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760 lines
21 KiB
760 lines
21 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt |
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#include <linux/init.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/string.h> |
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#include <linux/time.h> |
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#include <linux/types.h> |
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#include <linux/efi.h> |
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#include <linux/slab.h> |
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#include <linux/memblock.h> |
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#include <linux/acpi.h> |
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#include <linux/dmi.h> |
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#include <asm/e820/api.h> |
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#include <asm/efi.h> |
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#include <asm/uv/uv.h> |
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#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> |
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#include <asm/realmode.h> |
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#include <asm/reboot.h> |
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#define EFI_MIN_RESERVE 5120 |
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#define EFI_DUMMY_GUID \ |
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EFI_GUID(0x4424ac57, 0xbe4b, 0x47dd, 0x9e, 0x97, 0xed, 0x50, 0xf0, 0x9f, 0x92, 0xa9) |
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#define QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE 0x5f435348 /* _CSH */ |
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#define QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE 0x400 |
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/* |
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* Header prepended to the standard EFI capsule on Quark systems the are based |
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* on Intel firmware BSP. |
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* @csh_signature: Unique identifier to sanity check signed module |
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* presence ("_CSH"). |
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* @version: Current version of CSH used. Should be one for Quark A0. |
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* @modulesize: Size of the entire module including the module header |
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* and payload. |
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* @security_version_number_index: Index of SVN to use for validation of signed |
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* module. |
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* @security_version_number: Used to prevent against roll back of modules. |
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* @rsvd_module_id: Currently unused for Clanton (Quark). |
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* @rsvd_module_vendor: Vendor Identifier. For Intel products value is |
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* 0x00008086. |
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* @rsvd_date: BCD representation of build date as yyyymmdd, where |
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* yyyy=4 digit year, mm=1-12, dd=1-31. |
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* @headersize: Total length of the header including including any |
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* padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
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* @hash_algo: What Hash is used in the module signing. |
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* @cryp_algo: What Crypto is used in the module signing. |
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* @keysize: Total length of the key data including including any |
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* padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
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* @signaturesize: Total length of the signature including including any |
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* padding optionally added by the signing tool. |
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* @rsvd_next_header: 32-bit pointer to the next Secure Boot Module in the |
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* chain, if there is a next header. |
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* @rsvd: Reserved, padding structure to required size. |
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* |
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* See also QuartSecurityHeader_t in |
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* Quark_EDKII_v1.2.1.1/QuarkPlatformPkg/Include/QuarkBootRom.h |
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* from https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/23197/Intel-Quark-SoC-X1000-Board-Support-Package-BSP |
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*/ |
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struct quark_security_header { |
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u32 csh_signature; |
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u32 version; |
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u32 modulesize; |
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u32 security_version_number_index; |
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u32 security_version_number; |
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u32 rsvd_module_id; |
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u32 rsvd_module_vendor; |
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u32 rsvd_date; |
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u32 headersize; |
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u32 hash_algo; |
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u32 cryp_algo; |
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u32 keysize; |
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u32 signaturesize; |
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u32 rsvd_next_header; |
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u32 rsvd[2]; |
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}; |
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static const efi_char16_t efi_dummy_name[] = L"DUMMY"; |
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static bool efi_no_storage_paranoia; |
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/* |
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* Some firmware implementations refuse to boot if there's insufficient |
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* space in the variable store. The implementation of garbage collection |
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* in some FW versions causes stale (deleted) variables to take up space |
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* longer than intended and space is only freed once the store becomes |
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* almost completely full. |
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* |
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* Enabling this option disables the space checks in |
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* efi_query_variable_store() and forces garbage collection. |
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* |
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* Only enable this option if deleting EFI variables does not free up |
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* space in your variable store, e.g. if despite deleting variables |
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* you're unable to create new ones. |
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*/ |
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static int __init setup_storage_paranoia(char *arg) |
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{ |
