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692 lines
19 KiB
692 lines
19 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
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/* |
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* Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks |
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* |
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* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> |
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* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <linux/atomic.h> |
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#include <linux/bitops.h> |
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#include <linux/bits.h> |
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#include <linux/compiler_types.h> |
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#include <linux/dcache.h> |
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#include <linux/err.h> |
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#include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/init.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/limits.h> |
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#include <linux/list.h> |
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
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#include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/namei.h> |
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#include <linux/path.h> |
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
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#include <linux/spinlock.h> |
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#include <linux/stat.h> |
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#include <linux/types.h> |
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#include <linux/wait_bit.h> |
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#include <linux/workqueue.h> |
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#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h> |
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|
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#include "common.h" |
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#include "cred.h" |
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#include "fs.h" |
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#include "limits.h" |
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#include "object.h" |
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#include "ruleset.h" |
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#include "setup.h" |
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|
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/* Underlying object management */ |
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|
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static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object) |
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__releases(object->lock) |
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{ |
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struct inode *const inode = object->underobj; |
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struct super_block *sb; |
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|
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if (!inode) { |
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spin_unlock(&object->lock); |
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return; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference |
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* to the underlying inode. |
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*/ |
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object->underobj = NULL; |
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/* |
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* Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted, |
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* hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput(). |
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*/ |
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sb = inode->i_sb; |
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atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); |
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spin_unlock(&object->lock); |
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/* |
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* Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and |
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* get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset |
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* landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. It is therefore |
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* not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. |
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*/ |
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rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); |
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/* |
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* Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object(). |
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*/ |
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iput(inode); |
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if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)) |
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wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); |
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} |
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static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = { |
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.release = release_inode |
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}; |
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/* Ruleset management */ |
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static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) |
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{ |
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struct landlock_object *object, *new_object; |
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struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode); |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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retry: |
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object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object); |
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if (object) { |
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if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) { |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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return object; |
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} |
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/* |
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* We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going |
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* away. Wait for release_inode(), then retry. |
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*/ |
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spin_lock(&object->lock); |
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spin_unlock(&object->lock); |
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goto retry; |
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} |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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/* |
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* If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without |
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* holding any locks). |
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*/ |
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new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode); |
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if (IS_ERR(new_object)) |
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return new_object; |
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/* |
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* Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or |
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* hook_sb_delete(). |
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*/ |
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spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); |
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if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) { |
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/* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */ |
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); |
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kfree(new_object); |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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goto retry; |
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} |
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/* |
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* @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock |
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* shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the |
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* related object. |
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*/ |
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ihold(inode); |
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rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object); |
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); |
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return new_object; |
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} |
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/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */ |
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#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) |
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/* |
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* @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd(). |
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*/ |
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int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, |
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const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights) |
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{ |
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int err; |
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struct landlock_object *object; |
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|
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/* Files only get access rights that make sense. */ |
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if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != |
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ACCESS_FILE) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ |
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access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]; |
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object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); |
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if (IS_ERR(object)) |
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return PTR_ERR(object); |
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mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); |
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err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights); |
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mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); |
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/* |
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* No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule() |
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* increments the refcount for the new object if needed. |
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*/ |
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landlock_put_object(object); |
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return err; |
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} |
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/* Access-control management */ |
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static inline u64 unmask_layers( |
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const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, |
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const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request, |
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u64 layer_mask) |
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{ |
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const struct landlock_rule *rule; |
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const struct inode *inode; |
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size_t i; |
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if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) |
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/* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */ |
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return layer_mask; |
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inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, |
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rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object)); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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if (!rule) |
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return layer_mask; |
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/* |
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* An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule |
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* encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses, |
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* regardless of their position in the layer stack. We must then check |
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* the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to |
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* the last one. |
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*/ |
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for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) { |
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const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i]; |
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const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1); |
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/* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */ |
