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529 lines
19 KiB
529 lines
19 KiB
|
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============= |
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eBPF verifier |
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============= |
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The safety of the eBPF program is determined in two steps. |
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|
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First step does DAG check to disallow loops and other CFG validation. |
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In particular it will detect programs that have unreachable instructions. |
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(though classic BPF checker allows them) |
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Second step starts from the first insn and descends all possible paths. |
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It simulates execution of every insn and observes the state change of |
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registers and stack. |
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At the start of the program the register R1 contains a pointer to context |
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and has type PTR_TO_CTX. |
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If verifier sees an insn that does R2=R1, then R2 has now type |
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PTR_TO_CTX as well and can be used on the right hand side of expression. |
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If R1=PTR_TO_CTX and insn is R2=R1+R1, then R2=SCALAR_VALUE, |
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since addition of two valid pointers makes invalid pointer. |
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(In 'secure' mode verifier will reject any type of pointer arithmetic to make |
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sure that kernel addresses don't leak to unprivileged users) |
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If register was never written to, it's not readable:: |
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bpf_mov R0 = R2 |
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bpf_exit |
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will be rejected, since R2 is unreadable at the start of the program. |
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After kernel function call, R1-R5 are reset to unreadable and |
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R0 has a return type of the function. |
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Since R6-R9 are callee saved, their state is preserved across the call. |
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:: |
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bpf_mov R6 = 1 |
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bpf_call foo |
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bpf_mov R0 = R6 |
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bpf_exit |
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is a correct program. If there was R1 instead of R6, it would have |
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been rejected. |
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load/store instructions are allowed only with registers of valid types, which |
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are PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_MAP, PTR_TO_STACK. They are bounds and alignment checked. |
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For example:: |
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bpf_mov R1 = 1 |
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bpf_mov R2 = 2 |
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bpf_xadd *(u32 *)(R1 + 3) += R2 |
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bpf_exit |
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will be rejected, since R1 doesn't have a valid pointer type at the time of |
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execution of instruction bpf_xadd. |
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At the start R1 type is PTR_TO_CTX (a pointer to generic ``struct bpf_context``) |
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A callback is used to customize verifier to restrict eBPF program access to only |
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certain fields within ctx structure with specified size and alignment. |
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For example, the following insn:: |
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bpf_ld R0 = *(u32 *)(R6 + 8) |
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intends to load a word from address R6 + 8 and store it into R0 |
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If R6=PTR_TO_CTX, via is_valid_access() callback the verifier will know |
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that offset 8 of size 4 bytes can be accessed for reading, otherwise |
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the verifier will reject the program. |
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If R6=PTR_TO_STACK, then access should be aligned and be within |
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stack bounds, which are [-MAX_BPF_STACK, 0). In this example offset is 8, |
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so it will fail verification, since it's out of bounds. |
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The verifier will allow eBPF program to read data from stack only after |
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it wrote into it. |
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Classic BPF verifier does similar check with M[0-15] memory slots. |
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For example:: |
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bpf_ld R0 = *(u32 *)(R10 - 4) |
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bpf_exit |
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is invalid program. |
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Though R10 is correct read-only register and has type PTR_TO_STACK |
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and R10 - 4 is within stack bounds, there were no stores into that location. |
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Pointer register spill/fill is tracked as well, since four (R6-R9) |
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callee saved registers may not be enough for some programs. |
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Allowed function calls are customized with bpf_verifier_ops->get_func_proto() |
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The eBPF verifier will check that registers match argument constraints. |
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After the call register R0 will be set to return type of the function. |
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Function calls is a main mechanism to extend functionality of eBPF programs. |
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Socket filters may let programs to call one set of functions, whereas tracing |
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filters may allow completely different set. |
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If a function made accessible to eBPF program, it needs to be thought through |
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from safety point of view. The verifier will guarantee that the function is |
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called with valid arguments. |
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seccomp vs socket filters have different security restrictions for classic BPF. |
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Seccomp solves this by two stage verifier: classic BPF verifier is followed |
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by seccomp verifier. In case of eBPF one configurable verifier is shared for |
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all use cases. |
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See details of eBPF verifier in kernel/bpf/verifier.c |
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Register value tracking |
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======================= |
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In order to determine the safety of an eBPF program, the verifier must track |
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the range of possible values in each register and also in each stack slot. |
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This is done with ``struct bpf_reg_state``, defined in include/linux/ |
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bpf_verifier.h, which unifies tracking of scalar and pointer values. Each |
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register state has a type, which is either NOT_INIT (the register has not been |
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written to), SCALAR_VALUE (some value which is not usable as a pointer), or a |
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pointer type. The types of pointers describe their base, as follows: |
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PTR_TO_CTX |
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Pointer to bpf_context. |
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CONST_PTR_TO_MAP |
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Pointer to struct bpf_map. "Const" because arithmetic |
