|
do_sys_times(&tmp); |
|
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
} |
|
force_successful_syscall_return(); |
|
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
|
static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x) |
|
{ |
|
return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf) |
|
{ |
|
if (tbuf) { |
|
struct tms tms; |
|
struct compat_tms tmp; |
|
|
|
do_sys_times(&tms); |
|
/* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */ |
|
tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime); |
|
tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime); |
|
tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime); |
|
tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime); |
|
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
} |
|
force_successful_syscall_return(); |
|
return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* This needs some heavy checking ... |
|
* I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
|
* understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
|
* |
|
* OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
|
* only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
|
* can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
|
* |
|
* !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *p; |
|
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
|
struct pid *pgrp; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
if (!pid) |
|
pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
|
if (!pgid) |
|
pgid = pid; |
|
if (pgid < 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
|
|
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
|
* so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
|
*/ |
|
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
|
|
|
err = -ESRCH; |
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
|
if (!p) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL; |
|
if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
|
err = -EPERM; |
|
if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
|
goto out; |
|
err = -EACCES; |
|
if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
|
goto out; |
|
} else { |
|
err = -ESRCH; |
|
if (p != group_leader) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = -EPERM; |
|
if (p->signal->leader) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
pgrp = task_pid(p); |
|
if (pgid != pid) { |
|
struct task_struct *g; |
|
|
|
pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); |
|
g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
|
if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
|
if (err) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
|
change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
|
|
|
err = 0; |
|
out: |
|
/* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
|
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *p; |
|
struct pid *grp; |
|
int retval; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
if (!pid) |
|
grp = task_pgrp(current); |
|
else { |
|
retval = -ESRCH; |
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
|
if (!p) |
|
goto out; |
|
grp = task_pgrp(p); |
|
if (!grp) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
|
if (retval) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
retval = pid_vnr(grp); |
|
out: |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
|
{ |
|
return do_getpgid(pid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
|
{ |
|
return do_getpgid(0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *p; |
|
struct pid *sid; |
|
int retval; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
if (!pid) |
|
sid = task_session(current); |
|
else { |
|
retval = -ESRCH; |
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
|
if (!p) |
|
goto out; |
|
sid = task_session(p); |
|
if (!sid) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
|
if (retval) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
retval = pid_vnr(sid); |
|
out: |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; |
|
|
|
if (task_session(curr) != pid) |
|
change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); |
|
|
|
if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) |
|
change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ksys_setsid(void) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
|
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); |
|
pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
|
int err = -EPERM; |
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
|
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
|
if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
|
* proposed session id. |
|
*/ |
|
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
|
set_special_pids(sid); |
|
|
|
proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
|
|
|
err = session; |
|
out: |
|
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
|
if (err > 0) { |
|
proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
|
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); |
|
} |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
|
{ |
|
return ksys_setsid(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE |
|
#define override_architecture(name) \ |
|
(personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
|
copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ |
|
sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) |
|
#else |
|
#define override_architecture(name) 0 |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". |
|
* Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
|
* And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be |
|
* 2.6.60. |
|
*/ |
|
static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
|
{ |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
|
|
if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
|
const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; |
|
char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
|
int ndots = 0; |
|
unsigned v; |
|
size_t copy; |
|
|
|
while (*rest) { |
|
if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) |
|
break; |
|
if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') |
|
break; |
|
rest++; |
|
} |
|
v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60; |
|
copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
|
copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); |
|
ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
|
} |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
|
{ |
|
struct new_utsname tmp; |
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem); |
|
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
|
up_read(&uts_sem); |
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
if (override_architecture(name)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME |
|
/* |
|
* Old cruft |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) |
|
{ |
|
struct old_utsname tmp; |
|
|
|
if (!name) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem); |
|
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
|
up_read(&uts_sem); |
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
if (override_architecture(name)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) |
|
{ |
|
struct oldold_utsname tmp; |
|
|
|
if (!name) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem); |
|
memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
|
memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
|
memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
|
memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
|
memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
|
up_read(&uts_sem); |
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
if (override_architecture(name)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
|
{ |
|
int errno; |
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
errno = -EFAULT; |
|
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
|
struct new_utsname *u; |
|
|
|
down_write(&uts_sem); |
|
u = utsname(); |
|
memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); |
|
memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
|
errno = 0; |
|
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
|
up_write(&uts_sem); |
|
} |
|
return errno; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
struct new_utsname *u; |
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1]; |
|
|
|
if (len < 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
down_read(&uts_sem); |
|
u = utsname(); |
|
i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
|
if (i > len) |
|
i = len; |
|
memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i); |
|
up_read(&uts_sem); |
|
if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling |
|
* uname() |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
|
{ |
|
int errno; |
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
errno = -EFAULT; |
|
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
|
struct new_utsname *u; |
|
|
|
down_write(&uts_sem); |
|
u = utsname(); |
|
memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); |
|
memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
|
errno = 0; |
|
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
|
up_write(&uts_sem); |
|
} |
|
return errno; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit value; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); |
|
if (!ret) |
|
ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit r; |
|
struct compat_rlimit r32; |
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur; |
|
if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max; |
|
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit r; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r); |
|
if (!ret) { |
|
struct compat_rlimit r32; |
|
if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur; |
|
if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max; |
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
} |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. |
|
*/ |
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
|
struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit x; |
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
|
task_lock(current->group_leader); |
|
x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
|
task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
|
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
|
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
|
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
|
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
|
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit r; |
|
|
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
|
task_lock(current->group_leader); |
|
r = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
|
task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
|
if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
|
r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
|
if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
|
r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
|
|
|
if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) || |
|
put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) |
|
{ |
|
#if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 |
|
return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; |
|
#else |
|
return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; |
|
#endif |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) |
|
{ |
|
if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; |
|
if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) |
|
rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) |
|
{ |
|
if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) |
|
rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; |
|
if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) |
|
rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
|
else |
|
rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
|
int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, |
|
struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit *rlim; |
|
int retval = 0; |
|
|
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (new_rlim) { |
|
if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && |
|
new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ |
|
read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
|
if (!tsk->sighand) { |
|
retval = -ESRCH; |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
|
task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
|
if (new_rlim) { |
|
/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until |
|
cgroups can contain all limits */ |
|
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && |
|
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
|
retval = -EPERM; |
|
if (!retval) |
|
retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim); |
|
} |
|
if (!retval) { |
|
if (old_rlim) |
|
*old_rlim = *rlim; |
|
if (new_rlim) |
|
*rlim = *new_rlim; |
|
} |
|
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not |
|
* infinite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code |
|
* ignores the rlimit. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && |
|
new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY && |
|
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) |
|
update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
|
out: |
|
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
|
return retval; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* rcu lock must be held */ |
|
static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task, |
|
unsigned int flags) |
|
{ |
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
|
bool id_match; |
|
|
|
if (current == task) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
tcred = __task_cred(task); |
|
id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && |
|
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && |
|
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && |
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && |
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && |
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)); |
|
if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags); |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, |
|
const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, |
|
struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit64 old64, new64; |
|
struct rlimit old, new; |
|
struct task_struct *tsk; |
|
unsigned int checkflags = 0; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
if (old_rlim) |
|
checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ; |
|
|
|
if (new_rlim) { |
|
if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); |
|
checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; |
|
if (!tsk) { |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return -ESRCH; |
|
} |
|
ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags); |
|
if (ret) { |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
get_task_struct(tsk); |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, |
|
old_rlim ? &old : NULL); |
|
|
|
if (!ret && old_rlim) { |
|
rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); |
|
if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) |
|
ret = -EFAULT; |
|
} |
|
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk); |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
|
{ |
|
struct rlimit new_rlim; |
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, |
|
* except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After |
|
* task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would |
|
* make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information |
|
* a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not |
|
* measuring them yet). |
|
* |
|
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have |
|
* races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word |
|
* reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't |
|
* care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading |
|
* the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those |
|
* fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a |
|
* given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
|
* |
|
* Locking: |
|
* We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH |
|
* for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded |
|
* non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with |
|
* the siglock held. |
|
* Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and |
|
* single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one |
|
* else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else |
|
* can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the |
|
* signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just |
|
* exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. |
|
* On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal |
|
* as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> |
|
* fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
|
{ |
|
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; |