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if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) { |
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layer_mask &= ~layer_level; |
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if (layer_mask == 0) |
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return layer_mask; |
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} |
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} |
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return layer_mask; |
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} |
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static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, |
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const struct path *const path, u32 access_request) |
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{ |
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bool allowed = false; |
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struct path walker_path; |
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u64 layer_mask; |
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size_t i; |
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/* Make sure all layers can be checked. */ |
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BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); |
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if (!access_request) |
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return 0; |
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) |
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return 0; |
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/* |
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* Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable |
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* (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through |
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* /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> . |
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*/ |
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if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || |
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(d_is_positive(path->dentry) && |
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unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))) |
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return 0; |
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) |
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return -EACCES; |
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/* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */ |
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layer_mask = 0; |
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for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) { |
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if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request) |
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layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); |
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} |
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/* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */ |
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if (layer_mask == 0) |
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return 0; |
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walker_path = *path; |
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path_get(&walker_path); |
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/* |
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* We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant |
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* restriction. |
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*/ |
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while (true) { |
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struct dentry *parent_dentry; |
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layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path, |
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access_request, layer_mask); |
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if (layer_mask == 0) { |
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/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ |
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allowed = true; |
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break; |
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} |
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jump_up: |
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if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { |
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if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { |
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/* Ignores hidden mount points. */ |
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goto jump_up; |
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} else { |
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/* |
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* Stops at the real root. Denies access |
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* because not all layers have granted access. |
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*/ |
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allowed = false; |
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break; |
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} |
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} |
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if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) { |
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/* |
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* Stops at disconnected root directories. Only allows |
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* access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is |
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* reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>). |
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*/ |
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allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL); |
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break; |
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} |
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parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry); |
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dput(walker_path.dentry); |
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walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry; |
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} |
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path_put(&walker_path); |
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return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; |
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} |
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static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, |
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const u32 access_request) |
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{ |
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const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
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landlock_get_current_domain(); |
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if (!dom) |
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return 0; |
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return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); |
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} |
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/* Inode hooks */ |
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static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode) |
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{ |
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/* |
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* All inodes must already have been untied from their object by |
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* release_inode() or hook_sb_delete(). |
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*/ |
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WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object); |
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} |
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/* Super-block hooks */ |
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/* |
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* Release the inodes used in a security policy. |
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* |
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* Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes() |
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*/ |
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static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) |
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{ |
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struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL; |
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if (!landlock_initialized) |
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return; |
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spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); |
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list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { |
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struct landlock_object *object; |
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/* Only handles referenced inodes. */ |
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if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) |
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continue; |
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/* |
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* Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g. |
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* from get_inode_object()). |
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*/ |
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spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); |
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/* |
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* Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE to protect against a race |
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* condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which |
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* could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a |
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* second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also |
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* checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. |
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*/ |
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if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { |
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); |
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continue; |
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} |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); |
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if (!object) { |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); |
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continue; |
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} |
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/* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */ |
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__iget(inode); |
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); |
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/* |
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* If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we |
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* are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we |
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* will just wait for it to finish. |
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*/ |
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spin_lock(&object->lock); |
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if (object->underobj == inode) { |
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object->underobj = NULL; |
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spin_unlock(&object->lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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/* |
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* Because object->underobj was not NULL, |
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* release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee |
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* that it is safe to reset |
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* landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. |
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* It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. |
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*/ |
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rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); |
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/* |
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* At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was |
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* originally set up by get_inode_object() and the |
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* __iget() reference that we just set in this loop |
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* walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will |
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* not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at |
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* least two references to it. |
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*/ |
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iput(inode); |
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} else { |
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spin_unlock(&object->lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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} |
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if (prev_inode) { |
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/* |
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* At this point, we still own the __iget() reference |
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* that we just set in this loop walk. Therefore we |
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* can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't |
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* disappear from under us until the next loop walk. |
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*/ |
