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3831 lines
93 KiB
3831 lines
93 KiB
/* |
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BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux |
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Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies). |
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|
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as |
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published by the Free Software Foundation; |
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|
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS |
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OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, |
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. |
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IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY |
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CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES |
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WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN |
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ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF |
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OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
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|
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ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, |
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COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS |
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SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. |
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*/ |
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|
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#include <linux/debugfs.h> |
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h> |
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#include <linux/crypto.h> |
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#include <crypto/aes.h> |
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#include <crypto/algapi.h> |
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#include <crypto/hash.h> |
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#include <crypto/kpp.h> |
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|
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#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h> |
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#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h> |
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#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h> |
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#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h> |
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|
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#include "ecdh_helper.h" |
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#include "smp.h" |
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|
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#define SMP_DEV(hdev) \ |
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((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data) |
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|
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/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want |
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* accidentally in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys |
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* and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions. |
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*/ |
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#ifdef DEBUG |
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#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ |
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##__VA_ARGS__) |
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#else |
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#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \ |
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##__VA_ARGS__) |
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#endif |
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|
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#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd) |
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|
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/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */ |
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#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY) |
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|
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#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000) |
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|
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#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \ |
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0x3f : 0x07) |
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#define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07 |
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|
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/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */ |
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#define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80 |
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|
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enum { |
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SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, |
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SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, |
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SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, |
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SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, |
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SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, |
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SMP_FLAG_SC, |
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SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, |
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SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, |
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SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, |
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SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, |
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SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, |
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SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, |
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SMP_FLAG_CT2, |
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}; |
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struct smp_dev { |
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/* Secure Connections OOB data */ |
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bool local_oob; |
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u8 local_pk[64]; |
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u8 local_rand[16]; |
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bool debug_key; |
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|
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struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
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struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
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}; |
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struct smp_chan { |
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struct l2cap_conn *conn; |
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struct delayed_work security_timer; |
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unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */ |
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|
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u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ |
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u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ |
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u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */ |
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u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */ |
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u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ |
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u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */ |
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u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */ |
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u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */ |
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u8 enc_key_size; |
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u8 remote_key_dist; |
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bdaddr_t id_addr; |
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u8 id_addr_type; |
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u8 irk[16]; |
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struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
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struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk; |
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struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
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struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk; |
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struct smp_irk *remote_irk; |
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u8 *link_key; |
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unsigned long flags; |
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u8 method; |
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u8 passkey_round; |
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|
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/* Secure Connections variables */ |
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u8 local_pk[64]; |
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u8 remote_pk[64]; |
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u8 dhkey[32]; |
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u8 mackey[16]; |
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|
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struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
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struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
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}; |
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|
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/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core |
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* specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the |
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* private debug key. |
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*/ |
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static const u8 debug_pk[64] = { |
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0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, |
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0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, |
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0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, |
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0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20, |
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0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74, |
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0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76, |
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0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63, |
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0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc, |
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}; |
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|
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static const u8 debug_sk[32] = { |
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0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58, |
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0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a, |
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0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74, |
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0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f, |
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}; |
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static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len) |
