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2713 lines
72 KiB
2713 lines
72 KiB
/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
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* Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
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* |
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
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* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
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* Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
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* All Rights Reserved. |
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* |
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
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* (at your option) any later version. |
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* |
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
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* GNU General Public License for more details. |
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* |
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
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* |
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* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <[email protected]> |
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* |
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* Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
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* especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
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* |
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* The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
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* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
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* [email protected] and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
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* |
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* POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <[email protected]>, |
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* 2006. |
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* |
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* The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
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* added by Dustin Kirkland <[email protected]>, 2005. |
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* |
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* Modified by Amy Griffis <[email protected]> to collect additional |
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* filesystem information. |
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* |
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* Subject and object context labeling support added by <[email protected]> |
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* and <[email protected]> for LSPP certification compliance. |
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*/ |
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt |
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#include <linux/init.h> |
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#include <asm/types.h> |
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#include <linux/atomic.h> |
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#include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/namei.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> |
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/slab.h> |
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#include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/socket.h> |
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#include <linux/mqueue.h> |
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#include <linux/audit.h> |
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#include <linux/personality.h> |
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#include <linux/time.h> |
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#include <linux/netlink.h> |
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#include <linux/compiler.h> |
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#include <asm/unistd.h> |
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#include <linux/security.h> |
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#include <linux/list.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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#include <linux/highmem.h> |
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#include <linux/syscalls.h> |
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#include <asm/syscall.h> |
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#include <linux/capability.h> |
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
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#include <linux/compat.h> |
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#include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/string.h> |
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#include <linux/uaccess.h> |
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#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h> |
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#include <uapi/linux/limits.h> |
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#include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h> |
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#include "audit.h" |
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|
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/* flags stating the success for a syscall */ |
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#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 |
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#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 |
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#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 |
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/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits), |
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* see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */ |
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#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
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|
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/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */ |
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#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128 |
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/* number of audit rules */ |
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int audit_n_rules; |
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|
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/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
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int audit_signals; |
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struct audit_aux_data { |
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struct audit_aux_data *next; |
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int type; |
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}; |
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/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
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#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
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struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
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struct audit_aux_data d; |
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pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
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kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
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kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
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unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
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u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
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char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
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int pid_count; |
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}; |
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struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
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struct audit_aux_data d; |
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struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
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unsigned int fcap_ver; |
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struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
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struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
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}; |
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struct audit_tree_refs { |
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struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
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struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
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}; |
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struct audit_nfcfgop_tab { |
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enum audit_nfcfgop op; |
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const char *s; |
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}; |
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static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = { |
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{ AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" }, |
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{ AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" }, |
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{ AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" }, |
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{ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" }, |
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}; |
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static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
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{ |
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unsigned n; |
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if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