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efi_no_storage_paranoia = true; |
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return 0; |
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} |
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early_param("efi_no_storage_paranoia", setup_storage_paranoia); |
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/* |
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* Deleting the dummy variable which kicks off garbage collection |
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*/ |
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void efi_delete_dummy_variable(void) |
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{ |
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efi.set_variable_nonblocking((efi_char16_t *)efi_dummy_name, |
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&EFI_DUMMY_GUID, |
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EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | |
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EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | |
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EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, 0, NULL); |
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} |
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/* |
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* In the nonblocking case we do not attempt to perform garbage |
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* collection if we do not have enough free space. Rather, we do the |
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* bare minimum check and give up immediately if the available space |
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* is below EFI_MIN_RESERVE. |
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* |
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* This function is intended to be small and simple because it is |
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* invoked from crash handler paths. |
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*/ |
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static efi_status_t |
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query_variable_store_nonblocking(u32 attributes, unsigned long size) |
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{ |
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efi_status_t status; |
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u64 storage_size, remaining_size, max_size; |
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status = efi.query_variable_info_nonblocking(attributes, &storage_size, |
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&remaining_size, |
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&max_size); |
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
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return status; |
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if (remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) |
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return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
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return EFI_SUCCESS; |
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} |
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/* |
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* Some firmware implementations refuse to boot if there's insufficient space |
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* in the variable store. Ensure that we never use more than a safe limit. |
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* |
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* Return EFI_SUCCESS if it is safe to write 'size' bytes to the variable |
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* store. |
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*/ |
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efi_status_t efi_query_variable_store(u32 attributes, unsigned long size, |
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bool nonblocking) |
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{ |
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efi_status_t status; |
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u64 storage_size, remaining_size, max_size; |
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if (!(attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)) |
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return 0; |
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if (nonblocking) |
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return query_variable_store_nonblocking(attributes, size); |
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status = efi.query_variable_info(attributes, &storage_size, |
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&remaining_size, &max_size); |
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
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return status; |
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/* |
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* We account for that by refusing the write if permitting it would |
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* reduce the available space to under 5KB. This figure was provided by |
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* Samsung, so should be safe. |
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*/ |
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if ((remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) && |
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!efi_no_storage_paranoia) { |
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/* |
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* Triggering garbage collection may require that the firmware |
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* generate a real EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES error. We can force |
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* that by attempting to use more space than is available. |
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*/ |
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unsigned long dummy_size = remaining_size + 1024; |
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void *dummy = kzalloc(dummy_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
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if (!dummy) |
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return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
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status = efi.set_variable((efi_char16_t *)efi_dummy_name, |
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&EFI_DUMMY_GUID, |
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EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | |
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EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | |
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EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, |
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dummy_size, dummy); |
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if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) { |
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/* |
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* This should have failed, so if it didn't make sure |
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* that we delete it... |
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*/ |
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efi_delete_dummy_variable(); |
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} |
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kfree(dummy); |
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/* |
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* The runtime code may now have triggered a garbage collection |
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* run, so check the variable info again |
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*/ |
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status = efi.query_variable_info(attributes, &storage_size, |
