mirror of https://github.com/Qortal/Brooklyn
You can not select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
1358 lines
38 KiB
1358 lines
38 KiB
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
|
/* |
|
* Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc. |
|
* Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc. |
|
* Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <[email protected]> |
|
* Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <[email protected]> |
|
* Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH |
|
* Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH |
|
* Copyright 2018-2020 Intel Corporation |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
#include <linux/if_ether.h> |
|
#include <linux/etherdevice.h> |
|
#include <linux/list.h> |
|
#include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
|
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h> |
|
#include <linux/slab.h> |
|
#include <linux/export.h> |
|
#include <net/mac80211.h> |
|
#include <crypto/algapi.h> |
|
#include <asm/unaligned.h> |
|
#include "ieee80211_i.h" |
|
#include "driver-ops.h" |
|
#include "debugfs_key.h" |
|
#include "aes_ccm.h" |
|
#include "aes_cmac.h" |
|
#include "aes_gmac.h" |
|
#include "aes_gcm.h" |
|
|
|
|
|
/** |
|
* DOC: Key handling basics |
|
* |
|
* Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data) |
|
* keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface, |
|
* each station key also belongs to that interface. |
|
* |
|
* Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms |
|
* that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked |
|
* to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is |
|
* simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm |
|
* that isn't implemented in software). |
|
* There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW |
|
* or HW except by looking into debugfs. |
|
* |
|
* All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all |
|
* other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure |
|
* references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are |
|
* unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware |
|
* acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must |
|
* remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; |
|
|
|
static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local) |
|
{ |
|
lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void |
|
update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */ |
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock(); |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) |
|
vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta; |
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock(); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
|
{ |
|
/* |
|
* When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom |
|
* for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race |
|
* cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one: |
|
* |
|
* 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before |
|
* the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off. |
|
* |
|
* 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but |
|
* just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks |
|
* off. |
|
* |
|
* In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for |
|
* tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c) |
|
* |
|
* Solution has been explained at |
|
* http://mid.gmane.org/[email protected] |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); |
|
|
|
if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) { |
|
/* |
|
* Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no |
|
* encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1. |
|
*/ |
|
synchronize_net(); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
int delta) |
|
{ |
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta); |
|
|
|
update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta); |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; |
|
struct sta_info *sta; |
|
int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
might_sleep(); |
|
|
|
if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) { |
|
/* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is |
|
* tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more. |
|
* However, its flags may still indicate that it was |
|
* programmed into the device (since we're in resume) |
|
* so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove |
|
* it again later. |
|
*/ |
|
if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE && |
|
!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) |
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
|
|
|
key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!key->local->ops->set_key) |
|
goto out_unsupported; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(key->local); |
|
|
|
sta = key->sta; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it |
|
* is supported; if not, return. |
|
*/ |
|
if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && |
|
!ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK)) |
|
goto out_unsupported; |
|
|
|
if (sta && !sta->uploaded) |
|
goto out_unsupported; |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { |
|
/* |
|
* The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. |
|
* Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { |
|
ret = 1; |
|
goto out_unsupported; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, |
|
sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) { |
|
key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
|
|
|
if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) |
|
decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); |
|
|
|
WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
|
(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)); |
|
|
|
WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) && |
|
(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1) |
|
sdata_err(sdata, |
|
"failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n", |
|
key->conf.keyidx, |
|
sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); |
|
|
|
out_unsupported: |
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
/* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */ |
|
if (ret == 1) |
|
return 0; |
|
if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
return 0; |
|
default: |
|
return -EINVAL; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
|
struct sta_info *sta; |
|
int ret; |
|
|
|
might_sleep(); |
|
|
|
if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(key->local); |
|
|
|
if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
sta = key->sta; |
|
sdata = key->sdata; |
|
|
|
if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) |
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
|
|
|
key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
|
ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata, |
|
sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); |
|
|
|
if (ret) |
|
sdata_err(sdata, |
|
"failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n", |
|
key->conf.keyidx, |
|
sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force) |
|
{ |
|
struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(local); |
|
|
|
set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION); |
|
|
|
sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; |
|
|
|
if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) |
|
clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); |
|
ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
|
{ |
|
return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old, |
|
struct ieee80211_key *new) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local; |
|
struct sta_info *sta = new->sta; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(local); |
|
|
|
if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) { |
|
/* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */ |
|
|
|
if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX && |
|
!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) { |
|
/* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not |
|
* mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU. |
|
* Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block |
|
* new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to |
|
* ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not |
|
* supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only |
|
* would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the |
|
* job done for the few ms we need it.) |
|
*/ |
|
set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); |
|
mutex_lock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx); |
|
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) |
|
___ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i, |
|
AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); |
|
mutex_unlock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx); |
|
} |
|
} else if (old) { |
|
/* Rekey without Extended Key ID. |
|
* Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto. |
|
* A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW |
|
* crypto, though. |
|
*/ |
|
if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */ |
|
old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED; |
|
ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta); |
|
if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) { |
|
set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); |
|
ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta, |
|
AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); |
|
} |
|
if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy, |
|
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) { |
|
pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.", |
|
sta->sta.addr); |
|
/* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent |
|
* the clear text leaks and freezes. |
|
*/ |
|
ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
int idx, bool uni, bool multi) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) |
|
key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
|
|
|
if (uni) { |
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key); |
|
ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata); |
|
if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) |
|
drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (multi) |
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key); |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx, |
|
bool uni, bool multi) |
|
{ |
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi); |
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS && |
|
idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) |
|
key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key); |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
int idx) |
|
{ |
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx); |
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
|
|
|
if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS && |
|
idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + |
|
NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) |
|
key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_beacon_key, key); |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
int idx) |
|
{ |
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, idx); |
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
struct sta_info *sta, |
|
bool pairwise, |
|
struct ieee80211_key *old, |
|
struct ieee80211_key *new) |
|
{ |
|
int idx; |
|
int ret = 0; |
|
bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey; |
|
|
|
/* caller must provide at least one old/new */ |
|
if (WARN_ON(!new && !old)) |
|
return 0; |
|
|
|
if (new) |
|
list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list, &sdata->key_list); |
|
|
|
WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx); |
|
|
|
if (new && sta && pairwise) { |
|
/* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID |
|
* old is still NULL for the first rekey. |
|
*/ |
|
ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old, new); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (old) { |
|
idx = old->conf.keyidx; |
|
|
|
if (old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { |
|
ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old); |
|
|
|
if (new) |
|
ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new); |
|
} |
|
} else { |
|
/* new must be provided in case old is not */ |
|
idx = new->conf.keyidx; |
|
if (!new->local->wowlan) |
|
ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ret) |
|
return ret; |
|
|
|
if (sta) { |
|
if (pairwise) { |
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new); |
|
if (new && |
|
!(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX)) |
|
_ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true); |
|
} else { |
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new); |
|
} |
|
/* Only needed for transition from no key -> key. |
|
* Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID |
|
* and installing the second key ID the first time. |
|
*/ |
|
if (new && !old) |
|
ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta); |
|
} else { |
|
defunikey = old && |
|
old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
|
sdata->default_unicast_key); |
|
defmultikey = old && |
|
old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
|
sdata->default_multicast_key); |
|
defmgmtkey = old && |
|
old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
|
sdata->default_mgmt_key); |
|
defbeaconkey = old && |
|
old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
|
sdata->default_beacon_key); |
|
|
|
if (defunikey && !new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false); |
|
if (defmultikey && !new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true); |
|
if (defmgmtkey && !new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1); |
|
if (defbeaconkey && !new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, -1); |
|
|
|
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new); |
|
if (defunikey && new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx, |
|
true, false); |
|
if (defmultikey && new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx, |
|
false, true); |
|
if (defmgmtkey && new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, |
|
new->conf.keyidx); |
|
if (defbeaconkey && new) |
|
__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, |
|
new->conf.keyidx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (old) |
|
list_del_rcu(&old->list); |
|
|
|
return 0; |
|
} |
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_key * |
|
ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len, |
|
const u8 *key_data, |
|
size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq, |
|
const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
int i, j, err; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(idx < 0 || |
|
idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + |
|
NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS)) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
|
|
|
key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL); |
|
if (!key) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the |
|
* key to the hardware if possible. |
|
*/ |
|
key->conf.flags = 0; |
|
key->flags = 0; |
|
|
|
key->conf.cipher = cipher; |
|
key->conf.keyidx = idx; |
|
key->conf.keylen = key_len; |
|
switch (cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
|
if (seq) { |
|
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) { |
|
key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 = |
|
get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]); |
|
key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 = |
|
get_unaligned_le16(seq); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN; |
|
if (seq) { |
|
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) |
|
for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN; j++) |
|
key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] = |
|
seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
|
} |
|
/* |
|
* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
|
* it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
|
*/ |
|
key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt( |
|
key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) { |
|
err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN; |
|
for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) |
|
for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN; j++) |
|
key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] = |
|
seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
|
/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
|
* it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
|
*/ |
|
key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt( |
|
key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) { |
|
err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = 0; |
|
if (cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC) |
|
key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie); |
|
else |
|
key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16); |
|
if (seq) |
|
for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN; j++) |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] = |
|
seq[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
|
/* |
|
* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
|
* it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
|
*/ |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.tfm = |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) { |
|
err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = 0; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16); |
