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1272 lines
32 KiB
1272 lines
32 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
|
/* |
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* Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. |
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* Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> |
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* Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH |
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* Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation |
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*/ |
|
|
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#include <linux/netdevice.h> |
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#include <linux/types.h> |
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#include <linux/skbuff.h> |
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#include <linux/compiler.h> |
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#include <linux/ieee80211.h> |
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#include <linux/gfp.h> |
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#include <asm/unaligned.h> |
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#include <net/mac80211.h> |
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#include <crypto/aes.h> |
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#include <crypto/algapi.h> |
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|
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#include "ieee80211_i.h" |
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#include "michael.h" |
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#include "tkip.h" |
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#include "aes_ccm.h" |
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#include "aes_cmac.h" |
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#include "aes_gmac.h" |
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#include "aes_gcm.h" |
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#include "wpa.h" |
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|
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ieee80211_tx_result |
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ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
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{ |
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u8 *data, *key, *mic; |
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size_t data_len; |
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unsigned int hdrlen; |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; |
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struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; |
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struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
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int tail; |
|
|
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hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
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if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || |
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skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) |
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return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
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hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
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if (skb->len < hdrlen) |
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return TX_DROP; |
|
|
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data = skb->data + hdrlen; |
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data_len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
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|
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if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) { |
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/* Need to use software crypto for the test */ |
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info->control.hw_key = NULL; |
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} |
|
|
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if (info->control.hw_key && |
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(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG || |
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ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) && |
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!(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
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IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) { |
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/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */ |
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return TX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
|
|
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tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; |
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if (!info->control.hw_key) |
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tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
|
|
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if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
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skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, |
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"mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n", |
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skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, |
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skb_tailroom(skb), tail)) |
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return TX_DROP; |
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|
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mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
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|
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if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) { |
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/* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */ |
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memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
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return TX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
|
|
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key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY]; |
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michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); |
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if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) |
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mic[0]++; |
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|
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return TX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
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|
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|
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ieee80211_rx_result |
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ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
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{ |
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u8 *data, *key = NULL; |
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size_t data_len; |
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unsigned int hdrlen; |
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u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; |
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struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
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struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
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|
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/* |
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* it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other |
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* than data frames. |
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*/ |
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if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control)) |
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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|
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/* |
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* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or |
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* the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely |
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* on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a |
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* MIC failure report. |
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*/ |
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if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) { |
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if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) |
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goto mic_fail_no_key; |
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|
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if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key && |
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rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
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goto update_iv; |
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|
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
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|
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/* |
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* Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even |
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* though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no |
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* MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures. |
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*/ |
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if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || |
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!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) |
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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|
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if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) { |
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/* |
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* APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC |
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* errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for |
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* group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast |
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* frames in the BSS. |
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*/ |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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} |
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|
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if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) |
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goto mic_fail; |
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|
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hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
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if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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|
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if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
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|
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data = skb->data + hdrlen; |