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{ |
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size_t i; |
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|
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) |
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dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i]; |
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} |
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/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions |
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* AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6. |
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*/ |
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|
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static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, |
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size_t len, u8 mac[16]) |
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{ |
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uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX]; |
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int err; |
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|
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if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX) |
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return -EFBIG; |
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|
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if (!tfm) { |
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BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm); |
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return -EINVAL; |
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} |
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/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */ |
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swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); |
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swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len); |
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SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m); |
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SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k); |
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err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); |
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if (err) { |
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BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); |
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return err; |
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} |
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err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb); |
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if (err) { |
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BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err); |
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return err; |
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} |
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swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16); |
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SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], |
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const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16]) |
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{ |
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u8 m[65]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); |
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SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); |
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SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z); |
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m[0] = z; |
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memcpy(m + 1, v, 32); |
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memcpy(m + 33, u, 32); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32], |
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const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7], |
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const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) |
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{ |
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/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in |
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* the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII |
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* the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a |
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* random number whereas length is the value 256 in little |
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* endian format. |
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*/ |
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const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 }; |
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const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, |
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0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c }; |
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const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 }; |
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u8 m[53], t[16]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w); |
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SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); |
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SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t); |
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memcpy(m, length, 2); |
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memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7); |
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memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7); |
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memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16); |
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memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16); |
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memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4); |
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m[52] = 0; /* Counter */ |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey); |
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m[52] = 1; /* Counter */ |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
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const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16], |
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const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7], |
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u8 res[16]) |
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{ |
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u8 m[65]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w); |
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SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2); |
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SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2); |
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memcpy(m, a2, 7); |
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memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7); |
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memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3); |
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memcpy(m + 17, r, 16); |
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memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16); |
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memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32], |
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const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val) |
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{ |
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u8 m[80], tmp[16]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u); |
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SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v); |
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SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y); |
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memcpy(m, y, 16); |
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memcpy(m + 16, v, 32); |
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memcpy(m + 48, u, 32); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp); |
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*val %= 1000000; |
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SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val); |
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return 0; |
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} |
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static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
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const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16]) |
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{ |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16], |
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const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16]) |
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{ |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt); |
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err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res); |
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if (err) |
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return err; |
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SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res); |
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return err; |
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} |
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/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1, |
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* s1 and ah. |
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*/ |
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static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r) |
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{ |
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struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; |
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uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); |
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/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ |
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swap_buf(k, tmp, 16); |
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err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16); |
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if (err) { |
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BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); |
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return err; |
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} |
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/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ |
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swap_buf(r, data, 16); |
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aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data); |
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/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ |
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swap_buf(data, r, 16); |
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SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r); |
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memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16], |
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const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, |
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const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) |
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{ |
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u8 p1[16], p2[16]; |
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int err; |
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SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r); |
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SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra); |
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SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres); |
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memset(p1, 0, 16); |
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/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ |
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p1[0] = _iat; |
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p1[1] = _rat; |