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return 0; |
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n = ctx->major; |
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switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
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case 0: /* native */ |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
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return 1; |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
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return 1; |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
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return 1; |
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return 0; |
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case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
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return 1; |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
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return 1; |
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if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
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audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
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return 1; |
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return 0; |
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case 2: /* open */ |
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return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
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case 3: /* openat */ |
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return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
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case 4: /* socketcall */ |
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return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
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case 5: /* execve */ |
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return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
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default: |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) |
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{ |
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struct audit_names *n; |
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umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; |
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if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
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return 0; |
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list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
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if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) && |
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((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) |
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return 1; |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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/* |
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* We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
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* ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
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* ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
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* Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
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* "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
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* it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
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* References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
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*/ |
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static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
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{ |
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if (!ctx->prio) { |
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ctx->prio = 1; |
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ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; |
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} |
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} |
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static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
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{ |
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struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
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int left = ctx->tree_count; |
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if (likely(left)) { |
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p->c[--left] = chunk; |
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ctx->tree_count = left; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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if (!p) |
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return 0; |
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p = p->next; |
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if (p) { |
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p->c[30] = chunk; |
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ctx->trees = p; |
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ctx->tree_count = 30; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
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{ |
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struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
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ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
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if (!ctx->trees) { |
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ctx->trees = p; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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if (p) |
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p->next = ctx->trees; |
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else |
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ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
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ctx->tree_count = 31; |
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return 1; |
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} |
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static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
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struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
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{ |
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struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
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int n; |
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if (!p) { |
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/* we started with empty chain */ |
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p = ctx->first_trees; |
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count = 31; |
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/* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
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if (!p) |
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return; |
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} |
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n = count; |
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for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
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while (n--) { |
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audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
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q->c[n] = NULL; |
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} |
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} |
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while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
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audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
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q->c[n] = NULL; |
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} |
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ctx->trees = p; |
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ctx->tree_count = count; |
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} |
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static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
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{ |
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struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
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for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
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q = p->next; |
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kfree(p); |
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} |
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} |
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static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
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{ |
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struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
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int n; |
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if (!tree) |
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return 0; |
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/* full ones */ |
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for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
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for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
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if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
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return 1; |
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} |
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/* partial */ |
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if (p) { |
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for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
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if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
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return 1; |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, |