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&remaining_size, &max_size); |
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) |
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return status; |
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/* |
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* There still isn't enough room, so return an error |
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*/ |
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if (remaining_size - size < EFI_MIN_RESERVE) |
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return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
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} |
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return EFI_SUCCESS; |
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} |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efi_query_variable_store); |
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/* |
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* The UEFI specification makes it clear that the operating system is |
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* free to do whatever it wants with boot services code after |
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* ExitBootServices() has been called. Ignoring this recommendation a |
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* significant bunch of EFI implementations continue calling into boot |
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* services code (SetVirtualAddressMap). In order to work around such |
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* buggy implementations we reserve boot services region during EFI |
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* init and make sure it stays executable. Then, after |
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* SetVirtualAddressMap(), it is discarded. |
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* |
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* However, some boot services regions contain data that is required |
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* by drivers, so we need to track which memory ranges can never be |
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* freed. This is done by tagging those regions with the |
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* EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute. |
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* |
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* Any driver that wants to mark a region as reserved must use |
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* efi_mem_reserve() which will insert a new EFI memory descriptor |
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* into efi.memmap (splitting existing regions if necessary) and tag |
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* it with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME. |
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*/ |
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void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size) |
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{ |
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struct efi_memory_map_data data = { 0 }; |
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struct efi_mem_range mr; |
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efi_memory_desc_t md; |
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int num_entries; |
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void *new; |
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if (efi_mem_desc_lookup(addr, &md) || |
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md.type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) { |
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pr_err("Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for %pa\n", &addr); |
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return; |
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} |
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if (addr + size > md.phys_addr + (md.num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) { |
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pr_err("Region spans EFI memory descriptors, %pa\n", &addr); |
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return; |
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} |
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size += addr % EFI_PAGE_SIZE; |
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size = round_up(size, EFI_PAGE_SIZE); |
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addr = round_down(addr, EFI_PAGE_SIZE); |
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mr.range.start = addr; |
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mr.range.end = addr + size - 1; |
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mr.attribute = md.attribute | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME; |
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num_entries = efi_memmap_split_count(&md, &mr.range); |
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num_entries += efi.memmap.nr_map; |
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if (efi_memmap_alloc(num_entries, &data) != 0) { |
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pr_err("Could not allocate boot services memmap\n"); |
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return; |
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} |
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new = early_memremap(data.phys_map, data.size); |
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if (!new) { |
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pr_err("Failed to map new boot services memmap\n"); |
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return; |
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} |
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efi_memmap_insert(&efi.memmap, new, &mr); |
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early_memunmap(new, data.size); |
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efi_memmap_install(&data); |
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e820__range_update(addr, size, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); |
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e820__update_table(e820_table); |
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} |
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/* |
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* Helper function for efi_reserve_boot_services() to figure out if we |
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* can free regions in efi_free_boot_services(). |
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* |
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* Use this function to ensure we do not free regions owned by somebody |
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* else. We must only reserve (and then free) regions: |
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* |
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* - Not within any part of the kernel |
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* - Not the BIOS reserved area (E820_TYPE_RESERVED, E820_TYPE_NVS, etc) |
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*/ |
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static __init bool can_free_region(u64 start, u64 size) |
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{ |
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if (start + size > __pa_symbol(_text) && start <= __pa_symbol(_end)) |
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return false; |
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if (!e820__mapped_all(start, start+size, E820_TYPE_RAM)) |
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return false; |
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return true; |
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} |
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void __init efi_reserve_boot_services(void) |
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{ |
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efi_memory_desc_t *md; |