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memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); |
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memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); |
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SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1); |
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/* res = r XOR p1 */ |
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crypto_xor_cpy(res, r, p1, sizeof(p1)); |
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|
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/* res = e(k, res) */ |
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err = smp_e(k, res); |
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if (err) { |
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BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); |
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return err; |
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} |
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/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ |
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memcpy(p2, ra, 6); |
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memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); |
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memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); |
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SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2); |
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/* res = res XOR p2 */ |
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crypto_xor(res, p2, sizeof(p2)); |
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|
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/* res = e(k, res) */ |
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err = smp_e(k, res); |
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if (err) |
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BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16], |
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const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16]) |
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{ |
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int err; |
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|
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/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ |
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memcpy(_r, r2, 8); |
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memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); |
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err = smp_e(k, _r); |
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if (err) |
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BT_ERR("Encrypt data error"); |
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return err; |
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} |
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static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) |
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{ |
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u8 _res[16]; |
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int err; |
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|
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/* r' = padding || r */ |
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memcpy(_res, r, 3); |
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memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); |
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err = smp_e(irk, _res); |
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if (err) { |
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BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); |
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return err; |
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} |
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|
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/* The output of the random address function ah is: |
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* ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24 |
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* The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits |
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* by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the |
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* result of ah. |
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*/ |
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memcpy(res, _res, 3); |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], |
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const bdaddr_t *bdaddr) |
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{ |
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struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
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u8 hash[3]; |
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int err; |
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|
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if (!chan || !chan->data) |
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return false; |
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|
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bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk); |
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|
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err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash); |
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if (err) |
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return false; |
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|
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return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); |
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} |
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|
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int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) |
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{ |
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struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
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int err; |
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|
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if (!chan || !chan->data) |
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return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
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|
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get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); |
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|
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rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ |
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rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ |
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|
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err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); |
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if (err < 0) |
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return err; |
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|
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bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa); |
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|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) |
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{ |
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struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
struct smp_dev *smp; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data) |
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { |
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); |
|
err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); |
|
smp->debug_key = true; |
|
} else { |
|
while (true) { |
|
/* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ |
|
err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that |
|
* we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. |
|
*/ |
|
if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
smp->debug_key = false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); |
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); |
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16); |
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk, |
|
smp->local_rand, 0, hash); |
|
if (err < 0) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16); |
|
|
|
smp->local_oob = true; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
struct kvec iv[2]; |
|
struct msghdr msg; |
|
|
|
if (!chan) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code); |
|
|
|
iv[0].iov_base = &code; |
|
iv[0].iov_len = 1; |
|
|
|
iv[1].iov_base = data; |
|
iv[1].iov_len = len; |
|
|
|
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); |
|
|
|
iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len); |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len); |
|
|
|
if (!chan->data) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); |
|
schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq) |
|
{ |
|
if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) { |
|
if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) |
|
return BT_SECURITY_FIPS; |
|
else |
|
return BT_SECURITY_HIGH; |
|
} else { |
|
return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level) |
|
{ |
|
switch (sec_level) { |
|
case BT_SECURITY_FIPS: |
|
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH: |
|
return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
|
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM: |
|
return SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
|
default: |
|
return SMP_AUTH_NONE; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { |
|
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
|
} else { |
|
authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) |
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) |
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) && |
|
(authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) { |
|
struct oob_data *oob_data; |
|
u8 bdaddr_type; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) { |
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; |
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) |
|
bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; |
|
else |
|
bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; |
|
|
|
oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst, |
|
bdaddr_type); |
|
if (oob_data && oob_data->present) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags); |
|
oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT; |
|
memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16); |
|
memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16); |
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf); |
|
SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr); |
|
} |
|
|
|
} else { |
|
authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (rsp == NULL) { |
|
req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; |
|
req->oob_flag = oob_flag; |
|
req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; |
|
req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
|
req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; |
|
req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; |
|
rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag; |
|
rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size; |
|
rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
|
rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; |
|
rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev)); |
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS && |
|
max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) |
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
|
|
|
if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size || |
|
max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) |
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
|
|
|
smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
bool complete; |
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!smp); |
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); |
|
|
|
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
|
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete); |
|
|
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); |
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
|
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
|
|
|
/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key |
|
* support hasn't been explicitly enabled. |
|
*/ |
|
if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG && |
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) { |
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
|
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); |
|
smp->ltk = NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ |
|