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struct audit_names *name, |
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struct audit_field *f, |
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struct audit_context *ctx) |
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{ |
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struct audit_names *n; |
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int rc; |
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if (name) { |
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rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); |
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if (rc) |
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return rc; |
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} |
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if (ctx) { |
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list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
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rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); |
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if (rc) |
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return rc; |
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} |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, |
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struct audit_names *name, |
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struct audit_field *f, |
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struct audit_context *ctx) |
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{ |
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struct audit_names *n; |
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int rc; |
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if (name) { |
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rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); |
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if (rc) |
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return rc; |
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} |
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if (ctx) { |
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list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
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rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); |
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if (rc) |
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return rc; |
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} |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, |
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const struct cred *cred, |
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struct audit_field *f, |
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struct audit_context *ctx, |
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struct audit_names *name) |
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{ |
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switch (f->val) { |
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/* process to file object comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
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return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
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return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
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return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
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return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
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return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
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return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
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return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
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return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
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return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); |
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/* uid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, |
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audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
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/* auid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, |
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cred->euid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, |
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cred->suid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, |
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cred->fsuid); |
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/* euid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
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/* suid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: |
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return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
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/* gid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
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/* egid comparisons */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
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/* sgid comparison */ |
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case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: |
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return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
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default: |
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WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
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/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
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* otherwise. |
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* |
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* If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are |
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* filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are |
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* the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. |
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*/ |
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static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
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struct audit_krule *rule, |
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struct audit_context *ctx, |
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struct audit_names *name, |
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enum audit_state *state, |
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bool task_creation) |
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{ |
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const struct cred *cred; |
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int i, need_sid = 1; |
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u32 sid; |
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unsigned int sessionid; |
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|
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cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); |
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|
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for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
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struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
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struct audit_names *n; |
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int result = 0; |
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pid_t pid; |
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|
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switch (f->type) { |
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case AUDIT_PID: |
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pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); |
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result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_PPID: |
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if (ctx) { |
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if (!ctx->ppid) |
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ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk); |
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result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
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} |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_EXE: |
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result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe); |
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if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
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result = !result; |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_UID: |
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result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_EUID: |
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result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_SUID: |
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result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_FSUID: |
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result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); |
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break; |
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case AUDIT_GID: |
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result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
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if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
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if (!result) |
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result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); |
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} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
|
if (result) |
|
result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_EGID: |
|
result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); |
|
if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
|
if (!result) |
|
result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); |
|
} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