|
r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; |
|
r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; |
|
r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; |
|
r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); |
|
r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *t; |
|
unsigned long flags; |
|
u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
|
unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
|
|
|
memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); |
|
utime = stime = 0; |
|
|
|
if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
|
task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
|
accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
|
maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
switch (who) { |
|
case RUSAGE_BOTH: |
|
case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: |
|
utime = p->signal->cutime; |
|
stime = p->signal->cstime; |
|
r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; |
|
r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; |
|
r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; |
|
r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; |
|
r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; |
|
r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; |
|
maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; |
|
|
|
if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
|
break; |
|
fallthrough; |
|
|
|
case RUSAGE_SELF: |
|
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
|
utime += tgutime; |
|
stime += tgstime; |
|
r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; |
|
r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; |
|
r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; |
|
r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; |
|
r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; |
|
r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; |
|
if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) |
|
maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
|
t = p; |
|
do { |
|
accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); |
|
} while_each_thread(p, t); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
default: |
|
BUG(); |
|
} |
|
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
|
|
|
out: |
|
r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime); |
|
r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime); |
|
|
|
if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { |
|
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
|
|
|
if (mm) { |
|
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); |
|
mmput(mm); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
|
{ |
|
struct rusage r; |
|
|
|
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
|
who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
getrusage(current, who, &r); |
|
return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) |
|
{ |
|
struct rusage r; |
|
|
|
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
|
who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
getrusage(current, who, &r); |
|
return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
|
{ |
|
mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); |
|
return mask; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
|
{ |
|
struct fd exe; |
|
struct inode *inode; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
exe = fdget(fd); |
|
if (!exe.file) |
|
return -EBADF; |
|
|
|
inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make |
|
* sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an |
|
* overall picture. |
|
*/ |
|
err = -EACCES; |
|
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path)) |
|
goto exit; |
|
|
|
err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC); |
|
if (err) |
|
goto exit; |
|
|
|
err = replace_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file); |
|
exit: |
|
fdput(exe); |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses. |
|
* |
|
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful |
|
* in what is allowed for modification from userspace. |
|
*/ |
|
static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; |
|
int error = -EINVAL, i; |
|
|
|
static const unsigned char offsets[] = { |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), |
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), |
|
}; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Make sure the members are not somewhere outside |
|
* of allowed address space. |
|
*/ |
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { |
|
u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); |
|
|
|
if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || |
|
(unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Make sure the pairs are ordered. |
|
*/ |
|
#define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ |
|
((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ |
|
(unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL |
|
error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); |
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data); |
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); |
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); |
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); |
|
if (error) |
|
goto out; |
|
#undef __prctl_check_order |
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. |
|
*/ |
|
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, |
|
prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, |
|
prctl_map->start_data)) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
error = 0; |
|
out: |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
|
static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) |
|
{ |
|
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; |
|
unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; |
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); |
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) |
|
return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), |
|
(unsigned int __user *)addr); |
|
|
|
if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); |
|
if (error) |
|
return error; |
|
|
|
if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { |
|
/* |
|
* Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!prctl_map.auxv || |
|
prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); |
|
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, |
|
(const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, |
|
prctl_map.auxv_size)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
/* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ |
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; |
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { |
|
/* |
|
* Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable. |
|
* At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN |
|
* or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. |
|
* Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an |
|
* arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. |
|
* This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns())) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); |
|
if (error) |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* arg_lock protects concurrent updates but we still need mmap_lock for |
|
* read to exclude races with sys_brk. |
|
*/ |
|
mmap_read_lock(mm); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* We don't validate if these members are pointing to |
|
* real present VMAs because application may have correspond |
|
* VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics |
|
* output in procfs mostly, except |
|
* |
|
* - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups |
|
* for VMAs when updating these members so anything wrong written |
|
* here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead |
|
* to any problem in kernel itself |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); |
|
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; |
|
mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; |
|
mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; |
|
mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; |
|
mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; |
|
mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; |
|
mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; |
|
mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; |
|
mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; |
|
mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; |