if (!complete) { |
|
if (smp->ltk) { |
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list); |
|
kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->responder_ltk) { |
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list); |
|
kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_irk) { |
|
list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list); |
|
kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
chan->data = NULL; |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
hci_conn_drop(hcon); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
|
|
if (reason) |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), |
|
&reason); |
|
|
|
mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
|
|
|
if (chan->data) |
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
|
} |
|
|
|
#define JUST_WORKS 0x00 |
|
#define JUST_CFM 0x01 |
|
#define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02 |
|
#define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03 |
|
#define REQ_OOB 0x04 |
|
#define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05 |
|
#define OVERLAP 0xFF |
|
|
|
static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = { |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, |
|
{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP }, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = { |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY }, |
|
{ JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM }, |
|
{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY }, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) |
|
{ |
|
/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets |
|
* converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators. |
|
*/ |
|
if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY || |
|
remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY) |
|
return JUST_CFM; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
|
return sc_method[remote_io][local_io]; |
|
|
|
return gen_method[remote_io][local_io]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, |
|
u8 local_io, u8 remote_io) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
u32 passkey = 0; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */ |
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%u lcl:%u rem:%u", auth, local_io, |
|
remote_io); |
|
|
|
/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming |
|
* request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM |
|
* will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this |
|
* function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the |
|
* table. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM)) |
|
smp->method = JUST_CFM; |
|
else |
|
smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); |
|
|
|
/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ |
|
if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, |
|
&smp->flags)) |
|
smp->method = JUST_WORKS; |
|
|
|
/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */ |
|
if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && |
|
hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
|
smp->method = JUST_WORKS; |
|
|
|
/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */ |
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we |
|
* can only recover the just-works case. |
|
*/ |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ |
|
if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); |
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator |
|
* Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey. |
|
*/ |
|
if (smp->method == OVERLAP) { |
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
|
smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY; |
|
else |
|
smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Generate random passkey. */ |
|
if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) { |
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
|
get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); |
|
passkey %= 1000000; |
|
put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); |
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", passkey); |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) |
|
ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); |
|
else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM) |
|
ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, |
|
passkey, 1); |
|
else |
|
ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, |
|
hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, |
|
passkey, 0); |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
|
conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, |
|
conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, |
|
cp.confirm_val); |
|
if (ret) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
else |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
u8 confirm[16]; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, |
|
conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder"); |
|
|
|
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, |
|
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, |
|
hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); |
|
if (ret) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed " |
|
"(confirmation values mismatch)"); |
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
u8 stk[16]; |
|
__le64 rand = 0; |
|
__le16 ediv = 0; |
|
|
|
smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); |
|
|
|
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size); |
|
hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
|
set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); |
|
} else { |
|
u8 stk[16], auth; |
|
__le64 rand = 0; |
|
__le16 ediv = 0; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
|
smp->prnd); |
|
|
|
smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
|
auth = 1; |
|
else |
|
auth = 0; |
|
|
|
/* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the |
|
* responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator |
|
* STK never needs to be stored). |
|
*/ |
|
hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
|
SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
|
bool persistent; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
|
if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) |
|
persistent = false; |
|
else |
|
persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, |
|
&hcon->flags); |
|
} else { |
|
/* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if |
|
* both sides had the bonding bit set in their |
|
* authentication requests. |
|
*/ |
|
persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & |
|
SMP_AUTH_BONDING); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_irk) { |
|
mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent); |
|
|
|
/* Now that user space can be considered to know the |
|
* identity address track the connection based on it |
|
* from now on (assuming this is an LE link). |
|
*/ |
|
if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { |
|
bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr); |
|
hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type; |
|
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->csrk) { |
|
smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; |
|
bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); |
|
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->responder_csrk) { |
|
smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; |
|
bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); |
|
mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->ltk) { |
|
smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; |
|
bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); |
|
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->responder_ltk) { |
|
smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; |
|
bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); |
|
mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->link_key) { |
|
struct link_key *key; |
|
u8 type; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) |
|
type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION; |
|
else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) |
|
type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256; |
|
else |
|
type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256; |
|
|
|
key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst, |
|
smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent); |
|
if (key) { |
|
mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent); |
|
|
|
/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant |
|
* flag is not set. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) && |
|
key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) { |
|
list_del_rcu(&key->list); |
|
kfree_rcu(key, rcu); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; |
|
u8 key_type, auth; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags)) |
|
key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG; |
|
else |
|
key_type = SMP_LTK_P256; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS) |
|
auth = 1; |
|
else |
|
auth = 0; |
|
|
|
smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
|
key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
|
0, 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */ |
|
const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; |
|
|
|
smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!smp->link_key) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { |
|
/* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */ |
|
const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
|
|
|
if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) { |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); |
|
smp->link_key = NULL; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} else { |
|
/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */ |
|
const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) { |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); |
|
smp->link_key = NULL; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) { |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key); |
|
smp->link_key = NULL; |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
/* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs |
|
* will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive |
|
* them in the correct order. |
|
*/ |
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO); |
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); |
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */ |
|
const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 }; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct link_key *key; |
|
|
|
key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst); |
|
if (!key) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK"); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) { |
|
/* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */ |
|
const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
|
|
|
if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk)) |
|
return; |
|
} else { |
|
/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */ |
|
const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 }; |
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk)) |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
sc_add_ltk(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
__u8 *keydist; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
|
|
|
/* The responder sends its keys first */ |
|
if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) { |
|
smp_allow_key_dist(smp); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; |
|
*keydist &= req->init_key_dist; |
|
} else { |
|
keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; |
|
*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
|
if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)) |
|
sc_generate_link_key(smp); |
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)) |
|
sc_generate_ltk(smp); |
|
|
|
/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */ |
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist); |
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { |
|
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; |
|
struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident; |
|
struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
|
u8 authenticated; |
|
__le16 ediv; |
|
__le64 rand; |
|
|
|
/* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of |
|
* bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest |
|
* of the value to zeroes. |
|
*/ |
|
get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size); |
|
memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, |
|
sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size); |
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); |
|
get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); |
|
|
|
authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; |
|
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
|
SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk, |
|
smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); |
|
smp->responder_ltk = ltk; |
|
|
|
ident.ediv = ediv; |
|