|
if (result) |
|
result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_SGID: |
|
result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_FSGID: |
|
result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_SESSIONID: |
|
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk); |
|
result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_PERS: |
|
result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_ARCH: |
|
if (ctx) |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case AUDIT_EXIT: |
|
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
|
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) { |
|
if (f->val) |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
|
else |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
|
if (name) { |
|
if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
|
audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
|
++result; |
|
} else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
|
audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
|
if (name) { |
|
if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
|
audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
|
++result; |
|
} else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
|
audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_INODE: |
|
if (name) |
|
result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val); |
|
else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
|
if (name) { |
|
result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
|
} else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
|
if (name) { |
|
result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
|
} else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_WATCH: |
|
if (name) { |
|
result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, |
|
name->ino, |
|
name->dev); |
|
if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
|
result = !result; |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_DIR: |
|
if (ctx) { |
|
result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
|
if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
|
result = !result; |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
|
result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), |
|
f->op, f->uid); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
|
result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: |
|
if (ctx->sockaddr) |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family, |
|
f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
|
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
|
/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
|
a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
|
match for now to avoid losing information that |
|
may be wanted. An error message will also be |
|
logged upon error */ |
|
if (f->lsm_rule) { |
|
if (need_sid) { |
|
security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); |
|
need_sid = 0; |
|
} |
|
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
|
f->op, |
|
f->lsm_rule); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
|
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
|
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
|
also applies here */ |
|
if (f->lsm_rule) { |
|
/* Find files that match */ |
|
if (name) { |
|
result = security_audit_rule_match( |
|
name->osid, |
|
f->type, |
|
f->op, |
|
f->lsm_rule); |
|
} else if (ctx) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (security_audit_rule_match( |
|
n->osid, |
|
f->type, |
|
f->op, |
|
f->lsm_rule)) { |
|
++result; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
/* Find ipc objects that match */ |
|
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
|
break; |
|
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
|
f->type, f->op, |
|
f->lsm_rule)) |
|
++result; |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_ARG0: |
|
case AUDIT_ARG1: |
|
case AUDIT_ARG2: |
|
case AUDIT_ARG3: |
|
if (ctx) |
|
result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
|
/* ignore this field for filtering */ |
|
result = 1; |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_PERM: |
|
result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
|
if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
|
result = !result; |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
|
result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
|
if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
|
result = !result; |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: |
|
result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
if (!result) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ctx) { |
|
if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (rule->filterkey) { |
|
kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
|
ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
|
} |
|
ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
|
} |
|
switch (rule->action) { |
|
case AUDIT_NEVER: |
|
*state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED; |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_ALWAYS: |
|
*state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
|
* completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
|
* structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
|
*/ |
|
static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_entry *e; |
|
enum audit_state state; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
|
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, |
|
&state, true)) { |
|
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) |
|
*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return state; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) |
|
{ |
|
int word, bit; |
|
|
|
if (val > 0xffffffff) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
word = AUDIT_WORD(val); |
|
if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); |
|
|
|
return rule->mask[word] & bit; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is |
|
* not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not |
|
* high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record |
|
* (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD). |
|
*/ |
|
static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
|
struct audit_context *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_entry *e; |
|
enum audit_state state; |
|
|
|
if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], list) { |
|
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && |
|
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
|
&state, false)) { |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
ctx->current_state = state; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. |
|
* Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash |
|
*/ |
|
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, |
|
struct audit_names *n, |
|
struct audit_context *ctx) { |
|
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
|
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
|
struct audit_entry *e; |
|
enum audit_state state; |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
|
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && |
|
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { |
|
ctx->current_state = state; |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been |
|
* collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
|
* buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. |
|
* Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
|
*/ |
|
void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_names *n; |
|
|
|
if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
|
if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) |
|
{ |
|
kfree(context->proctitle.value); |
|
context->proctitle.value = NULL; |
|
context->proctitle.len = 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context) |
|
{ |
|
if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) { |
|
kfree(context->module.name); |
|
context->module.name = NULL; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_names *n, *next; |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
list_del(&n->list); |
|
if (n->name) |
|
putname(n->name); |
|
if (n->should_free) |
|
kfree(n); |
|
} |
|
context->name_count = 0; |
|
path_put(&context->pwd); |
|
context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
|
context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
|
|
|
while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
|
context->aux = aux->next; |
|
kfree(aux); |
|
} |
|
while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
|
context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
|
kfree(aux); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context; |
|
|
|
context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!context) |
|
return NULL; |
|
context->state = state; |
|
context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0; |
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); |
|
context->fds[0] = -1; |
|
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; |
|
return context; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
|
* @tsk: task |
|
* |
|
* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
|
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
|
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
|
* needed. |
|
*/ |
|
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context; |
|
enum audit_state state; |
|
char *key = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
|
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
|
|
|
state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
|
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) { |
|
clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
|
kfree(key); |
|
audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
} |
|
context->filterkey = key; |
|
|
|
audit_set_context(tsk, context); |
|
set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
|
{ |
|
audit_free_module(context); |
|
audit_free_names(context); |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
|
free_tree_refs(context); |
|
audit_free_aux(context); |
|
kfree(context->filterkey); |
|
kfree(context->sockaddr); |
|
audit_proctitle_free(context); |
|
kfree(context); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
|
kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
|
u32 sid, char *comm) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
char *ctx = NULL; |
|
u32 len; |
|
int rc = 0; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return rc; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); |
|
if (sid) { |
|
if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
|
rc = 1; |
|
} else { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
|
security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
|
|