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if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)) |
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return; |
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for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
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u64 start = md->phys_addr; |
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u64 size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; |
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bool already_reserved; |
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if (md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE && |
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md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) |
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continue; |
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already_reserved = memblock_is_region_reserved(start, size); |
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/* |
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* Because the following memblock_reserve() is paired |
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* with memblock_free_late() for this region in |
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* efi_free_boot_services(), we must be extremely |
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* careful not to reserve, and subsequently free, |
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* critical regions of memory (like the kernel image) or |
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* those regions that somebody else has already |
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* reserved. |
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* |
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* A good example of a critical region that must not be |
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* freed is page zero (first 4Kb of memory), which may |
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* contain boot services code/data but is marked |
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* E820_TYPE_RESERVED by trim_bios_range(). |
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*/ |
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if (!already_reserved) { |
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memblock_reserve(start, size); |
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/* |
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* If we are the first to reserve the region, no |
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* one else cares about it. We own it and can |
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* free it later. |
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*/ |
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if (can_free_region(start, size)) |
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continue; |
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} |
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/* |
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* We don't own the region. We must not free it. |
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* |
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* Setting this bit for a boot services region really |
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* doesn't make sense as far as the firmware is |
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* concerned, but it does provide us with a way to tag |
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* those regions that must not be paired with |
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* memblock_free_late(). |
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*/ |
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md->attribute |= EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Apart from having VA mappings for EFI boot services code/data regions, |
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* (duplicate) 1:1 mappings were also created as a quirk for buggy firmware. So, |
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* unmap both 1:1 and VA mappings. |
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*/ |
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static void __init efi_unmap_pages(efi_memory_desc_t *md) |
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{ |
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pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd; |
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u64 pa = md->phys_addr; |
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u64 va = md->virt_addr; |
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|
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/* |
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* EFI mixed mode has all RAM mapped to access arguments while making |
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* EFI runtime calls, hence don't unmap EFI boot services code/data |
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* regions. |
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*/ |
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if (efi_is_mixed()) |
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return; |
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if (kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pa, md->num_pages)) |
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pr_err("Failed to unmap 1:1 mapping for 0x%llx\n", pa); |
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if (kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd(pgd, va, md->num_pages)) |
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pr_err("Failed to unmap VA mapping for 0x%llx\n", va); |
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} |
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void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) |
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{ |
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struct efi_memory_map_data data = { 0 }; |
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efi_memory_desc_t *md; |
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int num_entries = 0; |
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void *new, *new_md; |
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/* Keep all regions for /sys/kernel/debug/efi */ |
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if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) |
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return; |
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for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
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unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr; |
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unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; |
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size_t rm_size; |
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if (md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE && |
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md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) { |
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num_entries++; |
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continue; |
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} |
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/* Do not free, someone else owns it: */ |
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if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) { |
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num_entries++; |
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continue; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Before calling set_virtual_address_map(), EFI boot services |
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* code/data regions were mapped as a quirk for buggy firmware. |
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* Unmap them from efi_pgd before freeing them up. |
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*/ |
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efi_unmap_pages(md); |