|
if (seq) |
|
for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN; j++) |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn[j] = |
|
seq[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
|
/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
|
* it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
|
*/ |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.tfm = |
|
ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm)) { |
|
err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm); |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; |
|
for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) |
|
for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN; j++) |
|
key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[i][j] = |
|
seq[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
|
/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
|
* it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
|
*/ |
|
key->u.gcmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data, |
|
key_len); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm)) { |
|
err = PTR_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm); |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
} |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
if (cs) { |
|
if (seq_len && seq_len != cs->pn_len) { |
|
kfree(key); |
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
|
} |
|
|
|
key->conf.iv_len = cs->hdr_len; |
|
key->conf.icv_len = cs->mic_len; |
|
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++) |
|
for (j = 0; j < seq_len; j++) |
|
key->u.gen.rx_pn[i][j] = |
|
seq[seq_len - j - 1]; |
|
key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len); |
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list); |
|
|
|
return key; |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
|
{ |
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm); |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
kfree_sensitive(key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key, |
|
bool delay_tailroom) |
|
{ |
|
if (key->local) { |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key); |
|
|
|
if (delay_tailroom) { |
|
/* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */ |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec++; |
|
schedule_delayed_work(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk, |
|
HZ/2); |
|
} else { |
|
decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_key_free_common(key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key, |
|
bool delay_tailroom) |
|
{ |
|
if (!key) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators |
|
* can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it. |
|
*/ |
|
synchronize_net(); |
|
|
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
|
{ |
|
WARN_ON(key->sdata || key->local); |
|
ieee80211_key_free_common(key); |
|
} |
|
|
|
static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
struct ieee80211_key *old, |
|
struct ieee80211_key *new) |
|
{ |
|
u8 tkip_old[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP], tkip_new[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP]; |
|
u8 *tk_old, *tk_new; |
|
|
|
if (!old || new->conf.keylen != old->conf.keylen) |
|
return false; |
|
|
|
tk_old = old->conf.key; |
|
tk_new = new->conf.key; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used |
|
* and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This |
|
* is the case in iwlwifi, for example. |
|
*/ |
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && |
|
new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP && |
|
new->conf.keylen == WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP && |
|
!(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { |
|
memcpy(tkip_old, tk_old, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP); |
|
memcpy(tkip_new, tk_new, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP); |
|
memset(tkip_old + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8); |
|
memset(tkip_new + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8); |
|
tk_old = tkip_old; |
|
tk_new = tkip_new; |
|
} |
|
|
|
return !crypto_memneq(tk_old, tk_new, new->conf.keylen); |
|
} |
|
|
|
int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
struct sta_info *sta) |
|
{ |
|
static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
|
struct ieee80211_key *old_key; |
|
int idx = key->conf.keyidx; |
|
bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; |
|
/* |
|
* We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that |
|
* case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and |
|
* can cause warnings to appear. |
|
*/ |
|
bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION; |
|
int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
|
|
if (sta && pairwise) { |
|
struct ieee80211_key *alt_key; |
|
|
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx]); |
|
alt_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]); |
|
|
|
/* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using |
|
* the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys. |
|
*/ |
|
if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) || |
|
(old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)) |
|
goto out; |
|
} else if (sta) { |
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]); |
|
} else { |
|
old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */ |
|
if (!pairwise) { |
|
if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the |
|
* new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues. |
|
*/ |
|
if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) { |
|
ieee80211_key_free_unused(key); |
|
ret = 0; |
|
goto out; |
|
} |
|
|
|
key->local = sdata->local; |
|
key->sdata = sdata; |
|
key->sta = sta; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed |
|
* key and fragment cache attacks. |
|
*/ |
|
key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color); |
|
|
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
|
|
|
ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); |
|
|
|
if (!ret) { |
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key); |
|
ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key, delay_tailroom); |
|
} else { |
|
ieee80211_key_free(key, delay_tailroom); |
|
} |
|
|
|
out: |
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
|
|
return ret; |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom) |
|
{ |
|
if (!key) |
|
return; |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used. |
|
*/ |
|
if (key->sdata) |
|
ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta, |
|
key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, |
|
key, NULL); |
|
ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; |
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
|
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) { |
|
vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; |
|
vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { |
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
|
ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta, |
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, |
|
void *data), |
|
void *iter_data) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_wiphy(hw->wiphy); |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
if (vif) { |
|
sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) |
|
iter(hw, &sdata->vif, |
|
key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, |
|
&key->conf, iter_data); |
|
} else { |
|
list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) |
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, |
|
&sdata->key_list, list) |
|
iter(hw, &sdata->vif, |
|
key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, |
|
&key->conf, iter_data); |
|
} |
|
mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys); |
|
|
|
static void |
|
_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta, |
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, |
|
void *data), |
|
void *iter_data) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { |
|
/* skip keys of station in removal process */ |
|
if (key->sta && key->sta->removed) |
|
continue; |
|
if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) |
|
continue; |
|
|
|
iter(hw, &sdata->vif, |
|
key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, |
|
&key->conf, iter_data); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
|
struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta, |
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, |
|
void *data), |
|
void *iter_data) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
|
|
|
if (vif) { |
|
sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
|
_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data); |
|
} else { |
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) |
|
_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu); |
|
|
|