return rc; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
|
struct audit_buffer **ab) |
|
{ |
|
long len_max; |
|
long len_rem; |
|
long len_full; |
|
long len_buf; |
|
long len_abuf = 0; |
|
long len_tmp; |
|
bool require_data; |
|
bool encode; |
|
unsigned int iter; |
|
unsigned int arg; |
|
char *buf_head; |
|
char *buf; |
|
const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start; |
|
|
|
/* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg |
|
* data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the |
|
* code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */ |
|
char abuf[96]; |
|
|
|
/* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the |
|
* current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it |
|
* is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle |
|
* room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */ |
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500); |
|
len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
|
|
|
/* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */ |
|
buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!buf_head) { |
|
audit_panic("out of memory for argv string"); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
buf = buf_head; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc); |
|
|
|
len_rem = len_max; |
|
len_buf = 0; |
|
len_full = 0; |
|
require_data = true; |
|
encode = false; |
|
iter = 0; |
|
arg = 0; |
|
do { |
|
/* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything |
|
* serious, but the audit record format insists we |
|
* provide an argument length for really long arguments, |
|
* e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but |
|
* to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for |
|
* recording in the log, although we don't use it |
|
* anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */ |
|
if (len_full == 0) |
|
len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
|
|
|
/* read more data from userspace */ |
|
if (require_data) { |
|
/* can we make more room in the buffer? */ |
|
if (buf != buf_head) { |
|
memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf); |
|
buf = buf_head; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* fetch as much as we can of the argument */ |
|
len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p, |
|
len_max - len_buf); |
|
if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) { |
|
/* unable to copy from userspace */ |
|
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
|
goto out; |
|
} else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) { |
|
/* buffer is not large enough */ |
|
require_data = true; |
|
/* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple |
|
* buffers force the encoding so we stand |
|
* a chance at a sane len_full value and |
|
* consistent record encoding */ |
|
encode = true; |
|
len_full = len_full * 2; |
|
p += len_tmp; |
|
} else { |
|
require_data = false; |
|
if (!encode) |
|
encode = audit_string_contains_control( |
|
buf, len_tmp); |
|
/* try to use a trusted value for len_full */ |
|
if (len_full < len_max) |
|
len_full = (encode ? |
|
len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp); |
|
p += len_tmp + 1; |
|
} |
|
len_buf += len_tmp; |
|
buf_head[len_buf] = '\0'; |
|
|
|
/* length of the buffer in the audit record? */ |
|
len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* write as much as we can to the audit log */ |
|
if (len_buf >= 0) { |
|
/* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we |
|
* can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the |
|
* existing audit buffer, flush it and start with |
|
* a new buffer */ |
|
if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) { |
|
len_rem = len_max; |
|
audit_log_end(*ab); |
|
*ab = audit_log_start(context, |
|
GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
|
if (!*ab) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */ |
|
len_tmp = 0; |
|
if (require_data || (iter > 0) || |
|
((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) { |
|
if (iter == 0) { |
|
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], |
|
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, |
|
" a%d_len=%lu", |
|
arg, len_full); |
|
} |
|
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], |
|
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, |
|
" a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++); |
|
} else |
|
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp], |
|
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp, |
|
" a%d=", arg); |
|
WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf)); |
|
abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0'; |
|
|
|
/* log the arg in the audit record */ |
|
audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf); |
|
len_rem -= len_tmp; |
|
len_tmp = len_buf; |
|
if (encode) { |
|
if (len_abuf > len_rem) |
|
len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */ |
|
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp); |
|
len_rem -= len_tmp * 2; |
|
len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2; |
|
} else { |
|
if (len_abuf > len_rem) |
|
len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */ |
|
audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp); |
|
len_rem -= len_tmp + 2; |
|
/* don't subtract the "2" because we still need |
|
* to add quotes to the remaining string */ |
|
len_abuf -= len_tmp; |
|
} |
|
len_buf -= len_tmp; |
|
buf += len_tmp; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* ready to move to the next argument? */ |
|
if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) { |
|
arg++; |
|
iter = 0; |
|
len_full = 0; |
|
require_data = true; |
|
encode = false; |
|
} |
|
} while (arg < context->execve.argc); |
|
|
|
/* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */ |
|
|
|
out: |
|
kfree(buf_head); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, |
|
kernel_cap_t *cap) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (cap_isclear(*cap)) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); |
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) |
|
{ |
|
if (name->fcap_ver == -1) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?"); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d", |
|
name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver, |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
switch (context->type) { |
|
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
|
int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
|
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
|
context->socketcall.args[i]); |
|
break; } |
|
case AUDIT_IPC: { |
|
u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), |
|
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), |
|
context->ipc.mode); |
|
if (osid) { |
|
char *ctx = NULL; |
|
u32 len; |
|
|
|
if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
|
*call_panic = 1; |
|
} else { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
|
security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
|
AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
|
if (unlikely(!ab)) |
|
return; |
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
"qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
|
context->ipc.qbytes, |
|
context->ipc.perm_uid, |
|
context->ipc.perm_gid, |
|
context->ipc.perm_mode); |
|
} |
|
break; } |
|
case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
|
"mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
|
context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
|
context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
|
context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
|
context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
|
context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
"mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
|
"abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
|
(long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
|
context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
|
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
|
struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
|
"mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
|
context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
|
attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
|
attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
|
break; } |
|
case AUDIT_CAPSET: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_MMAP: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, |
|
context->mmap.flags); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_EXECVE: |
|
audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "name="); |
|
if (context->module.name) { |
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name); |
|
} else |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); |
|
|
|
break; |
|
} |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) |
|
{ |
|
char *end = proctitle + len - 1; |
|
|
|
while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) |
|
end--; |
|
|
|
/* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */ |
|
len = end - proctitle + 1; |
|
len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0; |
|
return len; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names |
|
* @context: audit_context for the task |
|
* @n: audit_names structure with reportable details |
|
* @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name |
|
* @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names |
|
* @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails |
|
*/ |
|
static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, |
|
const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); |
|
|
|
if (path) |
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path); |
|
else if (n->name) { |
|
switch (n->name_len) { |
|
case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: |
|
/* log the full path */ |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name); |
|
break; |
|
case 0: |
|
/* name was specified as a relative path and the |
|
* directory component is the cwd |
|
*/ |
|
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) |
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); |
|
else |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
/* log the name's directory component */ |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name="); |
|
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name, |
|
n->name_len); |
|
} |
|
} else |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); |
|
|
|
if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", |
|
n->ino, |
|
MAJOR(n->dev), |
|
MINOR(n->dev), |
|
n->mode, |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid), |
|
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid), |
|
MAJOR(n->rdev), |
|
MINOR(n->rdev)); |
|
if (n->osid != 0) { |
|
char *ctx = NULL; |