ident.rand = rand; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident), |
|
&ident); |
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { |
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; |
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; |
|
|
|
memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); |
|
|
|
/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address |
|
* after the connection has been established. |
|
* |
|
* This is true even when the connection has been |
|
* established using a resolvable random address. |
|
*/ |
|
bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); |
|
addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), |
|
&addrinfo); |
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { |
|
struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; |
|
struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
|
|
|
/* Generate a new random key */ |
|
get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); |
|
|
|
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (csrk) { |
|
if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED; |
|
else |
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; |
|
memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); |
|
} |
|
smp->responder_csrk = csrk; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); |
|
|
|
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ |
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) { |
|
smp_allow_key_dist(smp); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags); |
|
smp_notify_keys(conn); |
|
|
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, |
|
security_timer.work); |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
|
|
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
|
if (!smp) |
|
return NULL; |
|
|
|
smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); |
|
goto zfree_smp; |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); |
|
goto free_shash; |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp->conn = conn; |
|
chan->data = smp; |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL); |
|
|
|
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); |
|
|
|
hci_conn_hold(hcon); |
|
|
|
return smp; |
|
|
|
free_shash: |
|
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
|
zfree_smp: |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
return NULL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16]) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; |
|
u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7]; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
na = smp->prnd; |
|
nb = smp->rrnd; |
|
} else { |
|
na = smp->rrnd; |
|
nb = smp->prnd; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); |
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); |
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; |
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; |
|
|
|
return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check; |
|
u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; |
|
u8 io_cap[3], r[16]; |
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); |
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); |
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; |
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
local_addr = a; |
|
remote_addr = b; |
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); |
|
} else { |
|
local_addr = b; |
|
remote_addr = a; |
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); |
|
} |
|
|
|
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
|
put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) |
|
memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16); |
|
|
|
smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap, |
|
local_addr, remote_addr, check.e); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; |
|
u8 r; |
|
|
|
r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); |
|
r |= 0x80; |
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
|
|
|
if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r, |
|
cfm.confirm_val)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
u8 cfm[16], r; |
|
|
|
/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */ |
|
if (smp->passkey_round >= 20) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
switch (smp_op) { |
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: |
|
r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01); |
|
r |= 0x80; |
|
|
|
if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, |
|
smp->rrnd, r, cfm)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) |
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
|
|
|
smp->passkey_round++; |
|
|
|
if (smp->passkey_round == 20) { |
|
/* Generate MacKey and LTK */ |
|
if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* The round is only complete when the initiator |
|
* receives pairing random. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!hcon->out) { |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, |
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); |
|
if (smp->passkey_round == 20) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
else |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Start the next round */ |
|
if (smp->passkey_round != 20) |
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0); |
|
|
|
/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */ |
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
|
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, |
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: |
|
default: |
|
/* Initiating device starts the round */ |
|
if (!hcon->out) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u", |
|
smp->passkey_round + 1); |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
|
|
return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
u8 smp_op; |
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
switch (mgmt_op) { |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: |
|
smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
|
return 0; |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: |
|
smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED); |
|
return 0; |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: |
|
hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey); |
|
smp->passkey_round = 0; |
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) |
|
smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM; |
|
else |
|
smp_op = 0; |
|
|
|
if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op)) |
|
return -EIO; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */ |
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { |
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
|
sc_add_ltk(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
u32 value; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
if (!conn) |
|
return -ENOTCONN; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp; |
|
if (!chan) |
|
return -ENOTCONN; |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
|
if (!chan->data) { |
|
err = -ENOTCONN; |
|
goto unlock; |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
|
err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey); |
|
goto unlock; |
|
} |
|
|
|
switch (mgmt_op) { |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: |
|
value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); |
|
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %u", value); |
|
put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); |
|
fallthrough; |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); |
|
break; |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY: |
|
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY: |
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
|
err = 0; |
|
goto unlock; |
|
default: |
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED); |
|
err = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
|
goto unlock; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = 0; |
|
|
|
/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */ |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) { |
|
u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp); |
|
if (rsp) |
|
smp_failure(conn, rsp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
unlock: |
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp, |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) { |
|
local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING)) |
|
remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY)) |
|
local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (!rsp) { |
|
memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); |
|
|
|
req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; |
|
req->init_key_dist = local_dist; |
|
req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist; |
|
req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; |
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist; |
|
|
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp)); |
|
|
|
rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2; |
|
rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size; |
|
rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist; |
|
rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist; |
|
|
|
smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) |
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
if (!chan->data) |
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
|
else |
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (!smp) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ |
|
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && |
|
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
|
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); |
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); |
|
|
|
/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has |
|
* successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the |
|
* flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. |
|
*/ |
|
if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */ |
|
if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
|
/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */ |
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) && |
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
|
return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED; |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp); |
|
|
|
if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) |
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
|
|
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; |
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); |
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth); |
|
|
|
if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
|
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
|
else |
|
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); |
|
|
|
if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) |
|
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; |
|
|
|
/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
|
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
|
u8 method; |
|
|
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability, |
|
req->io_capability); |
|
if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) |
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size); |
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) |
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp); |
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
/* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the |
|
* SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth |
|
* req bits from our security request, which may create a false |
|
* positive SC enablement. |
|
*/ |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); |
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; |
|
/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */ |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Request setup of TK */ |
|
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability); |
|
if (ret) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
struct smp_dev *smp_dev; |
|
|
|
if (!chan || !chan->data) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
smp_dev = chan->data; |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64); |
|
memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16); |
|
|
|
if (smp_dev->debug_key) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { |
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); |
|
if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
|
} else { |
|
while (true) { |
|
/* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */ |
|
if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that |
|
* we didn't accidentally generate a debug key. |
|
*/ |
|
if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
done: |
|
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk); |
|
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
u8 key_size, auth; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp)); |
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
|
|
key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size); |
|
if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) |
|
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; |
|
|
|
auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
|
|
|
/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has |
|
* successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the |
|
* flag to indicate that local OOB is in use. |
|
*/ |
|
if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; |
|
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); |
|
|
|
/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared |
|
* some bits that we had enabled in our request. |
|
*/ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; |
|
|
|
if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2)) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */ |
|
if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; |
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
|
else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) |
|
conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; |
|
|
|
/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */ |
|
if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { |
|
u8 method; |
|
|
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability, |
|
rsp->io_capability); |
|
if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM) |
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd)); |
|
|
|
/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared |
|
* some bits that we had enabled in our request. |
|
*/ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
|
/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); |
|
return sc_send_public_key(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
auth |= req->auth_req; |
|
|
|
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); |
|
if (ret) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) |
|
return smp_confirm(smp); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out) { |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
|
smp->prnd); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits |
|
* from our security request and thereby create the impression that |
|
* we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it. |
|
*/ |
|
static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; |
|
u8 auth; |
|
|
|
/* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */ |
|
if (hcon->out) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode"); |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP"); |
|
|
|
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
|
|
|
/* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist); |
|
|
|
auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
|
|
|
if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP"); |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, |
|
hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder"); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); |
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) { |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */ |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) |
|
return sc_check_confirm(smp); |
|
|
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); |
|
|
|
ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp); |
|
if (ret) |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (conn->hcon->out) { |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
|
smp->prnd); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags)) |
|
return smp_confirm(smp); |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint; |
|
u32 passkey; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); |
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) |
|
return smp_random(smp); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
pkax = smp->local_pk; |
|
pkbx = smp->remote_pk; |
|
na = smp->prnd; |
|
nb = smp->rrnd; |
|
} else { |
|
pkax = smp->remote_pk; |
|
pkbx = smp->local_pk; |
|
na = smp->rrnd; |
|
nb = smp->prnd; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
|
if (!hcon->out) |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, |
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
goto mackey_and_ltk; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Passkey entry has special treatment */ |
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
u8 cfm[16]; |
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk, |
|
smp->rrnd, 0, cfm); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16)) |
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
|
} else { |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), |
|
smp->prnd); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
|
|
/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */ |
|
if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS) |
|
goto mackey_and_ltk; |
|
|
|
/* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave |
|
* the decision to user space since the remote device could |
|
* be legitimate or malicious. |
|
*/ |
|
if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, |
|
hcon->role)) { |
|
/* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since |
|
* it'll be ignored anyway. |
|
*/ |
|
passkey = 0; |
|
confirm_hint = 1; |
|
goto confirm; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
mackey_and_ltk: |
|
/* Generate MacKey and LTK */ |
|
err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK); |
|
} |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
confirm_hint = 0; |
|
|
|
confirm: |
|
err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, |
|
hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_ltk *key; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
|
|
key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role); |
|
if (!key) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) |
|
return true; |
|
|
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); |
|
hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size; |
|
|
|
/* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */ |
|
clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags); |
|
|
|
return true; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level, |
|
enum smp_key_pref key_pref) |
|
{ |
|
if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW) |
|
return true; |
|
|
|
/* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using |
|
* LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the |
|
* connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK |
|
* provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we |
|
* don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits). |
|
*/ |
|
if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK && |
|
test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) && |
|
hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role)) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level) |
|
return true; |
|
|
|
return false; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
u8 sec_level, auth; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
|
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev); |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC)) |
|
return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) |
|
sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
|
else |
|
sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); |
|
|
|
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) { |
|
/* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we |
|
* still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3, |
|
* Part H 2.4.6 |
|
*/ |
|
smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; |
|
|
|
if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
|
if (!smp) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) && |
|
(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) |
|
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
|
|
|
memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); |
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); |
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
__u8 authreq; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, |
|
sec_level); |
|
|
|
/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ |
|
if (!conn) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) |
|
return 1; |
|
|
|
if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
|
if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp; |
|
if (!chan) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available"); |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
|
|
|
/* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */ |
|
if (chan->data) { |
|
ret = 0; |
|
goto unlock; |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
|
if (!smp) { |
|
ret = 1; |
|
goto unlock; |
|
} |
|
|
|
authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); |
|
|
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) { |
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC; |
|
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) |
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs |
|
* Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C |
|
*/ |
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) { |
|
/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level |
|
* requires it. |
|
*/ |
|
if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT || |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
|
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) { |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; |
|
|
|
build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq); |
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
|
} else { |
|
struct smp_cmd_security_req cp; |
|
cp.auth_req = authreq; |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); |
|
} |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags); |
|
ret = 0; |
|
|
|
unlock: |
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); |
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, |
|
u8 addr_type) |
|
{ |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon; |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); |
|
hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); |
|
|
|
hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type); |
|
if (!hcon) |
|
goto done; |
|
|
|
conn = hcon->l2cap_data; |
|
if (!conn) |
|
goto done; |
|
|
|
chan = conn->smp; |
|
if (!chan) |
|
goto done; |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_lock(chan); |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
if (smp) { |
|
/* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to |
|
* remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ |
|
smp->ltk = NULL; |
|
smp->responder_ltk = NULL; |
|
smp->remote_irk = NULL; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) |
|
smp_failure(conn, 0); |
|
else |
|
smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED); |
|
err = 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); |
|
|
|
done: |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ |
|
if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK, |
|
rp->ltk)) { |
|
bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, |
|
"LTK blocked for %pMR", |
|
&conn->hcon->dst); |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT); |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk)); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_ltk *ltk; |
|
u8 authenticated; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO); |
|
else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
|
|
|
authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH); |
|
ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK, |
|
authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size, |
|
rp->ediv, rp->rand); |
|
smp->ltk = ltk; |
|
if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */ |
|
if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK, |
|
info->irk)) { |
|
bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev, |
|
"Identity key blocked for %pMR", |
|
&conn->hcon->dst); |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO); |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
bdaddr_t rpa; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; |
|
|
|
if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO); |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); |
|
|
|
/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending |
|
* an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK |
|
* as "identity information". However, since such |
|
* implementations are not known of and in order to not over |
|
* complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never |
|
* received an IRK for such a device. |
|
* |
|
* The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public |
|
* Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) || |
|
!hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address"); |
|
goto distribute; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is |
|
* providing different address as identity information. |
|
* |
|
* Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug. |
|
*/ |
|
if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) && |
|
(bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) || |
|
info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, |
|
"ignoring IRK with invalid identity address"); |
|
goto distribute; |
|
} |
|
|
|
bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); |
|
smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; |
|