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on these pointers is forbidden. |
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PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
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Pointer to the value stored in a map element. |
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PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL |
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Either a pointer to a map value, or NULL; map accesses |
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(see maps.rst) return this type, which becomes a |
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PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE when checked != NULL. Arithmetic on |
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these pointers is forbidden. |
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PTR_TO_STACK |
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Frame pointer. |
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PTR_TO_PACKET |
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skb->data. |
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PTR_TO_PACKET_END |
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skb->data + headlen; arithmetic forbidden. |
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PTR_TO_SOCKET |
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Pointer to struct bpf_sock_ops, implicitly refcounted. |
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PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL |
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Either a pointer to a socket, or NULL; socket lookup |
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returns this type, which becomes a PTR_TO_SOCKET when |
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checked != NULL. PTR_TO_SOCKET is reference-counted, |
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so programs must release the reference through the |
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socket release function before the end of the program. |
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Arithmetic on these pointers is forbidden. |
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However, a pointer may be offset from this base (as a result of pointer |
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arithmetic), and this is tracked in two parts: the 'fixed offset' and 'variable |
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offset'. The former is used when an exactly-known value (e.g. an immediate |
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operand) is added to a pointer, while the latter is used for values which are |
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not exactly known. The variable offset is also used in SCALAR_VALUEs, to track |
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the range of possible values in the register. |
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The verifier's knowledge about the variable offset consists of: |
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* minimum and maximum values as unsigned |
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* minimum and maximum values as signed |
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* knowledge of the values of individual bits, in the form of a 'tnum': a u64 |
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'mask' and a u64 'value'. 1s in the mask represent bits whose value is unknown; |
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1s in the value represent bits known to be 1. Bits known to be 0 have 0 in both |
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mask and value; no bit should ever be 1 in both. For example, if a byte is read |
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into a register from memory, the register's top 56 bits are known zero, while |
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the low 8 are unknown - which is represented as the tnum (0x0; 0xff). If we |
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then OR this with 0x40, we get (0x40; 0xbf), then if we add 1 we get (0x0; |
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0x1ff), because of potential carries. |
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Besides arithmetic, the register state can also be updated by conditional |
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branches. For instance, if a SCALAR_VALUE is compared > 8, in the 'true' branch |
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it will have a umin_value (unsigned minimum value) of 9, whereas in the 'false' |
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branch it will have a umax_value of 8. A signed compare (with BPF_JSGT or |
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BPF_JSGE) would instead update the signed minimum/maximum values. Information |
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from the signed and unsigned bounds can be combined; for instance if a value is |
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first tested < 8 and then tested s> 4, the verifier will conclude that the value |
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is also > 4 and s< 8, since the bounds prevent crossing the sign boundary. |
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PTR_TO_PACKETs with a variable offset part have an 'id', which is common to all |
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pointers sharing that same variable offset. This is important for packet range |
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checks: after adding a variable to a packet pointer register A, if you then copy |
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it to another register B and then add a constant 4 to A, both registers will |
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share the same 'id' but the A will have a fixed offset of +4. Then if A is |
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bounds-checked and found to be less than a PTR_TO_PACKET_END, the register B is |
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now known to have a safe range of at least 4 bytes. See 'Direct packet access', |
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below, for more on PTR_TO_PACKET ranges. |
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The 'id' field is also used on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, common to all copies of |
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the pointer returned from a map lookup. This means that when one copy is |
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checked and found to be non-NULL, all copies can become PTR_TO_MAP_VALUEs. |
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As well as range-checking, the tracked information is also used for enforcing |
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alignment of pointer accesses. For instance, on most systems the packet pointer |
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is 2 bytes after a 4-byte alignment. If a program adds 14 bytes to that to jump |
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over the Ethernet header, then reads IHL and addes (IHL * 4), the resulting |
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pointer will have a variable offset known to be 4n+2 for some n, so adding the 2 |
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bytes (NET_IP_ALIGN) gives a 4-byte alignment and so word-sized accesses through |
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that pointer are safe. |
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The 'id' field is also used on PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, common |
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to all copies of the pointer returned from a socket lookup. This has similar |
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behaviour to the handling for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL->PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, but |
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it also handles reference tracking for the pointer. PTR_TO_SOCKET implicitly |
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represents a reference to the corresponding ``struct sock``. To ensure that the |
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reference is not leaked, it is imperative to NULL-check the reference and in |
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the non-NULL case, and pass the valid reference to the socket release function. |
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Direct packet access |
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==================== |
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In cls_bpf and act_bpf programs the verifier allows direct access to the packet |
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data via skb->data and skb->data_end pointers. |
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Ex:: |
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1: r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */ |
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2: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */ |
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3: r5 = r3 |
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4: r5 += 14 |
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5: if r5 > r4 goto pc+16 |
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R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp |