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spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); |
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/* |
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* We can now actually put the inode reference from the |
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* previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore. |
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*/ |
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iput(prev_inode); |
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cond_resched(); |
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spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); |
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} |
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prev_inode = inode; |
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} |
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spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); |
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/* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */ |
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if (prev_inode) |
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iput(prev_inode); |
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/* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */ |
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wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read( |
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&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)); |
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} |
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/* |
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* Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem |
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* topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files |
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* not previously allowed. |
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* |
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* To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked |
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* processes. Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a |
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* landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide |
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* access-control security policy. |
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* |
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* This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount |
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* namespace updates requested by a landlocked process. Indeed, we could |
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* update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into |
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* account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point. |
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* However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically |
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* inherit these new constraints. Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons, |
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* a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag). |
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*/ |
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static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name, |
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const struct path *const path, const char *const type, |
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const unsigned long flags, void *const data) |
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{ |
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if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) |
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return 0; |
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return -EPERM; |
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} |
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static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path, |
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const struct path *const to_path) |
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{ |
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if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) |
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return 0; |
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return -EPERM; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which |
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* may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden. |
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*/ |
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static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags) |
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{ |
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if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) |
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return 0; |
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return -EPERM; |
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} |
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static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts) |
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{ |
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if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) |
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return 0; |
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return -EPERM; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace. It must |
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* then be forbidden for a landlocked process. |
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* |
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* However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root |
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* directory of the current process. Moreover, it can be used to restrict the |
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* view of the filesystem. |
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*/ |
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static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, |
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const struct path *const new_path) |
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{ |
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if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) |
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return 0; |
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return -EPERM; |
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} |
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/* Path hooks */ |
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|
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static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) |
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{ |
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switch (mode & S_IFMT) { |
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case S_IFLNK: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; |
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case 0: |
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/* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ |
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case S_IFREG: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; |
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case S_IFDIR: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; |
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case S_IFCHR: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; |
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case S_IFBLK: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; |
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case S_IFIFO: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; |
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case S_IFSOCK: |
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return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; |
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default: |
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WARN_ON_ONCE(1); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not |
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* handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more |
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* privileges by being accessible from the destination. This is getting more |
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* complex when dealing with multiple layers. The whole picture can be seen as |
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* a multilayer partial ordering problem. A future version of Landlock will |
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* deal with that. |
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*/ |
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static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, |
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const struct path *const new_dir, |
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struct dentry *const new_dentry) |
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{ |
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const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
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landlock_get_current_domain(); |
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|
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if (!dom) |
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return 0; |
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/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ |
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if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry) |
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/* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ |
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return -EXDEV; |
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if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) |
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return -ENOENT; |
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return check_access_path(dom, new_dir, |
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get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); |
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} |
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|
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static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) |
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{ |
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if (d_is_negative(dentry)) |
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return 0; |
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return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : |
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; |
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} |
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|
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static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, |
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struct dentry *const old_dentry, |
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const struct path *const new_dir, |
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struct dentry *const new_dentry) |
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{ |
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const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
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landlock_get_current_domain(); |
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|
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if (!dom) |
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return 0; |
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/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ |
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if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry) |
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/* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ |
|
return -EXDEV; |
|
if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) |
|
return -ENOENT; |
|
/* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */ |
|
return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) | |
|
maybe_remove(new_dentry) | |
|
get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir, |
|
struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode) |
|
{ |
|
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir, |
|
struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode, |
|
const unsigned int dev) |
|
{ |
|
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
|
landlock_get_current_domain(); |
|
|
|
if (!dom) |
|
return 0; |
|
return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir, |
|
struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name) |
|
{ |
|
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir, |
|
struct dentry *const dentry) |
|
{ |
|
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, |
|
struct dentry *const dentry) |
|
{ |
|
return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* File hooks */ |
|
|
|
static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file) |
|
{ |
|
u32 access = 0; |
|
|
|
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { |
|
/* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */ |
|
if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) |
|
return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; |
|
access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; |
|
} |
|
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) |
|
access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; |
|
/* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */ |
|
if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) |
|
access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; |
|
return access; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file) |
|
{ |
|
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = |
|
landlock_get_current_domain(); |
|
|
|
if (!dom) |
|
return 0; |
|
/* |
|
* Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may |
|
* return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock |
|
* evolution. |
|
*/ |
|
return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), |
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), |
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), |
|
}; |
|
|
|
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void) |
|
{ |
|
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), |
|
LANDLOCK_NAME); |
|
}
|
|
|