|
|
if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type)) |
|
bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst); |
|
else |
|
bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY); |
|
|
|
smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr, |
|
smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa); |
|
|
|
distribute: |
|
if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) |
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct smp_csrk *csrk; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Mark the information as received */ |
|
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; |
|
|
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); |
|
|
|
csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (csrk) { |
|
if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM) |
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED; |
|
else |
|
csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED; |
|
memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); |
|
} |
|
smp->csrk = csrk; |
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote; |
|
u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method; |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) || |
|
test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) |
|
return REQ_OOB; |
|
|
|
/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs |
|
* which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get |
|
* the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the |
|
* first byte which contains the opcode. |
|
*/ |
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
local = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
|
} else { |
|
local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; |
|
remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
local_io = local->io_capability; |
|
remote_io = remote->io_capability; |
|
|
|
local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); |
|
remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM); |
|
|
|
/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table, |
|
* otherwise use JUST WORKS. |
|
*/ |
|
if (local_mitm || remote_mitm) |
|
method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io); |
|
else |
|
method = JUST_WORKS; |
|
|
|
/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */ |
|
if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags)) |
|
method = JUST_WORKS; |
|
|
|
return method; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
/* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is |
|
* not in use. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) && |
|
!crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical"); |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64); |
|
|
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) { |
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk, |
|
smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16)) |
|
return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving |
|
* the key from the initiating device. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!hcon->out) { |
|
err = sc_send_public_key(smp); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk); |
|
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32); |
|
|
|
/* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private |
|
* key was set/generated. |
|
*/ |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) { |
|
struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
struct smp_dev *smp_dev; |
|
|
|
if (!hchan || !hchan->data) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
smp_dev = hchan->data; |
|
|
|
tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh; |
|
} else { |
|
tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey); |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method); |
|
|
|
/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ |
|
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM; |
|
else |
|
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS; |
|
|
|
if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64)) |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) { |
|
get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify, |
|
sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify)); |
|
hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000; |
|
hcon->passkey_entered = 0; |
|
smp->passkey_round = 0; |
|
if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, |
|
hcon->dst_type, |
|
hcon->passkey_notify, |
|
hcon->passkey_entered)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) { |
|
if (hcon->out) |
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, |
|
sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd); |
|
|
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) { |
|
if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, |
|
hcon->dst_type)) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to |
|
* send the confirm value. |
|
*/ |
|
if (conn->hcon->out) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, |
|
0, cfm.confirm_val); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data; |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr; |
|
u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) |
|
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; |
|
|
|
memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6); |
|
memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6); |
|
a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type; |
|
b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
local_addr = a; |
|
remote_addr = b; |
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3); |
|
} else { |
|
local_addr = b; |
|
remote_addr = a; |
|
memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3); |
|
} |
|
|
|
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); |
|
|
|
if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) |
|
put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r); |
|
else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) |
|
memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16); |
|
|
|
err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r, |
|
io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e); |
|
if (err) |
|
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16)) |
|
return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED; |
|
|
|
if (!hcon->out) { |
|
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) { |
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */ |
|
sc_dhkey_check(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
sc_add_ltk(smp); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->out) { |
|
hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size); |
|
hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
__u8 code, reason; |
|
int err = 0; |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < 1) |
|
return -EILSEQ; |
|
|
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) { |
|
reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
code = skb->data[0]; |
|
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code)); |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX) |
|
goto drop; |
|
|
|
if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)) |
|
goto drop; |
|
|
|
/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are |
|
* pairing request and security request. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ) |
|
goto drop; |
|
|
|
switch (code) { |
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL: |
|
smp_failure(conn, 0); |
|
err = -EPERM; |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY: |
|
reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb); |
|
break; |
|
|
|
default: |
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); |
|
reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
done: |
|
if (!err) { |
|
if (reason) |
|
smp_failure(conn, reason); |
|
kfree_skb(skb); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return err; |
|
|
|
drop: |
|
bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", |
|
code, &hcon->dst); |
|
kfree_skb(skb); |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
if (chan->data) |
|
smp_chan_destroy(conn); |
|
|
|
conn->smp = NULL; |
|
l2cap_chan_put(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; |
|
struct smp_cmd_pairing req; |
|
struct smp_chan *smp; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
/* Only new pairings are interesting */ |
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */ |
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */ |
|
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */ |
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */ |
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) && |
|
!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */ |
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */ |
|
if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */ |
|
if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */ |
|
if (chan->data) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
smp = smp_chan_create(conn); |
|
if (!smp) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR"); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR"); |
|
|
|
/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */ |
|
build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL); |
|
|
|
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; |
|
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req)); |
|
|
|
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req); |
|
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { |
|
bredr_pairing(chan); |
|
return; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!smp) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer); |
|
|
|
smp_distribute_keys(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; |
|
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own |
|
* the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the |
|
* first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in |
|
* l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont |
|
* get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called. |
|
*/ |
|
conn->smp = chan; |
|
|
|
if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags)) |
|
bredr_pairing(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); |
|
if (err) { |
|
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; |
|
|
|
if (smp) |
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer); |
|
|
|
hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE); |
|
} |
|
|
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, |
|
unsigned long hdr_len, |
|
unsigned long len, int nb) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
|
|
skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!skb) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
|
|
|
skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX; |
|
bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan; |
|
|
|
return skb; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { |
|
.name = "Security Manager", |
|
.ready = smp_ready_cb, |
|
.recv = smp_recv_cb, |
|
.alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb, |
|
.teardown = smp_teardown_cb, |
|
.resume = smp_resume_cb, |
|
|
|
.new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection, |
|
.state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, |
|
.close = l2cap_chan_no_close, |
|
.defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, |
|
.suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, |
|
.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, |
|
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
|
|
BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); |
|
|
|
chan = l2cap_chan_create(); |
|
if (!chan) |
|
return NULL; |
|
|
|
chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; |
|
chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; |
|
chan->scid = pchan->scid; |
|
chan->dcid = chan->scid; |
|
chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; |
|
chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; |
|
chan->mode = pchan->mode; |
|
|
|
/* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to |
|
* change the security level. This means that the SMP channel |
|
* lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep |
|
* warnings. |
|
*/ |
|
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); |
|
|
|
BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
return chan; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { |
|
.name = "Security Manager Root", |
|
.new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb, |
|
|
|
/* None of these are implemented for the root channel */ |
|
.close = l2cap_chan_no_close, |
|
.alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb, |
|
.recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv, |
|
.state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change, |
|
.teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown, |
|
.ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready, |
|
.defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer, |
|
.suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend, |
|
.resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume, |
|
.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown, |
|
.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