static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
struct list_head *keys) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; |
|
|
|
decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata); |
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata); |
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) { |
|
ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta, |
|
key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, |
|
key, NULL); |
|
list_add_tail(&key->list, keys); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
|
bool force_synchronize) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *master; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; |
|
LIST_HEAD(keys); |
|
|
|
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk); |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
|
|
ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata, &keys); |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) |
|
ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan, &keys); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&keys) || force_synchronize) |
|
synchronize_net(); |
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &keys, list) |
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false); |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { |
|
if (sdata->bss) { |
|
master = container_of(sdata->bss, |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, |
|
u.ap); |
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt != |
|
master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt); |
|
} |
|
} else { |
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); |
|
} |
|
|
|
if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) { |
|
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) |
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || |
|
vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); |
|
} |
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local, |
|
struct sta_info *sta) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
int i; |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) { |
|
key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]); |
|
if (!key) |
|
continue; |
|
ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta, |
|
key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, |
|
key, NULL); |
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type == |
|
NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION); |
|
} |
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { |
|
key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[i]); |
|
if (!key) |
|
continue; |
|
ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta, |
|
key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, |
|
key, NULL); |
|
__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type == |
|
NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION); |
|
} |
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
|
|
|
sdata = container_of(wk, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data, |
|
dec_tailroom_needed_wk.work); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to |
|
* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted |
|
* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the |
|
* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes |
|
* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this |
|
* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on |
|
* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than |
|
* zero and no 0->1 transition happens. |
|
* |
|
* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys |
|
* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no |
|
* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case |
|
* within an ESS this usually won't happen. |
|
*/ |
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec); |
|
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0; |
|
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
|
} |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid, |
|
const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
|
|
|
trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr); |
|
|
|
cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp); |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify); |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, |
|
int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
const u8 *pn; |
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32; |
|
seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
if (tid < 0) |
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; |
|
else |
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid]; |
|
memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) |
|
return; |
|
pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn; |
|
memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) |
|
return; |
|
pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn; |
|
memcpy(seq->aes_gmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
if (tid < 0) |
|
pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; |
|
else |
|
pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid]; |
|
memcpy(seq->gcmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq); |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, |
|
int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
u8 *pn; |
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32 = seq->tkip.iv32; |
|
key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16 = seq->tkip.iv16; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
if (tid < 0) |
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; |
|
else |
|
pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid]; |
|
memcpy(pn, seq->ccmp.pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) |
|
return; |
|
pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn; |
|
memcpy(pn, seq->aes_cmac.pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) |
|
return; |
|
pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn; |
|
memcpy(pn, seq->aes_gmac.pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS)) |
|
return; |
|
if (tid < 0) |
|
pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS]; |
|
else |
|
pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid]; |
|
memcpy(pn, seq->gcmp.pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
WARN_ON(1); |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq); |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
|
|
|
assert_key_lock(key->local); |
|
|
|
/* |
|
* if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d) |
|
* it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly |
|
*/ |
|
if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { |
|
key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
|
|
|
if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | |
|
IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) |
|
increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata); |
|
} |
|
|
|
ieee80211_key_free(key, false); |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key); |
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf * |
|
ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
|
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
int err; |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!local->wowlan)) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION)) |
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
|
|
|
key = ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keyidx, |
|
keyconf->keylen, keyconf->key, |
|
0, NULL, NULL); |
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) |
|
return ERR_CAST(key); |
|
|
|
if (sdata->u.mgd.mfp != IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED) |
|
key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT; |
|
|
|
err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, NULL); |
|
if (err) |
|
return ERR_PTR(err); |
|
|
|
return &key->conf; |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add); |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_key_mic_failure(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; |
|
break; |
|
default: |
|
/* ignore the others for now, we don't keep counters now */ |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_mic_failure); |
|
|
|
void ieee80211_key_replay(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf) |
|
{ |
|
struct ieee80211_key *key; |
|
|
|
key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
|
|
|
switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: |
|
key->u.ccmp.replays++; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: |
|
key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: |
|
key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; |
|
break; |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: |
|
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: |
|
key->u.gcmp.replays++; |
|
break; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_replay);
|
|
|