|
mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
|
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus |
|
* if someone reads this member in procfs while we're |
|
* updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's |
|
* known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to |
|
* not introduce additional locks here making the kernel |
|
* more complex. |
|
*/ |
|
if (prctl_map.auxv_size) |
|
memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); |
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ |
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, |
|
unsigned long len) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to |
|
* mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's |
|
* up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace |
|
* tools which use this vector might be unhappy. |
|
*/ |
|
unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {}; |
|
|
|
if (len > sizeof(user_auxv)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len)) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
/* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ |
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; |
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; |
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
|
|
|
task_lock(current); |
|
memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); |
|
task_unlock(current); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, |
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
|
{ |
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
|
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { |
|
.auxv = NULL, |
|
.auxv_size = 0, |
|
.exe_fd = -1, |
|
}; |
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
|
int error; |
|
|
|
if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && |
|
opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && |
|
opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) |
|
return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4); |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) |
|
return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); |
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) |
|
return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4); |
|
|
|
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* arg_lock protects concurrent updates of arg boundaries, we need |
|
* mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr |
|
* validation. |
|
*/ |
|
mmap_read_lock(mm); |
|
vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); |
|
prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; |
|
prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code; |
|
prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data; |
|
prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data; |
|
prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk; |
|
prctl_map.brk = mm->brk; |
|
prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack; |
|
prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start; |
|
prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end; |
|
prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start; |
|
prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end; |
|
|
|
switch (opt) { |
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
|
prctl_map.start_code = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
|
prctl_map.end_code = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
|
prctl_map.start_data = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: |
|
prctl_map.end_data = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
|
prctl_map.start_stack = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: |
|
prctl_map.start_brk = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_BRK: |
|
prctl_map.brk = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
|
prctl_map.arg_start = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
|
prctl_map.arg_end = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
|
prctl_map.env_start = addr; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
|
prctl_map.env_end = addr; |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); |
|
if (error) |
|
goto out; |
|
|
|
switch (opt) { |
|
/* |
|
* If command line arguments and environment |
|
* are placed somewhere else on stack, we can |
|
* set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup |
|
* command line arguments and ENV_START/END |
|
* for environment. |
|
*/ |
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
|
if (!vma) { |
|
error = -EFAULT; |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; |
|
mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; |
|
mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; |
|
mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; |
|
mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; |
|
mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; |
|
mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; |
|
mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; |
|
mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; |
|
mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; |
|
mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
|
|
|
error = 0; |
|
out: |
|
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); |
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
|
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
|
{ |
|
return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); |
|
} |
|
#else |
|
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
|
{ |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
#endif |
|
|
|
static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* If task has has_child_subreaper - all its descendants |
|
* already have these flag too and new descendants will |
|
* inherit it on fork, skip them. |
|
* |
|
* If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in |
|
* it's subtree as they will never get out pidns. |
|
*/ |
|
if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper || |
|
is_child_reaper(task_pid(p))) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which) |
|
{ |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which, |
|
unsigned long ctrl) |
|
{ |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE) |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
|
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
|
{ |
|
struct task_struct *me = current; |
|
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; |
|
long error; |
|
|
|
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
|
if (error != -ENOSYS) |
|
return error; |
|
|
|
error = 0; |
|
switch (option) { |
|
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: |
|
if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { |
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
me->pdeath_signal = arg2; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: |
|
error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: |
|
error = get_dumpable(me->mm); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: |
|
if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { |
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case PR_SET_UNALIGN: |
|
error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_UNALIGN: |
|
error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_FPEMU: |
|
error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_FPEMU: |
|
error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_FPEXC: |
|
error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_FPEXC: |
|
error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_TIMING: |
|
error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_TIMING: |
|
if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) |
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_NAME: |
|
comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; |
|
if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, |
|
sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
set_task_comm(me, comm); |
|
proc_comm_connector(me); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_NAME: |
|
get_task_comm(comm, me); |
|
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_ENDIAN: |
|
error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_ENDIAN: |
|
error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_SECCOMP: |
|
error = prctl_get_seccomp(); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_SECCOMP: |
|
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_TSC: |
|
error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_TSC: |