|
u32 len; |
|
|
|
if (security_secid_to_secctx( |
|
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); |
|
if (call_panic) |
|
*call_panic = 2; |
|
} else { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
|
security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* log the audit_names record type */ |
|
switch (n->type) { |
|
case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL"); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT"); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE"); |
|
break; |
|
case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE"); |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN"); |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
|
|
audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_proctitle(void) |
|
{ |
|
int res; |
|
char *buf; |
|
char *msg = "(null)"; |
|
int len = strlen(msg); |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle="); |
|
|
|
/* Not cached */ |
|
if (!context->proctitle.value) { |
|
buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!buf) |
|
goto out; |
|
/* Historically called this from procfs naming */ |
|
res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN); |
|
if (res == 0) { |
|
kfree(buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res); |
|
if (res == 0) { |
|
kfree(buf); |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
context->proctitle.value = buf; |
|
context->proctitle.len = res; |
|
} |
|
msg = context->proctitle.value; |
|
len = context->proctitle.len; |
|
out: |
|
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_exit(void) |
|
{ |
|
int i, call_panic = 0; |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
|
struct audit_names *n; |
|
|
|
context->personality = current->personality; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
|
context->arch, context->major); |
|
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
|
if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
|
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
|
context->return_code); |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", |
|
context->argv[0], |
|
context->argv[1], |
|
context->argv[2], |
|
context->argv[3], |
|
context->name_count); |
|
|
|
audit_log_task_info(ab); |
|
audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
|
|
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
|
|
|
switch (aux->type) { |
|
|
|
case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
|
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
|
audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d", |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, |
|
axs->fcap.rootid)); |
|
break; } |
|
|
|
} |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (context->type) |
|
show_special(context, &call_panic); |
|
|
|
if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
|
if (ab) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
|
context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
|
if (ab) { |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
|
audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
|
context->sockaddr_len); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
|
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
|
if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
|
axs->target_auid[i], |
|
axs->target_uid[i], |
|
axs->target_sessionid[i], |
|
axs->target_sid[i], |
|
axs->target_comm[i])) |
|
call_panic = 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (context->target_pid && |
|
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
|
context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
|
context->target_sessionid, |
|
context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
|
call_panic = 1; |
|
|
|
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
|
if (ab) { |
|
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
i = 0; |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
if (n->hidden) |
|
continue; |
|
audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); |
|
} |
|
|
|
audit_log_proctitle(); |
|
|
|
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
|
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
|
if (ab) |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
if (call_panic) |
|
audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
|
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
|
* |
|
* Called from copy_process and do_exit |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
|
|
|
if (!context) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
|
audit_kill_trees(context); |
|
|
|
/* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code; |
|
* in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a |
|
* random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we |
|
* need to log via audit_log_exit(). |
|
*/ |
|
if (tsk == current && !context->dummy && context->in_syscall) { |
|
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID; |
|
context->return_code = 0; |
|
|
|
audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context); |
|
audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
|
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) |
|
audit_log_exit(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
audit_set_context(tsk, NULL); |
|
audit_free_context(context); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
|
* @major: major syscall type (function) |
|
* @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
|
* @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
|
* @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
|
* @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
|
* |
|
* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
|
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
|
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
|
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD, |
|
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
|
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
|
* be written). |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
|
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
enum audit_state state; |
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled || !context) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
|
|
|
state = context->state; |
|
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
|
if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) { |
|
context->prio = 0; |
|
if (auditd_test_task(current)) |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current); |
|
context->major = major; |
|
context->argv[0] = a1; |
|
context->argv[1] = a2; |
|
context->argv[2] = a3; |
|
context->argv[3] = a4; |
|
context->serial = 0; |
|
context->in_syscall = 1; |
|
context->current_state = state; |
|
context->ppid = 0; |
|
ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
|
* @success: success value of the syscall |
|
* @return_code: return value of the syscall |
|
* |
|
* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
|
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from |
|
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit |
|
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
|
* free the names stored from getname(). |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context; |
|
|
|
context = audit_context(); |
|
if (!context) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
|
audit_kill_trees(context); |
|
|
|
if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) { |
|
if (success) |
|
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; |
|
else |
|
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_FAILURE; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the |
|
* actual return codes are later going to be fixed up by the |
|
* arch specific signal handlers |
|
* |
|
* This is actually a test for: |
|
* (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
|
* (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
|
* |
|
* but is faster than a bunch of || |
|
*/ |
|
if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
|
(return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
|
(return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
|
context->return_code = -EINTR; |
|
else |
|
context->return_code = return_code; |
|
|
|
audit_filter_syscall(current, context); |
|
audit_filter_inodes(current, context); |
|
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) |
|
audit_log_exit(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
context->in_syscall = 0; |
|
context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0; |
|
|
|
audit_free_module(context); |
|
audit_free_names(context); |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
|
audit_free_aux(context); |
|
context->aux = NULL; |
|
context->aux_pids = NULL; |
|
context->target_pid = 0; |
|
context->target_sid = 0; |
|
context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
|
context->type = 0; |
|
context->fds[0] = -1; |
|
if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) { |
|
kfree(context->filterkey); |
|
context->filterkey = NULL; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context; |
|
struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
|
struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
|
int count; |
|
|
|
if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) |
|
return; |
|
context = audit_context(); |
|
p = context->trees; |
|
count = context->tree_count; |
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
if (!chunk) |
|
return; |
|
if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
|
return; |
|
if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
|
pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
|
audit_set_auditable(context); |
|
audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context; |
|
struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
|
const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
|
struct audit_chunk *drop; |
|
unsigned long seq; |
|
int count; |
|
|
|
context = audit_context(); |
|
p = context->trees; |
|
count = context->tree_count; |
|
retry: |
|
drop = NULL; |
|
d = dentry; |
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
|
for(;;) { |
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); |
|
|
|
if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) { |
|
struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
|
|
|
chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
|
if (chunk) { |
|
if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
|
drop = chunk; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
parent = d->d_parent; |
|
if (parent == d) |
|
break; |
|
d = parent; |
|
} |
|
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
if (!drop) { |
|
/* just a race with rename */ |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
|
goto retry; |
|
} |
|
audit_put_chunk(drop); |
|
if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