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|
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/* |
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* Nasty quirk: if all sub-1MB memory is used for boot |
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* services, we can get here without having allocated the |
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* real mode trampoline. It's too late to hand boot services |
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* memory back to the memblock allocator, so instead |
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* try to manually allocate the trampoline if needed. |
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* |
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* I've seen this on a Dell XPS 13 9350 with firmware |
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* 1.4.4 with SGX enabled booting Linux via Fedora 24's |
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* grub2-efi on a hard disk. (And no, I don't know why |
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* this happened, but Linux should still try to boot rather |
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* panicing early.) |
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*/ |
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rm_size = real_mode_size_needed(); |
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if (rm_size && (start + rm_size) < (1<<20) && size >= rm_size) { |
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set_real_mode_mem(start); |
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start += rm_size; |
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size -= rm_size; |
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} |
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memblock_free_late(start, size); |
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} |
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|
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if (!num_entries) |
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return; |
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|
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if (efi_memmap_alloc(num_entries, &data) != 0) { |
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pr_err("Failed to allocate new EFI memmap\n"); |
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return; |
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} |
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new = memremap(data.phys_map, data.size, MEMREMAP_WB); |
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if (!new) { |
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pr_err("Failed to map new EFI memmap\n"); |
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return; |
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} |
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/* |
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* Build a new EFI memmap that excludes any boot services |
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* regions that are not tagged EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME, since those |
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* regions have now been freed. |
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*/ |
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new_md = new; |
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for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { |
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if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) && |
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(md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || |
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md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA)) |
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continue; |
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|
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memcpy(new_md, md, efi.memmap.desc_size); |
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new_md += efi.memmap.desc_size; |
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} |
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|
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memunmap(new); |
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|
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if (efi_memmap_install(&data) != 0) { |
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pr_err("Could not install new EFI memmap\n"); |
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return; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* A number of config table entries get remapped to virtual addresses |
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* after entering EFI virtual mode. However, the kexec kernel requires |
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* their physical addresses therefore we pass them via setup_data and |
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* correct those entries to their respective physical addresses here. |
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* |
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* Currently only handles smbios which is necessary for some firmware |
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* implementation. |
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*/ |
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int __init efi_reuse_config(u64 tables, int nr_tables) |
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{ |
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int i, sz, ret = 0; |
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void *p, *tablep; |
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struct efi_setup_data *data; |
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|
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if (nr_tables == 0) |
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return 0; |
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|
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if (!efi_setup) |
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return 0; |
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|
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if (!efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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data = early_memremap(efi_setup, sizeof(*data)); |
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if (!data) { |
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ret = -ENOMEM; |
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goto out; |
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} |
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|
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if (!data->smbios) |
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goto out_memremap; |
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|
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sz = sizeof(efi_config_table_64_t); |
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p = tablep = early_memremap(tables, nr_tables * sz); |
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if (!p) { |
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pr_err("Could not map Configuration table!\n"); |
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ret = -ENOMEM; |
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goto out_memremap; |
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} |
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|
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for (i = 0; i < nr_tables; i++) { |
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efi_guid_t guid; |
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|
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guid = ((efi_config_table_64_t *)p)->guid; |
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|
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if (!efi_guidcmp(guid, SMBIOS_TABLE_GUID)) |
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((efi_config_table_64_t *)p)->table = data->smbios; |
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p += sz; |