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data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; |
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key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; |
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michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); |
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if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)) |
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goto mic_fail; |
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|
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/* remove Michael MIC from payload */ |
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skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
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|
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update_iv: |
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/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ |
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rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; |
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rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16; |
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|
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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mic_fail: |
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rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++; |
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|
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mic_fail_no_key: |
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/* |
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* In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in |
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* a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if |
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* the key is set. |
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*/ |
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cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2, |
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is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ? |
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NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP : |
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NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE, |
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rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1, |
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NULL, GFP_ATOMIC); |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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} |
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|
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static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) |
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{ |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
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struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
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struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
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unsigned int hdrlen; |
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int len, tail; |
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u64 pn; |
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u8 *pos; |
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|
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if (info->control.hw_key && |
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!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
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!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { |
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/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */ |
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
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len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
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|
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if (info->control.hw_key) |
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tail = 0; |
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else |
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tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
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|
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if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
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skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN)) |
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return -1; |
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|
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pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); |
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memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); |
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pos += hdrlen; |
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|
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/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
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if (info->control.hw_key && |
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(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
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return 0; |
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|
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/* Increase IV for the frame */ |
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pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
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pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn); |
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|
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/* hwaccel - with software IV */ |
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if (info->control.hw_key) |
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return 0; |
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|
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/* Add room for ICV */ |
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skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); |
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|
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return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx, |
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key, skb, pos, len); |
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} |
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ieee80211_tx_result |
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ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
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{ |
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struct sk_buff *skb; |
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|
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ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
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|
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skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
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if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) |
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return TX_DROP; |
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} |
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|
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return TX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
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|
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ieee80211_rx_result |
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ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
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{ |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; |
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int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0; |
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struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
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struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
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struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
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|
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hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
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|
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if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) |
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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|
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if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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|
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/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */ |
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if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
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hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
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|
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/* |
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* Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption. |
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* In the case where hardware checks the IV as well, |
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* we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt() |
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*/ |
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if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) |
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hwaccel = 1; |
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|
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res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx, |
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key, skb->data + hdrlen, |
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skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, |
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hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, |
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&rx->tkip.iv32, |
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&rx->tkip.iv16); |
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if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) |
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return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
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/* Trim ICV */ |
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if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED)) |
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skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); |
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|
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/* Remove IV */ |
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memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
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skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); |
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|
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return RX_CONTINUE; |
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} |
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|
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static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad) |
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{ |
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__le16 mask_fc; |
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int a4_included, mgmt; |
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u8 qos_tid; |
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u16 len_a; |