|
/* OK, got more space */ |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
|
goto retry; |
|
} |
|
/* too bad */ |
|
pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
|
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
|
audit_set_auditable(context); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, |
|
unsigned char type) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_names *aname; |
|
|
|
if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { |
|
aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; |
|
memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); |
|
} else { |
|
aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); |
|
if (!aname) |
|
return NULL; |
|
aname->should_free = true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; |
|
aname->type = type; |
|
list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); |
|
|
|
context->name_count++; |
|
if (!context->pwd.dentry) |
|
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); |
|
return aname; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry |
|
* @uptr: userland ptr to pathname |
|
* |
|
* Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an |
|
* existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename |
|
* associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. |
|
*/ |
|
struct filename * |
|
__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct audit_names *n; |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
if (!n->name) |
|
continue; |
|
if (n->name->uptr == uptr) { |
|
n->name->refcnt++; |
|
return n->name; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_getname - add a name to the list |
|
* @name: name to add |
|
* |
|
* Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
|
* Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct audit_names *n; |
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
|
if (!n) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
n->name = name; |
|
n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
|
name->aname = n; |
|
name->refcnt++; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, |
|
const struct dentry *dentry) |
|
{ |
|
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; |
|
int rc; |
|
|
|
if (!dentry) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps); |
|
if (rc) |
|
return rc; |
|
|
|
name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted; |
|
name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; |
|
name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
|
name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid; |
|
name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> |
|
VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ |
|
static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, |
|
const struct dentry *dentry, |
|
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) |
|
{ |
|
name->ino = inode->i_ino; |
|
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
|
name->mode = inode->i_mode; |
|
name->uid = inode->i_uid; |
|
name->gid = inode->i_gid; |
|
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; |
|
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); |
|
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) { |
|
name->fcap_ver = -1; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
|
* @name: name being audited |
|
* @dentry: dentry being audited |
|
* @flags: attributes for this particular entry |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
|
unsigned int flags) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
|
struct audit_names *n; |
|
bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; |
|
struct audit_entry *e; |
|
struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
|
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { |
|
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; |
|
|
|
if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE |
|
&& audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic, |
|
f->op, f->val) |
|
&& e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
|
|
if (!name) |
|
goto out_alloc; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can |
|
* just use it directly if the type is correct. |
|
*/ |
|
n = name->aname; |
|
if (n) { |
|
if (parent) { |
|
if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
|
n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
|
goto out; |
|
} else { |
|
if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
if (n->ino) { |
|
/* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */ |
|
if (n->ino != inode->i_ino || |
|
n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev) |
|
continue; |
|
} else if (n->name) { |
|
/* inode number has not been set, check the name */ |
|
if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) |
|
continue; |
|
} else |
|
/* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */ |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
/* match the correct record type */ |
|
if (parent) { |
|
if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
|
n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
|
goto out; |
|
} else { |
|
if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
out_alloc: |
|
/* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */ |
|
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
|
if (!n) |
|
return; |
|
if (name) { |
|
n->name = name; |
|
name->refcnt++; |
|
} |
|
|
|
out: |
|
if (parent) { |
|
n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
|
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; |
|
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) |
|
n->hidden = true; |
|
} else { |
|
n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
|
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; |
|
} |
|
handle_path(dentry); |
|
audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_file(const struct file *file) |
|
{ |
|
__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
|
* @parent: inode of dentry parent |
|
* @dentry: dentry being audited |
|
* @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for |
|
* |
|
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
|
* can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
|
* This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
|
* Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
|
* the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
|
* must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
|
* unsuccessful attempts. |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, |
|
const struct dentry *dentry, |
|
const unsigned char type) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
|
const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name; |
|
struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
|
struct audit_entry *e; |
|
struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS]; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
if (!context->in_syscall) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
|
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { |
|
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; |
|
|
|
if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE |
|
&& audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic, |
|
f->op, f->val) |
|
&& e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) { |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
|
|
if (inode) |
|
handle_one(inode); |
|
|
|
/* look for a parent entry first */ |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
if (!n->name || |
|
(n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT && |
|
n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && |
|
!audit_compare_dname_path(dname, |
|
n->name->name, n->name_len)) { |
|
if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
|
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; |
|
found_parent = n; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* is there a matching child entry? */ |
|
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
|
/* can only match entries that have a name */ |
|
if (!n->name || |
|
(n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) || |
|
!audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, |
|
found_parent ? |
|
found_parent->name_len : |
|
AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { |
|
if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
|
n->type = type; |
|
found_child = n; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!found_parent) { |
|
/* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ |
|
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); |
|
if (!n) |
|
return; |
|
audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!found_child) { |
|
found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); |
|
if (!found_child) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
|
* directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
|
* audit_free_names() */ |
|
if (found_parent) { |
|
found_child->name = found_parent->name; |
|
found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
|
found_child->name->refcnt++; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (inode) |
|
audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0); |
|
else |
|
found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET; |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
|
* @ctx: audit_context for the task |
|
* @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context |
|
* @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
|
* |
|
* Also sets the context as auditable. |
|
*/ |
|
int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
|
struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial) |
|
{ |
|
if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (!ctx->serial) |
|
ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
|
t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
|
t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
|
*serial = ctx->serial; |
|
if (!ctx->prio) { |
|
ctx->prio = 1; |
|
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD; |
|
} |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
|
* @oflag: open flag |
|
* @mode: mode bits |
|
* @attr: queue attributes |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
if (attr) |
|
memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
|
else |
|
memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
|
|
|
context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
|
context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
|
|
|
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
|
* @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
|
* @msg_len: Message length |
|
* @msg_prio: Message priority |
|
* @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
|
const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
|
|
|
if (abs_timeout) |
|
memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p)); |