struct smp_dev *smp; |
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
|
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
|
|
|
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) { |
|
smp = NULL; |
|
goto create_chan; |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!smp) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
|
|
|
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac); |
|
} |
|
|
|
tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { |
|
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); |
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh); |
|
} |
|
|
|
smp->local_oob = false; |
|
smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac; |
|
smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh; |
|
|
|
create_chan: |
|
chan = l2cap_chan_create(); |
|
if (!chan) { |
|
if (smp) { |
|
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
|
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
} |
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
|
} |
|
|
|
chan->data = smp; |
|
|
|
l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid); |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); |
|
|
|
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) { |
|
u8 bdaddr_type; |
|
|
|
hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type); |
|
|
|
if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) |
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC; |
|
else |
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM; |
|
} else { |
|
bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr); |
|
chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR; |
|
} |
|
|
|
chan->state = BT_LISTEN; |
|
chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; |
|
chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU; |
|
chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops; |
|
|
|
/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */ |
|
atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT); |
|
|
|
return chan; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan) |
|
{ |
|
struct smp_dev *smp; |
|
|
|
BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); |
|
|
|
smp = chan->data; |
|
if (smp) { |
|
chan->data = NULL; |
|
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); |
|
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh); |
|
kfree_sensitive(smp); |
|
} |
|
|
|
l2cap_chan_put(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int smp_force_bredr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable) |
|
{ |
|
if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
|
return -EALREADY; |
|
|
|
if (enable) { |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); |
|
if (IS_ERR(chan)) |
|
return PTR_ERR(chan); |
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; |
|
} else { |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
|
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; |
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
|
|
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); |
|
|
|
/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then |
|
* there is also no need to register any SMP channel. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) { |
|
chan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP); |
|
if (IS_ERR(chan)) |
|
return PTR_ERR(chan); |
|
|
|
hdev->smp_data = chan; |
|
|
|
if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) { |
|
/* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */ |
|
if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP)) |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) { |
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; |
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR); |
|
if (IS_ERR(chan)) { |
|
int err = PTR_ERR(chan); |
|
chan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev) |
|
{ |
|
struct l2cap_chan *chan; |
|
|
|
if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) { |
|
chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data; |
|
hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (hdev->smp_data) { |
|
chan = hdev->smp_data; |
|
hdev->smp_data = NULL; |
|
smp_del_chan(chan); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP) |
|
|
|
static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) |
|
{ |
|
u8 pk[64]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_ah(void) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 irk[16] = { |
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, |
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; |
|
const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 }; |
|
const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d }; |
|
u8 res[3]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_ah(irk, r, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_c1(void) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 k[16] = { |
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 r[16] = { |
|
0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63, |
|
0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 }; |
|
const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 }; |
|
const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 }; |
|
const u8 _iat = 0x01; |
|
const u8 _rat = 0x00; |
|
const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } }; |
|
const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } }; |
|
const u8 exp[16] = { |
|
0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2, |
|
0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e }; |
|
u8 res[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_s1(void) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 k[16] = { |
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, |
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 r1[16] = { |
|
0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 }; |
|
const u8 r2[16] = { |
|
0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 }; |
|
const u8 exp[16] = { |
|
0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b, |
|
0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a }; |
|
u8 res[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 u[32] = { |
|
0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, |
|
0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, |
|
0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, |
|
0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; |
|
const u8 v[32] = { |
|
0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, |
|
0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, |
|
0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, |
|
0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; |
|
const u8 x[16] = { |
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, |
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; |
|
const u8 z = 0x00; |
|
const u8 exp[16] = { |
|
0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1, |
|
0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 }; |
|
u8 res[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 w[32] = { |
|
0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86, |
|
0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99, |
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, |
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; |
|
const u8 n1[16] = { |
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, |
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; |
|
const u8 n2[16] = { |
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, |
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; |
|
const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 exp_ltk[16] = { |
|
0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98, |
|
0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 }; |
|
const u8 exp_mackey[16] = { |
|
0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, |
|
0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; |
|
u8 mackey[16], ltk[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 w[16] = { |
|
0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd, |
|
0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 }; |
|
const u8 n1[16] = { |
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, |
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; |
|
const u8 n2[16] = { |
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, |
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; |
|
const u8 r[16] = { |
|
0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08, |
|
0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 }; |
|
const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 }; |
|
const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 }; |
|
const u8 exp[16] = { |
|
0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2, |
|
0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 }; |
|
u8 res[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 u[32] = { |
|
0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc, |
|
0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef, |
|
0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e, |
|
0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 }; |
|
const u8 v[32] = { |
|
0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b, |
|
0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59, |
|
0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90, |
|
0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 }; |
|
const u8 x[16] = { |
|
0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff, |
|
0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 }; |
|
const u8 y[16] = { |
|
0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21, |
|
0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 }; |
|
const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000; |
|
u32 val; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (val != exp_val) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac) |
|
{ |
|
const u8 w[16] = { |
|
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34, |
|
0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec }; |
|
const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c }; |
|
const u8 exp[16] = { |
|
0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8, |
|
0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d }; |
|
u8 res[16]; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res); |
|
if (err) |
|
return err; |
|
|
|
if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static char test_smp_buffer[32]; |
|
|
|
static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, |
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos) |
|
{ |
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer, |
|
strlen(test_smp_buffer)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = { |
|
.open = simple_open, |
|
.read = test_smp_read, |
|
.llseek = default_llseek, |
|
}; |
|
|
|
static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, |
|
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh) |
|
{ |
|
ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime; |
|
unsigned long long duration; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
calltime = ktime_get(); |
|
|
|
err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("debug_key test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_ah(); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_c1(); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_s1(); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_f4(tfm_cmac); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_f5(tfm_cmac); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_f6(tfm_cmac); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_g2(tfm_cmac); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = test_h6(tfm_cmac); |
|
if (err) { |
|
BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed"); |
|
goto done; |
|
} |
|
|
|
rettime = ktime_get(); |
|
delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime); |
|
duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10; |
|
|
|
BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration); |
|
|
|
done: |
|
if (!err) |
|
snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), |
|
"PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration); |
|
else |
|
snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n"); |
|
|
|
debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL, |
|
&test_smp_fops); |
|
|
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int __init bt_selftest_smp(void) |
|
{ |
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac; |
|
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { |
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); |
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac); |
|
} |
|
|
|
tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh-nist-p256", 0, 0); |
|
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { |
|
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); |
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); |
|
return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh); |
|
} |
|
|
|
err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh); |
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); |
|
crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh); |
|
|
|
return err; |
|
} |
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|