|
error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: |
|
error = perf_event_task_disable(); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: |
|
error = perf_event_task_enable(); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
|
if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX) |
|
error = ULONG_MAX; |
|
else |
|
error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: |
|
if (arg2 <= 0) |
|
current->timer_slack_ns = |
|
current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
|
else |
|
current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_MCE_KILL: |
|
if (arg4 | arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
switch (arg2) { |
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: |
|
if (arg3 != 0) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: |
|
current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
|
if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) |
|
current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; |
|
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) |
|
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; |
|
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) |
|
current->flags &= |
|
~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
|
else |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: |
|
if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) |
|
error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? |
|
PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; |
|
else |
|
error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_MM: |
|
error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: |
|
error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
|
me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; |
|
if (!arg2) |
|
break; |
|
|
|
walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
|
error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, |
|
(int __user *)arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
|
if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
task_set_no_new_privs(current); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; |
|
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: |
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: |
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm)) |
|
return -EINTR; |
|
if (arg2) |
|
set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
|
else |
|
clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
|
mmap_write_unlock(me->mm); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
|
case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
|
/* No longer implemented: */ |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
case PR_SET_FP_MODE: |
|
error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_FP_MODE: |
|
error = GET_FP_MODE(me); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SVE_SET_VL: |
|
error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SVE_GET_VL: |
|
error = SVE_GET_VL(); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: |
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: |
|
if (arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: |
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS: |
|
if (arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS: |
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(); |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER: |
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if (arg2 == 1) |
|
current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
|
else if (!arg2) |
|
current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
|
else |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER: |
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
|
return -EPERM; |
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
|
break; |
|
case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH: |
|
error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(arg2, arg3, arg4, |
|
(char __user *) arg5); |
|
break; |
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE |
|
case PR_SCHED_CORE: |
|
error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
|
break; |
|
#endif |
|
default: |
|
error = -EINVAL; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
return error; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, |
|
struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
|
{ |
|
int err = 0; |
|
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
|
|
|
if (cpup) |
|
err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); |
|
if (nodep) |
|
err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
|
return err ? -EFAULT : 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct |
|
* @info: pointer to buffer to fill |
|
*/ |
|
static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; |
|
unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; |
|
struct timespec64 tp; |
|
|
|
memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
|
|
|
ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp); |
|
timens_add_boottime(&tp); |
|
info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); |
|
|
|
get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); |
|
|
|
info->procs = nr_threads; |
|
|
|
si_meminfo(info); |
|
si_swapinfo(info); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) |
|
* is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then |
|
* we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, |
|
* well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... |
|
* |
|
* -Erik Andersen <[email protected]> |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; |
|
if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) |
|
goto out; |
|
bitcount = 0; |
|
mem_unit = info->mem_unit; |
|
while (mem_unit > 1) { |
|
bitcount++; |
|
mem_unit >>= 1; |
|
sav_total = mem_total; |
|
mem_total <<= 1; |
|
if (mem_total < sav_total) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by |
|
* info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible |
|
* with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x |
|
* kernels... |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
info->mem_unit = 1; |
|
info->totalram <<= bitcount; |
|
info->freeram <<= bitcount; |
|
info->sharedram <<= bitcount; |
|
info->bufferram <<= bitcount; |
|
info->totalswap <<= bitcount; |
|
info->freeswap <<= bitcount; |
|
info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; |
|
info->freehigh <<= bitcount; |
|
|
|
out: |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) |
|
{ |
|
struct sysinfo val; |
|
|
|
do_sysinfo(&val); |
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
|
struct compat_sysinfo { |
|
s32 uptime; |
|
u32 loads[3]; |
|
u32 totalram; |
|
u32 freeram; |
|
u32 sharedram; |
|
u32 bufferram; |
|
u32 totalswap; |
|
u32 freeswap; |
|
u16 procs; |
|
u16 pad; |
|
u32 totalhigh; |
|
u32 freehigh; |
|
u32 mem_unit; |
|
char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; |
|
}; |
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) |
|
{ |
|
struct sysinfo s; |
|
struct compat_sysinfo s_32; |
|
|
|
do_sysinfo(&s); |
|
|
|
/* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale |
|
* down if needed |
|
*/ |
|
if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { |
|
int bitcount = 0; |
|
|
|
while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { |
|
s.mem_unit <<= 1; |
|
bitcount++; |
|
} |
|
|
|
s.totalram >>= bitcount; |
|
s.freeram >>= bitcount; |
|
s.sharedram >>= bitcount; |
|
s.bufferram >>= bitcount; |
|
s.totalswap >>= bitcount; |
|
s.freeswap >>= bitcount; |
|
s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; |
|
s.freehigh >>= bitcount; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32)); |
|
s_32.uptime = s.uptime; |
|
s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0]; |
|
s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1]; |
|
s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2]; |
|
s_32.totalram = s.totalram; |
|
s_32.freeram = s.freeram; |
|
s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram; |
|
s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram; |
|
s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap; |
|
s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap; |
|
s_32.procs = s.procs; |
|
s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh; |
|
s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh; |
|
s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit; |
|
if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32))) |
|
return -EFAULT; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
|
|
|