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6: r0 = *(u16 *)(r3 +12) /* access 12 and 13 bytes of the packet */ |
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this 2byte load from the packet is safe to do, since the program author |
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did check ``if (skb->data + 14 > skb->data_end) goto err`` at insn #5 which |
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means that in the fall-through case the register R3 (which points to skb->data) |
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has at least 14 directly accessible bytes. The verifier marks it |
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as R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14). |
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id=0 means that no additional variables were added to the register. |
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off=0 means that no additional constants were added. |
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r=14 is the range of safe access which means that bytes [R3, R3 + 14) are ok. |
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Note that R5 is marked as R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14). It also points |
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to the packet data, but constant 14 was added to the register, so |
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it now points to ``skb->data + 14`` and accessible range is [R5, R5 + 14 - 14) |
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which is zero bytes. |
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More complex packet access may look like:: |
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R0=inv1 R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp |
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6: r0 = *(u8 *)(r3 +7) /* load 7th byte from the packet */ |
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7: r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12) |
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8: r4 *= 14 |
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9: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */ |
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10: r3 += r4 |
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11: r2 = r1 |
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12: r2 <<= 48 |
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13: r2 >>= 48 |
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14: r3 += r2 |
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15: r2 = r3 |
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16: r2 += 8 |
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17: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */ |
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18: if r2 > r1 goto pc+2 |
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R0=inv(id=0,umax_value=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=pkt_end R2=pkt(id=2,off=8,r=8) R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8) R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=3570,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffe)) R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp |
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19: r1 = *(u8 *)(r3 +4) |
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The state of the register R3 is R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8) |
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id=2 means that two ``r3 += rX`` instructions were seen, so r3 points to some |
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offset within a packet and since the program author did |
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``if (r3 + 8 > r1) goto err`` at insn #18, the safe range is [R3, R3 + 8). |
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The verifier only allows 'add'/'sub' operations on packet registers. Any other |
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operation will set the register state to 'SCALAR_VALUE' and it won't be |
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available for direct packet access. |
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Operation ``r3 += rX`` may overflow and become less than original skb->data, |
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therefore the verifier has to prevent that. So when it sees ``r3 += rX`` |
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instruction and rX is more than 16-bit value, any subsequent bounds-check of r3 |
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against skb->data_end will not give us 'range' information, so attempts to read |
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through the pointer will give "invalid access to packet" error. |
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Ex. after insn ``r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12)`` (insn #7 above) the state of r4 is |
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R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) which means that upper 56 bits |
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of the register are guaranteed to be zero, and nothing is known about the lower |
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8 bits. After insn ``r4 *= 14`` the state becomes |
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R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=3570,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffe)), since multiplying an 8-bit |
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value by constant 14 will keep upper 52 bits as zero, also the least significant |
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bit will be zero as 14 is even. Similarly ``r2 >>= 48`` will make |
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R2=inv(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)), since the shift is not sign |
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extending. This logic is implemented in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() function, |
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which calls adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() for adding pointer to scalar (or vice |
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versa) and adjust_scalar_min_max_vals() for operations on two scalars. |
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The end result is that bpf program author can access packet directly |
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using normal C code as:: |
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void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data; |
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void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end; |
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struct eth_hdr *eth = data; |
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struct iphdr *iph = data + sizeof(*eth); |
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struct udphdr *udp = data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph); |
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if (data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(*udp) > data_end) |
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return 0; |
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if (eth->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
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return 0; |
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if (iph->protocol != IPPROTO_UDP || iph->ihl != 5) |
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return 0; |
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if (udp->dest == 53 || udp->source == 9) |
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...; |
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which makes such programs easier to write comparing to LD_ABS insn |
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and significantly faster. |
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Pruning |
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======= |
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The verifier does not actually walk all possible paths through the program. For |
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each new branch to analyse, the verifier looks at all the states it's previously |
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been in when at this instruction. If any of them contain the current state as a |
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subset, the branch is 'pruned' - that is, the fact that the previous state was |
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accepted implies the current state would be as well. For instance, if in the |
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previous state, r1 held a packet-pointer, and in the current state, r1 holds a |
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packet-pointer with a range as long or longer and at least as strict an |
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alignment, then r1 is safe. Similarly, if r2 was NOT_INIT before then it can't |
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have been used by any path from that point, so any value in r2 (including |
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another NOT_INIT) is safe. The implementation is in the function regsafe(). |
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Pruning considers not only the registers but also the stack (and any spilled |