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} |
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early_memunmap(tablep, nr_tables * sz); |
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|
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out_memremap: |
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early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data)); |
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out: |
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return ret; |
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} |
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|
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void __init efi_apply_memmap_quirks(void) |
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{ |
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/* |
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* Once setup is done earlier, unmap the EFI memory map on mismatched |
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* firmware/kernel architectures since there is no support for runtime |
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* services. |
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*/ |
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if (!efi_runtime_supported()) { |
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pr_info("Setup done, disabling due to 32/64-bit mismatch\n"); |
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efi_memmap_unmap(); |
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} |
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} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* For most modern platforms the preferred method of powering off is via |
|
* ACPI. However, there are some that are known to require the use of |
|
* EFI runtime services and for which ACPI does not work at all. |
|
* |
|
* Using EFI is a last resort, to be used only if no other option |
|
* exists. |
|
*/ |
|
bool efi_reboot_required(void) |
|
{ |
|
if (!acpi_gbl_reduced_hardware) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
efi_reboot_quirk_mode = EFI_RESET_WARM; |
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool efi_poweroff_required(void) |
|
{ |
|
return acpi_gbl_reduced_hardware || acpi_no_s5; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_QUIRK_QUARK_CSH |
|
|
|
static int qrk_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void **pkbuff, |
|
size_t hdr_bytes) |
|
{ |
|
struct quark_security_header *csh = *pkbuff; |
|
|
|
/* Only process data block that is larger than the security header */ |
|
if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(struct quark_security_header)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (csh->csh_signature != QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE || |
|
csh->headersize != QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
/* Only process data block if EFI header is included */ |
|
if (hdr_bytes < QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE + |
|
sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
pr_debug("Quark security header detected\n"); |
|
|
|
if (csh->rsvd_next_header != 0) { |
|
pr_err("multiple Quark security headers not supported\n"); |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
*pkbuff += csh->headersize; |
|
cap_info->total_size = csh->headersize; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Update the first page pointer to skip over the CSH header. |
|
*/ |
|
cap_info->phys[0] += csh->headersize; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* cap_info->capsule should point at a virtual mapping of the entire |
|
* capsule, starting at the capsule header. Our image has the Quark |
|
* security header prepended, so we cannot rely on the default vmap() |
|
* mapping created by the generic capsule code. |
|
* Given that the Quark firmware does not appear to care about the |
|
* virtual mapping, let's just point cap_info->capsule at our copy |
|
* of the capsule header. |
|
*/ |
|
cap_info->capsule = &cap_info->header; |
|
|
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static const struct x86_cpu_id efi_capsule_quirk_ids[] = { |
|
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(INTEL, 5, INTEL_FAM5_QUARK_X1000, |
|
&qrk_capsule_setup_info), |
|
{ } |
|
}; |
|
|
|
int efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info, void *kbuff, |
|
size_t hdr_bytes) |
|
{ |
|
int (*quirk_handler)(struct capsule_info *, void **, size_t); |
|
const struct x86_cpu_id *id; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
cap_info->total_size = 0; |
|
|
|
id = x86_match_cpu(efi_capsule_quirk_ids); |
|
if (id) { |
|
/* |
|
* The quirk handler is supposed to return |
|
* - a value > 0 if the setup should continue, after advancing |
|
* kbuff as needed |
|
* - 0 if not enough hdr_bytes are available yet |
|
* - a negative error code otherwise |
|
*/ |
|
quirk_handler = (typeof(quirk_handler))id->driver_data; |
|
ret = quirk_handler(cap_info, &kbuff, hdr_bytes); |
|
if (ret <= 0) |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(&cap_info->header, kbuff, sizeof(cap_info->header)); |
|
|
|
cap_info->total_size += cap_info->header.imagesize; |
|
|
|
return __efi_capsule_setup_info(cap_info); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If any access by any efi runtime service causes a page fault, then, |
|
* 1. If it's efi_reset_system(), reboot through BIOS. |
|
* 2. If any other efi runtime service, then |
|
* a. Return error status to the efi caller process. |
|
* b. Disable EFI Runtime Services forever and |
|
* c. Freeze efi_rts_wq and schedule new process. |
|
* |
|
* @return: Returns, if the page fault is not handled. This function |
|
* will never return if the page fault is handled successfully. |
|
*/ |
|
void efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr) |
|
{ |
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If we get an interrupt/NMI while processing an EFI runtime service |
|
* then this is a regular OOPS, not an EFI failure. |
|
*/ |
|
if (in_interrupt()) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Make sure that an efi runtime service caused the page fault. |
|
* READ_ONCE() because we might be OOPSing in a different thread, |
|
* and we don't want to trip KTSAN while trying to OOPS. |
|
*/ |
|
if (READ_ONCE(efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id) == EFI_NONE || |
|
current_work() != &efi_rts_work.work) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Address range 0x0000 - 0x0fff is always mapped in the efi_pgd, so |
|
* page faulting on these addresses isn't expected. |
|
*/ |
|
if (phys_addr <= 0x0fff) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Print stack trace as it might be useful to know which EFI Runtime |
|
* Service is buggy. |
|
*/ |
|
WARN(1, FW_BUG "Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0x%lx\n", |
|
phys_addr); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Buggy efi_reset_system() is handled differently from other EFI |
|
* Runtime Services as it doesn't use efi_rts_wq. Although, |
|
* native_machine_emergency_restart() says that machine_real_restart() |
|
* could fail, it's better not to compilcate this fault handler |
|
* because this case occurs *very* rarely and hence could be improved |
|
* on a need by basis. |
|
*/ |
|
if (efi_rts_work.efi_rts_id == EFI_RESET_SYSTEM) { |
|
pr_info("efi_reset_system() buggy! Reboot through BIOS\n"); |
|
machine_real_restart(MRR_BIOS); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Before calling EFI Runtime Service, the kernel has switched the |
|
* calling process to efi_mm. Hence, switch back to task_mm. |
|
*/ |
|
arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(); |
|
|
|
/* Signal error status to the efi caller process */ |
|
efi_rts_work.status = EFI_ABORTED; |
|
complete(&efi_rts_work.efi_rts_comp); |
|
|
|
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags); |
|
pr_info("Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services\n"); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Call schedule() in an infinite loop, so that any spurious wake ups |
|
* will never run efi_rts_wq again. |
|
*/ |
|
for (;;) { |
|
set_current_state(TASK_IDLE); |
|
schedule(); |
|
} |
|
}
|
|
|