|
else |
|
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); |
|
|
|
context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
|
context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
|
|
|
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
|
* @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
|
* @notification: Notification event |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
if (notification) |
|
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
|
else |
|
context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
|
|
|
context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
|
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
|
* @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
|
* @mqstat: MQ flags |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
|
context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
|
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
|
* @ipcp: ipc permissions |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
|
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
|
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
|
context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
|
security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
|
context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
|
* @qbytes: msgq bytes |
|
* @uid: msgq user id |
|
* @gid: msgq group id |
|
* @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
|
* |
|
* Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
|
context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
|
context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
|
context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
|
context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
|
context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
|
* @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. |
|
* @args: args array |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
|
context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
|
memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
|
* @fd1: the first file descriptor |
|
* @fd2: the second file descriptor |
|
* |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->fds[0] = fd1; |
|
context->fds[1] = fd2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
|
* @len: data length in user space |
|
* @a: data address in kernel space |
|
* |
|
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
|
*/ |
|
int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
if (!context->sockaddr) { |
|
void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
|
|
if (!p) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
context->sockaddr = p; |
|
} |
|
|
|
context->sockaddr_len = len; |
|
memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); |
|
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
|
context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
|
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
|
security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); |
|
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls |
|
* @t: task being signaled |
|
* |
|
* If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
|
* and uid that is doing that. |
|
*/ |
|
int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
|
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); |
|
kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); |
|
|
|
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
|
* in audit_context */ |
|
if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
|
ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); |
|
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
|
ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
|
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
|
security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
|
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
|
if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
|
axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
|
if (!axp) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
|
|
axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
|
axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
|
ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
|
} |
|
BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
|
|
|
axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t); |
|
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
|
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
|
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
|
security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
|
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
|
axp->pid_count++; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
|
* @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
|
* @new: the proposed new credentials |
|
* @old: the old credentials |
|
* |
|
* Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
|
* store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
|
* |
|
* -Eric |
|
*/ |
|
int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
|
const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
|
|
|
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!ax) |
|
return -ENOMEM; |
|
|
|
ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
|
ax->d.next = context->aux; |
|
context->aux = (void *)ax; |
|
|
|
get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, |
|
bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); |
|
|
|
ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
|
ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
|
ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
|
ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid; |
|
ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
|
|
|
ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
|
ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
|
ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
|
ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient; |
|
|
|
ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
|
ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
|
ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
|
ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
|
* @new: the new credentials |
|
* @old: the old (current) credentials |
|
* |
|
* Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
|
* audit system if applicable |
|
*/ |
|
void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); |
|
context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
|
context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
|
context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
|
context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient; |
|
context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->mmap.fd = fd; |
|
context->mmap.flags = flags; |
|
context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!context->module.name) |
|
audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module"); |
|
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) |
|
{ |
|
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, |
|
AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) |
|
{ |
|
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET, |
|
"sec=%lli nsec=%li", |
|
(long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad, |
|
const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type) |
|
{ |
|
const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type]; |
|
|
|
if (val->newval == val->oldval) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL, |
|
"op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad) |
|
{ |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET); |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ); |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS); |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI); |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK); |
|
audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, |
|
enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG); |
|
if (!ab) |
|
return; |
|
audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s", |
|
name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s); |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current)); |
|
audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */ |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg); |
|
|
|
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
|
{ |
|
kuid_t auid, uid; |
|
kgid_t gid; |
|
unsigned int sessionid; |
|
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; |
|
|
|
auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); |
|
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
|
current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
|
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), |
|
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), |
|
sessionid); |
|
audit_log_task_context(ab); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current)); |
|
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); |
|
audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
|
* @signr: signal value |
|
* |
|
* If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
|
* should record the event for investigation. |
|
*/ |
|
void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
|
return; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
|
if (unlikely(!ab)) |
|
return; |
|
audit_log_task(ab); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action |
|
* @syscall: syscall number |
|
* @signr: signal value |
|
* @code: the seccomp action |
|
* |
|
* Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for |
|
* seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log(). |
|
* Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled |
|
* and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when |
|
* audit is not in use. |
|
*/ |
|
void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); |
|
if (unlikely(!ab)) |
|
return; |
|
audit_log_task(ab); |
|
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", |
|
signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall, |
|
in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, |
|
int res) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_buffer *ab; |
|
|
|
if (!audit_enabled) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, |
|
AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); |
|
if (unlikely(!ab)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
audit_log_format(ab, |
|
"op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d", |
|
names, old_names, res); |
|
audit_log_end(ab); |
|
} |
|
|
|
struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
|
{ |
|
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); |
|
|
|
if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
|
return NULL; |
|
return &ctx->killed_trees; |
|
}
|
|
|