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unsigned int hdrlen; |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
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|
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/* |
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* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) |
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* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected |
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*/ |
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mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control); |
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mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; |
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mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | |
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IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); |
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if (!mgmt) |
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mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); |
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mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); |
|
|
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hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
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len_a = hdrlen - 2; |
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a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); |
|
|
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if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) |
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qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); |
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else |
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qos_tid = 0; |
|
|
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/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC |
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* mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived |
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* from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the |
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* data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take |
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* care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting |
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* and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. |
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*/ |
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b_0[0] = 0x1; |
|
|
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/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN |
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* Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) |
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*/ |
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b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4); |
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memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
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memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
|
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/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header |
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* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ |
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put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]); |
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put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); |
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memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); |
|
|
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/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ |
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aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; |
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aad[23] = 0; |
|
|
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if (a4_included) { |
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memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); |
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aad[30] = qos_tid; |
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aad[31] = 0; |
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} else { |
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memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); |
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aad[24] = qos_tid; |
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} |
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} |
|
|
|
|
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static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) |
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{ |
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hdr[0] = pn[5]; |
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hdr[1] = pn[4]; |
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hdr[2] = 0; |
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hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); |
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hdr[4] = pn[3]; |
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hdr[5] = pn[2]; |
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hdr[6] = pn[1]; |
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hdr[7] = pn[0]; |
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} |
|
|
|
|
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static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) |
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{ |
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pn[0] = hdr[7]; |
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pn[1] = hdr[6]; |
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pn[2] = hdr[5]; |
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pn[3] = hdr[4]; |
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pn[4] = hdr[1]; |
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pn[5] = hdr[0]; |
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} |
|
|
|
|
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static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, |
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unsigned int mic_len) |
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{ |
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struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
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struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
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struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
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int hdrlen, len, tail; |
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u8 *pos; |
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u8 pn[6]; |
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u64 pn64; |
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u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN]; |
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u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
|
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if (info->control.hw_key && |
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!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
|
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
|
!((info->control.hw_key->flags & |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && |
|
ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { |
|
/* |
|
* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP |
|
* header or MIC fields |
|
*/ |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
tail = 0; |
|
else |
|
tail = mic_len; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
|
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
|
return -1; |
|
|
|
pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); |
|
memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); |
|
|
|
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
|
if (info->control.hw_key && |
|
(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
pos += hdrlen; |
|
|
|
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
|
|
|
pn[5] = pn64; |
|
pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
|
pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
|
pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
|
pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
|
pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
|
|
|
ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */ |
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; |
|
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); |
|
return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, |
|
skb_put(skb, mic_len)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, |
|
unsigned int mic_len) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
|
|
|
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
|
if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, |
|
unsigned int mic_len) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; |
|
int hdrlen; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
|
u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; |
|
int data_len; |
|
int queue; |
|
|
|
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && |
|
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { |
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) |
|
mic_len = 0; |
|
} else { |
|
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ |
|
hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; |
|
|
|
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; |
|
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { |
|
int res; |
|
|
|
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); |
|
|
|
queue = rx->security_idx; |
|
|
|
res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], |
|
IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
if (res < 0 || |
|
(!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { |
|
key->u.ccmp.replays++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
|
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
|
ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( |
|
key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, |
|
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, |
|
data_len, |
|
skb->data + skb->len - mic_len)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) |
|
memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ |
|
if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
|
skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad) |
|
{ |
|
__le16 mask_fc; |
|
u8 qos_tid; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
|
|
memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
|
memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
j_0[13] = 0; |
|
j_0[14] = 0; |
|
j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; |
|
|
|
/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header |
|
* FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] |
|
*/ |
|
put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]); |
|
/* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) |
|
* Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected |
|
*/ |
|
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; |
|
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | |
|
IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); |
|
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); |
|
mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); |
|
|
|
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); |
|
memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); |
|
|
|
/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ |
|
aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; |
|
aad[23] = 0; |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); |
|
else |
|
qos_tid = 0; |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) { |
|
memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); |
|
aad[30] = qos_tid; |
|
aad[31] = 0; |
|
} else { |
|
memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); |
|
aad[24] = qos_tid; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id) |
|
{ |
|
hdr[0] = pn[5]; |
|
hdr[1] = pn[4]; |
|
hdr[2] = 0; |
|
hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); |
|
hdr[4] = pn[3]; |
|
hdr[5] = pn[2]; |
|
hdr[6] = pn[1]; |
|
hdr[7] = pn[0]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr) |
|
{ |
|
pn[0] = hdr[7]; |
|
pn[1] = hdr[6]; |
|
pn[2] = hdr[5]; |
|
pn[3] = hdr[4]; |
|
pn[4] = hdr[1]; |
|
pn[5] = hdr[0]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
int hdrlen, len, tail; |
|
u8 *pos; |
|
u8 pn[6]; |
|
u64 pn64; |
|
u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN]; |
|
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key && |
|
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
|
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
|
!((info->control.hw_key->flags & |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && |
|
ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) { |
|
/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP |
|
* header or MIC fields |
|
*/ |
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
tail = 0; |
|
else |
|
tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
|
skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
|
return -1; |
|
|
|
pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
|
memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); |
|
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + |
|
IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
|
|
|
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
|
if (info->control.hw_key && |
|
(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
pos += hdrlen; |
|
|
|
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
|
|
|
pn[5] = pn64; |
|
pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
|
pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
|
pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
|
pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
|
pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
|
|
|
gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */ |
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; |
|
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); |
|
return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, |
|
skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
|
|
|
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
|
if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; |
|
int hdrlen; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
|
u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN]; |
|
int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; |
|
|
|
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && |
|
!ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { |
|
if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) |
|
mic_len = 0; |
|
} else { |
|
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ |
|
hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; |
|
|
|
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; |
|
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { |
|
int res; |
|
|
|
gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); |
|
|
|
queue = rx->security_idx; |
|
|
|
res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], |
|
IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
if (res < 0 || |
|
(!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { |
|
key->u.gcmp.replays++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
|
u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
|
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
|
gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt( |
|
key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, |
|
skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, |
|
data_len, |
|
skb->data + skb->len - |
|
IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) |
|
memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ |
|
if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
|
skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, |
|
struct sk_buff *skb) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
int hdrlen; |
|
u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len; |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key && |
|
!(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { |
|
/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */ |
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len && |
|
pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
|
|
pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len); |
|
memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen); |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len) |
|
{ |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
/* pn is little endian */ |
|
for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
|
if (pn1[i] < pn2[i]) |
|
return -1; |
|
else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i]) |
|
return 1; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; |
|
const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL; |
|
int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); |
|
int data_len; |
|
u8 *rx_pn; |
|
u8 *skb_pn; |
|
u8 qos_tid; |
|
|
|
if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme || |
|
!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme; |
|
|
|
data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len; |
|
|
|
if (data_len < 0) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); |
|
else |
|
qos_tid = 0; |
|
|
|
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid]; |
|
skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off; |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len); |
|
|
|
/* remove security header and MIC */ |
|
if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen); |
|
skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad) |
|
{ |
|
__le16 mask_fc; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
|
|
|
/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */ |
|
|
|
/* FC type/subtype */ |
|
/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */ |
|
mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; |
|
mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | |
|
IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); |
|
put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]); |
|
/* A1 || A2 || A3 */ |
|
memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN); |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn) |
|
{ |
|
*d++ = pn; |
|
*d++ = pn >> 8; |
|
*d++ = pn >> 16; |
|
*d++ = pn >> 24; |
|
*d++ = pn >> 32; |
|
*d = pn >> 40; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s) |
|
{ |
|
*d++ = s[5]; |
|
*d++ = s[4]; |
|
*d++ = s[3]; |
|
*d++ = s[2]; |
|
*d++ = s[1]; |
|
*d = s[0]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; |
|
u8 aad[20]; |
|
u64 pn64; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); |
|
|
|
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key && |
|
!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE)) |
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
|
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
|
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
/* PN = PN + 1 */ |
|
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64) |
|
*/ |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
|
u8 aad[20]; |
|
u64 pn64; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); |
|
|
|
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
|
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
|
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
/* PN = PN + 1 */ |
|
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); |
|
|
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
|
|
/* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) |
|
*/ |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic); |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; |
|
u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6]; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
/* management frames are already linear */ |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) |
|
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
|
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); |
|
|
|
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
|
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); |
|
if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
|
|
|
/* Remove MMIE */ |
|
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
|
u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6]; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
/* management frames are already linear */ |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) |
|
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
|
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); |
|
|
|
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
|
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); |
|
if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
|
|
|
/* Remove MMIE */ |
|
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; |
|
u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN]; |
|
u64 pn64; |
|
u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs); |
|
|
|
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
|
|
if (info->control.hw_key) |
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
|
mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
|
mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
/* PN = PN + 1 */ |
|
pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn); |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64); |
|
|
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
|
|
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
|
bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number); |
|
|
|
/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */ |
|
if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
|
struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
|
u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; |
|
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
|
|
|
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) |
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
|
|
/* management frames are already linear */ |
|
|
|
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
|
|
mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) |
|
(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
|
mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
|
|
|
bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number); |
|
|
|
if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) { |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
|
/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
|
bip_aad(skb, aad); |
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
|
memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); |
|
|
|
mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); |
|
if (!mic) |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, |
|
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, |
|
mic) < 0 || |
|
crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; |
|
kfree(mic); |
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
} |
|
kfree(mic); |
|
} |
|
|
|
memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
|
|
|
/* Remove MMIE */ |
|
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
|
|
|
return RX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
|
{ |
|
struct sk_buff *skb; |
|
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL; |
|
ieee80211_tx_result res; |
|
|
|
skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
|
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
|
|
|
/* handle hw-only algorithm */ |
|
if (!info->control.hw_key) |
|
return TX_DROP; |
|
|
|
if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) { |
|
res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb); |
|
if (res != TX_CONTINUE) |
|
return res; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
|
|
|
return TX_CONTINUE; |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_rx_result |
|
ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
|
{ |
|
if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme) |
|
return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx); |
|
|
|
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; |
|
}
|
|
|