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registers it may hold). They must all be safe for the branch to be pruned. |
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This is implemented in states_equal(). |
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Understanding eBPF verifier messages |
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==================================== |
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The following are few examples of invalid eBPF programs and verifier error |
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messages as seen in the log: |
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Program with unreachable instructions:: |
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static struct bpf_insn prog[] = { |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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}; |
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Error:: |
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unreachable insn 1 |
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Program that reads uninitialized register:: |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (bf) r0 = r2 |
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R2 !read_ok |
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Program that doesn't initialize R0 before exiting:: |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (bf) r2 = r1 |
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1: (95) exit |
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R0 !read_ok |
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Program that accesses stack out of bounds:: |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, 8, 0), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 +8) = 0 |
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invalid stack off=8 size=8 |
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Program that doesn't initialize stack before passing its address into function:: |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
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BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
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BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), |
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BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (bf) r2 = r10 |
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1: (07) r2 += -8 |
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2: (b7) r1 = 0x0 |
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3: (85) call 1 |
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invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8 |
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Program that uses invalid map_fd=0 while calling to map_lookup_elem() function:: |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
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BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
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BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), |
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BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 |
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1: (bf) r2 = r10 |
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2: (07) r2 += -8 |
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3: (b7) r1 = 0x0 |
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4: (85) call 1 |
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fd 0 is not pointing to valid bpf_map |
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Program that doesn't check return value of map_lookup_elem() before accessing |
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map element:: |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
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BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
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BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), |
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BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 |
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1: (bf) r2 = r10 |
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2: (07) r2 += -8 |
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3: (b7) r1 = 0x0 |
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4: (85) call 1 |
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5: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 0 |
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R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' |
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Program that correctly checks map_lookup_elem() returned value for NULL, but |
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accesses the memory with incorrect alignment:: |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
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BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
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BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), |
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BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
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BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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Error:: |
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0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 |
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1: (bf) r2 = r10 |
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2: (07) r2 += -8 |
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3: (b7) r1 = 1 |
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4: (85) call 1 |
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5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 |
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R0=map_ptr R10=fp |
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6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 |
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misaligned access off 4 size 8 |
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|
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Program that correctly checks map_lookup_elem() returned value for NULL and |
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accesses memory with correct alignment in one side of 'if' branch, but fails |
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to do so in the other side of 'if' branch:: |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), |
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BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
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BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
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BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), |
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BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
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BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0), |
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BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
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BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), |
|
BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
|
|
|
Error:: |
|
|
|
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 |
|
1: (bf) r2 = r10 |
|
2: (07) r2 += -8 |
|
3: (b7) r1 = 1 |
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4: (85) call 1 |
|
5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2 |
|
R0=map_ptr R10=fp |
|
6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 0 |
|
7: (95) exit |
|
|
|
from 5 to 8: R0=imm0 R10=fp |
|
8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 1 |
|
R0 invalid mem access 'imm' |
|
|
|
Program that performs a socket lookup then sets the pointer to NULL without |
|
checking it:: |
|
|
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0), |
|
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
|
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
|
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 4), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0), |
|
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), |
|
BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
|
|
|
Error:: |
|
|
|
0: (b7) r2 = 0 |
|
1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r2 |
|
2: (bf) r2 = r10 |
|
3: (07) r2 += -8 |
|
4: (b7) r3 = 4 |
|
5: (b7) r4 = 0 |
|
6: (b7) r5 = 0 |
|
7: (85) call bpf_sk_lookup_tcp#65 |
|
8: (b7) r0 = 0 |
|
9: (95) exit |
|
Unreleased reference id=1, alloc_insn=7 |
|
|
|
Program that performs a socket lookup but does not NULL-check the returned |
|
value:: |
|
|
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0), |
|
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
|
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), |
|
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 4), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), |
|
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0), |
|
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp), |
|
BPF_EXIT_INSN(), |
|
|
|
Error:: |
|
|
|
0: (b7) r2 = 0 |
|
1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r2 |
|
2: (bf) r2 = r10 |
|
3: (07) r2 += -8 |
|
4: (b7) r3 = 4 |
|
5: (b7) r4 = 0 |
|
6: (b7) r5 = 0 |
|
7: (85) call bpf_sk_lookup_tcp#65 |
|
8: (95) exit |
|
Unreleased reference id=1, alloc_insn=7
|
|
|